LEARNING MATERIALS
COMPRESSED EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA
- A COMPREHENSIVE EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA POLITICAL DIALOGUE: GOVERNANCE, SECURITY AND MIGRATION
Africa has been categorized into 2 according to development: the fragile states mostly the Sahel with poor government, little state capacity and insurgency; and the better governed with a state-building mechanism in place characterized by adequate means of revenue generation and the overall high standard of living. This difference can be eliminated by the proper system of governance, adequate means of revenue and the increased legitimacy of the government. This issue can be properly solved by the EU-Africa partnership. This is because despite the other partnerships that the African continent can enter into (or are into), the EU-Africa is the most beneficial and sustainable according to statistics in terms of FDI, AfCFTA, ODA and humanitarian aid (which has been supplied since 2014). This proposal is to last from 2021 to 2027 with clear mutual advantages but the problems of individuality, migration and mobility which stems from the explosive population growth of some African countries while taking into consideration, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The strategy acknowledges the relationship with China but revers its action to be due to the present resources and the boost caused to the Chinese economy with no much respect for the rights and status quo of the African countries. This was further affirmed with the occurrence of the COVID 19 which though had the continent receiving health aids from China, still stirred rumours about the origin of the virus. The Parliament however does not see China as a threat rather it regards the current relationship in furtherance to form the EU-Africa partnership. An instance is the strengthening of the Center for Disease Control capacity of the AU which was formed in 2017. To effectively allow for the proposed partnership, the Parliament is tasked with the tolerance of values and ideas unlike the norm-based values and ideologies of the European Union. On one hand, the developed category claims to be a thriving and well-advanced market and on the other hand is the fragility dilemma suffered by the second category with the Sahel region as a focus.
Security
While conflicts such as the Mano River Basin and the Angola civil war have become things of the past, conflicts in DRC, Somalia and the Sahel region keeps reflecting in the books of insecurity thus the need for international assistance and intervention which the EU seeks to render. Though the EUCAP-Sahel, EUTM, MINUSMA and AFISMA have been in operation, there isn’t much positivity to be recorded. For this reason, currently, focus is now on balancing the needs of the region and the foreign policy of the union all to achieve the goal of security.
Sahel, The Eu And Regional Organisations
This is clearly seen in the G5 Sahel initiative which merely illustrates the objective of economic integration of the Union hence the danger of the consequences of such narrow security arrangement. Thus, in subsequent policies, more about the unintended consequences, the political integration and the general development of EU and Africa need be taken into consideration.
State building, governance and human rights.
‘Good governance is the effective and inclusive economic, social, education and health policies, Equal access to basic social services, equal access to fair redistribution of resources, equal access to justice and open and inclusive societies foster peace and security and act as a foundation for jobs and growth, Attracting investment’. The EU confirms that it has been attending to this issue in a wrong format hence the strategy of fiscal capacity amidst other possible long term support systems which will in turn lead to the national development in and sustainable social contract of the African countries.
Migration and mobility
This is seen as an opportunity and challenge depending on the cause-effect relationship as seen from the lens of AU and EU during the European Refugees crisis 2014-2015. Countries like Mali, Mauritania and extensively in the Sahel region will come to light on mention of the Canary Islands and the Mediterranean Routes. However, a well managed migration and mobility will have a positive impact on the country of origin, transit and destination countries through balancing security concerns and larger development agenda.
On the way to go, a more closer dialogue is to be had with AU, ECOWAS and national government to fully understand the continent’s needs and resources in order to yield an effective joint-interest.
- COMPREHENSIVE EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA DEVELOPMENT, HUMANITARIAN AID AND CLIMATE CHANGE.
This brings into focus the technology sectors as well as climate change mitigation with respect to agriculture and other related fields in Africa while working towards a government-to-government approach rather than the individual approach to facilitate the efficiency of the institutions (ACP) and financial cooperation of EU-Africa.
Sustainable Development Priorities
The strategy faults the precedence given to economic growth, thorough urbanisation, infrastructure and mechanised agriculture as they do not align with the current realities of Africa. For this reason, there is the need to prioritize the SDGs in a way in line with a bottom-up administration and operation. Thus, attention should be given to social and environmental discourse before the overall economic influence is worked upon to make for a balance and sustainable practice.
Security Development Nexus
Here, humanitarian aid should be looked upon and ideals such as cooperation on disaster risk prevention and mitigation should be upheld rather than leaving the discourse for future conversations.
Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation
The decision on this can be linked to its political effect rather than its social or environmental effect. Nonetheless, it is necessary to identify the difference sources of clean, affordable energy that will mitigate climate change in the vulnerable regions while not neglecting the gradual depletion of the entire ecosystem and emulate the practice of climate diplomacy.
Migration and Development
The current brain drain of education and health professionals is highlighted for mention in addition to a modification of the current policies on return and re-admission to a more complementary policy that will work in favour of both parties for a legal migration to achieve a general positive impact.
Institutional Compatibility and Funding
Restating the harm in going on with the AU-ACP coexistence as to being against sustainable development, a diversion and novel way is sought. Also, the AU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly is one that has the analysed result to be worthy of note in ensuring sustainability as it will mitigate the imbalance in the partnership. Moreso, similar structures such as NEPAD and AUDA need to be in operation as against the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) to bring about proper funding. Lastly, bilateral sources of funding need be acquired through the co-operation of both parties and affected bodies to mobilise domestic taxes to boost the ODA.
Policy Cohesion and Sustainable Development
PCSD ought to include coherence between social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, the inclusion of non-state actors in implementation and the vertical governance at multilateral and local level. Primarily, it should include an evidence based political and policy discussion with direct participation by stakeholders.
Relevance for post Covid 19 pandemic
This is necessary to foster future relationship between the parties and dealing with the pandemic from the health aspect alone won’t be enough to solve the issue hence the inclusion of digitalization and a more robust health infrastructure that will serve the long-term goal post COVID-19 era
Primarily, the EU strategy with Africa seeks to promote increased participation, development in social aspects, the awareness of the crucial role of the state’s preparedness for crisis, emphasis on the adaptation policies, continent-to-continent approach with respect to institutional framework, joint financing and emphasis on people-centered solutions.
- COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PROGRESS TOWARDS A NEW COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY WITH AFRICA
While this is in a way to work with Africa, 5 plans have been highlighted: green transition and energy access, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance along with migration and mobility which will be treated in 10 actions. Other ideas in motion include the political alliance of both parties, the focus on youth empowerment, the expansion of the continent, the multilateral cooperation amidst others to foster primarily the mutual partnership. Specifically with respect to trade and investment, the proposals are job creations, sustainable investment, a more coordinated approach for mobilisation of investors and a common interest as set by the World Trade Organisation. All of this is with emphasis on digital transformation.
ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AFRICA
1 EU-Africa trade relations and regional trends
Prior to Covid 19, the import and export rate of Africa and EU according to statistics was on the scale of a moderately profitable one which works well for both economies. However, during the pandemic the numbers have fallen due to the reduction in demand together with supply from both parties which in turn affected both economies negatively. As to regional trends, intra-African trade has been on the lower side of the chain. It is referred to as the lowest inter-regional trade in the world. However, there is a dynamic in the current system of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
2 Trends in Foreign Direct Investment to Africa
The COVID-19 caused a global decline in the FDI with the most affected being South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia, Egypt and Congo and the top investors being France, Netherlands, US, UK, China and Italy making member states of the EU majority on the list. However, this is dependent on the areas of investment, capitals, jobs created and projects. This decline will be solved by the strategy if operated with policies which are in tandem with the plans and actions proposed.
EU TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA
1 EU Trade Regimes Towards Africa
The EU trade policy towards Africa has been traditional divided into North African policies and Sub-Saharan Africa. When North Africa is mentioned, the rate of import and export are not on an equal balance hence the negotiation on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) within the region. Though substantial progress has been made, the negotiation has stalled due to government issues and the Western Saharan issue with Morocco over sovereignty. The Economic Partnership Agreement which has been since 2003 can also be regarded as a way in which the Union has extended help towards Africa together with other regimes of trade policy.
2 The EU and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
Currently, the EU is supporting the operation of the FTA which is an agreement of the African Union with about 44 signatories. This support is in 3 channels: the Pan-African Programme (that supports negotiations, the establishing of an African Trade Observatory and strategic dialogue on investment climate reforms, among others), the EU Aid for Trade and the EU External Investment Plan.
3 EU Initiatives For Mobilizing Investments
Due to the absence of a single framework for the mobilization of investments in Africa from the EU, the initiatives have been formed; the Africa-Europe Alliance, The External Investment Plan (EIP) and European Investment Bank-related instruments.
EUROPEAN CULTURE AND VALUES
BY
ADEBOWALE AYOBADE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WORK
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS
aayobade@unilag.edu,ng, ayobade2000@yahoo.com
Introduction
Culture is a very important emblem that people all over the world used in distinguishing themselves from others. It has been a source of discrimination and prejudice which has affected intergroup relations even in contemporary society. Africans take pride in their cultural heritage just as the Asians, Europeans, people of the Middle East and those in the Persian Gulf see their culture as superior to others. Culture creates a universe of meaning from which individual perceive the world around them. Every culture has inherent values which make the use of the universe of meaning practically possible, foster social interaction and organization of the society for peaceful co-existence and social order. Every society looks back upon its own history and has consequently derived its own set of values from it. It is believed that common set of values unites individuals, and therefore a society comes into existence. Values’ describe those beliefs or ideal mental images used to maintain social customs or habits of interest to us or introduce new ones. Much have been learned about African culture by African students but little is known to them about European culture. Therefore, this session focuses on European culture, it’s nature and formation to its present state.
Learning Objectives
The objective of this session is to provide students with a basic knowledge of European culture. Specific objective of the session includes;
- The creation of an understanding of the common features of European cultures.
- Exposure of the dividing line in European culture
- Examination of the formation of European culture.
- To provide a brief examples of European culture by country.
The Concept of Culture and Value
Culture can be described as the totality of customs, norms, values, beliefs, attitude, art, capability and standard that distinguish a group or a society from others. Culture provides social identity and to individuals and groups and give them a sense of belonging coupled with its socializing influence. Culture changes and are passed down from generation to generation. It dictates the nature of society and the pattern of behaviour therein. “We use the word ‘values’ to describe those beliefs or ideal mental images used to maintain social customs or habits of interest to us or to introduce new ones. If habits or customs becomes obsolete, the values that surrounded and sustained them will also go into extinction. Values are the fundamental elements of the culture; they define the meaning and significance for the people within a social system. (Bilbeny, 2020). “Values are the fundamental elements of the culture; they define the meaning and significance for the people within a social system (society). The rules and norms of a society are derived from its values. From this point of view, it becomes clear that values have a deep significance for the respective social system due to the fact that they significantly influence, control and regulate this social system” (European Value Info, ND).
European Cultural Divide and Commonality
Most scholarly work on culture focus more on African, Asian and the American cultures and tend to shy away from the fact that Europe also have cultures that distinguish them from and connect them to other cultures all over the world. Europe grows as divisions as the continent increased into, the practical division, in 314, of the Roman Empire into East and West, the ‘New Rome’, arose within the Empire with the second split in 768. The third division emerged form the schism between East and West in 1054. While, the fourth division was the greatest, taking place within the Western Church itself in 1517, between the Protestant North, followers of Luther, and the Catholic South (Bilbeny, 2020). Cultural values of any society are either individualistic or collectivistic in nature and the European cultural value falls within the individualistic dimension (Gobel et.al, 2018). Though there are differences in the culture of European societies, they share common features which distinguish them from the rest of the world. European cultural values emphasise the uniqueness of the self and embrace egalitarianism rather than individualistic hierarchy. And this unites Europe as one undivided cultural society. This fact is succinctly explained in the words of Gobel et.al (2018) below.
Drawing on data from the World Values Survey (WVS), the results from their two studies show that despite the existence of large differences among European cultures, they all share a distinct model of selfhood characterised by commitment to others and egalitarian values, but also by an emphasis on seeing the self as unique (i.e., different from others) and decontextualized (i.e., with an essence that does not require contextual information). They find a distinctive European value profile that is consistent with this selfhood: European cultures uniformly value
relationships that are agreeable and horizontal. They strongly endorse harmony–egalitarianism, rather than mastery–hierarchy. It is the commitment to others and the egalitarianism rather than individualism–collectivism that distinguish the European continent from other cultures in the world. (p. 860).
However, the history of European societies was characterized by conflict and violence over dominance and subjugation and great concerns over national identity rather than egalitarianism. In recent years, the issue of Brexit, Scotland and Catalonia quest for independence and the great divide between eastern and western Europe reveal the fragmented nature of European culture and the difficulty in accepting or complying with the values foisted by the European Union on European society by some countries like Poland and Hungary. Egalitarianism in practice is only superficial contrary to what European scholars believe. The difference and the problem of uniting European culture and values into a united one has a long history has revealed in the words of Bilbeny (2020).
Paradoxically, the idea of Europe grows as divisions within the continent increase, and as there is a degree of awareness of the latter. First came the practical division, in 314, of the Roman Empire into East and West. This division, which would give rise to Constantinople, the ‘New Rome’, arose for internal reasons within the Empire, something that would not be the case with the second split in 768, with Charlemagne’s Germanic Holy Roman Empire and its increasing confrontation with Islam, which was approaching from the Mediterranean and which led to a separation between the Carolingian North and the Muslim South.
The third division arose out of the schism between East and West in the Christian Church in 1054. A cause —internal this time— that would create a dividing line between the West, with its Latin rite, and the East, with its Greek one. But the fourth division, internal once again, turned out to be the greatest, taking place within the Western Church itself in 1517, between the Protestant North, followers of Luther, and the Catholic South. For many Christians, this was a blow comparable only to that suffered by the same religion back in 314, when the Roman Empire was divided, and they felt that the end of the world was upon them. In the sixteenth century, the Lutherans were regarded, despite the obvious differences, much as the jihadists are viewed (and condemned) today. A real shock to the system that just happened to coincide with the Turks’ expansion across the Mediterranean. Finally, the very last internal division in Europe, one that will surely have contributed to its self-awareness, took place in 1945 after the defeat of the Nazis, between the capitalist West and the communist East. Each division of Europe bolstered the idea that the different parts had of themselves and, indirectly, due to this very division, the idea of Europe itself. An idea that would begin forming after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 and at the end of the Eastern Empire in 1453, with the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans (para.5-7).
So, European culture and values can be divided into individualism and communitarianism. While most of the western European cultures embrace individualistic values, most eastern European cultures emphasize communitarian values. And there is a clear cultural difference in terms of the geographical divide in the European continent. According to Bilbeny (2020), there are four geo-cultural spaces in Europe: The Franco-German, the central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Slavic. The term “European values” usually includes achievements of European arts like painting, architecture, literature, music and the like. While “Basic European Values” contains only the essential and elementary values from which the fundamental of our free, modern and democratic society has evolved (Creative Commons by EuropeanValues.info).
Europeans often perceive their cultural value as universal and the European Union have made efforts at unifying its members culturally on the basis of the so called universal values. These values include; humanistic thinking, rationality, secularity, rule of law, democracy and human rights. But not all European countries adhere to these cultural values as some of them are not members of the union, challenging the acclaimed universality.
Quiz: European culture is universal. How true is this statement?
Development of European culture
Historically, the first known European culture was that of the people living in the Lower Danube Valley and Balkan Foothills prior to the emergence of the first cities and temples in the Mesopotamia and the Nile (Wilford, 2009). These people developed technology, art and long distance trade at that time. Writing further about this cultural group, Wilford (2009) said.
For 1,500 years, starting earlier than 5000 B.C., they farmed and built sizable towns, a few with as many as 2,000 dwellings. They mastered large-scale copper smelting, the new technology of the age. Their graves held an impressive array of exquisite headdresses and necklaces and, in one cemetery, the earliest major assemblage of gold artifacts to be found anywhere in the world. The striking designs of their pottery speak of the refinement of the culture’s visual language. Until recent discoveries, the most intriguing artifacts were the ubiquitous terracotta “goddess” figurines, originally interpreted as evidence of the spiritual and political power of women in society (para.2-3).
The spread of Greek ideas and culture as well as the rise of empires like the Roman empire and other empires from small communities in Europe together with Jewish and Christian influence contributed a lot to the formation of European culture and values through cultural diffusion and convergence. Series of crises among emerging European nations, the Turks’ expansion across the Mediterranean and the division of the Roman empire into Western and Eastern empires and their collapse in 476 and 1453 (due to the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans) respectively, led to the quest for the restoration of old empires giving rise to the Humanist Movement and imitation of classical Greco-Roman lifestyle (Bilbeny, 2020). The humanist ideas and values evolved into rationalism, secularism, rule of law, democracy and human rights successively, representing the main value from which other European cultural values are derived (European Value Info, ND). Despite the influx of immigrants from Muslim societies and Africa into Europe, it is very easy to distinguish the immigrant group cultures from the European culture (Gobel et.al, 2018). So, immigrants have to undergo the process of acculturation in order to enjoy inclusiveness in the society.
Quiz: European culture developed from chaos. Do you agree/?
Examples of Cultures in Europe
The analysis of European culture above shows that there are diverse cultural heritages among European societies despite the common cultural features that unify them. Here, we shall look at specific European societies and their cultural elements.
British Culture
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is made up of four countries including England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The British culture is built around the royalty with the four countries committed to the same monarch and government despite having their different legislative houses. They use the same currency and share similar laws and policies and subject to the same royal family (Evason, 2021).
The constituent countries of the UK Speak English as a common language but have differences in accents or dialects due to differences in native language. The native languages include: Welsh spoken in Wales, Gaelic and Scots spoken in Scotland, Irish and Ulster Scots in Northern Ireland and Cornish in Cornwall, England. Scottish is a Celtic language spoken in Northern part of Scotland while the Cornish language is spoken by a small group of people in England. While there are other minor languages, the UK has over 50 accents which are different from the Queen’s English (Great British Mag, 2022).
The British value punctuality as they often frown at late coming for either official or unofficial events. British do not condone jumping queue, they see standing patiently on the queue as a normal thing and would challenge any person who jump or try to jump the queue. It is part of the British culture to apologize to people for any inconveniences and keep a little distance when conversing with one another as closeness to them may mean aggression. British are used to shaking hands when greeting but for close relatives they do not just shake, they give a kiss on the cheek especially when one of those greeting is a female. It is customary to bring gifts like chocolate, flower or wine to the a family or home when invited by them as an appreciation for the invitation. Also, they often respect the elderly and the disabled. For instance, individual is expected to leave his seat in public transport by standing up for the elderly and disabled.
Art work is a very important part of British culture and history as they help to showcase old traditional heritage of Britain. One of such is the Stonehenge which as built around 2600 B.C. Closely related to British art is the architectural prowess of the British people which usually show specific traits characteristic of different periods in history.. The British are tea loving people and have a sense of humour and sarcasm in their interaction with one another and used to making fun of politicians in the public. In addition, the class system is an integral part of British culture though the working class is believed to have faded away, there is stark difference between the middle class and the upper class (Evason, 2021).
The German Culture
Germany is the second largest country in Europe after Russia and wield great influence politically and economically in Europe. While German is the official language of the people, other languages include “Serbian in eastern Germany; North and West Frisian, spoken around the Rhine estuary; and Danish, primarily spoken in the area along the Danish border. Romani, which is an indigenous language, Turkish and Kurdish” (Zimmermann, 2018). Advameg (2022) gives more information about the German language in the following words.
The major German dialect groups are High and Low German, the language varieties of the southern highlands and the northern lowlands. Low German dialects, in many ways similar to Dutch, were spoken around the mouth of the Rhine and on the northern coast but are now less widespread. High German dialects may be divided into Middle and Upper categories, which, again, correspond to geographical regions (para.11)
The Germans are very rich in art and music that they have contributed a lot to classical music that wield influence even up till today. Talking the German art, Zimmermann (2018) said,
With their penchant for precision and engineering, it is not surprising that Germans have a strong tradition of printmaking by woodcut and engraving. There is also a strong representation of all phases of architecture — including Romanesque, Gothic, Classicist, Baroque, Rococo and Renaissance — represented in cathedrals, castles and public buildings. One well-known example of classic German art is the Brandenburg Gate, a former city gate that is now used to symbolize Berlin’s unity (para.14).
Germans place high value on control, privacy and community as well as punctuality as they traditionally cherish an organized way of doing things. In the community, Germans are used to helping one another care for their garden and often work together to protect and maintain the environment. Germans maintain a small family size and take family life very serious and at the same time protect their privacy. Germany is the home of beer in the orld as most of world best beer are brewed there. Beer is an integral part of the German culture, it’s their favourite beverage and certain festivals like the Oktoberfest (literally, “October celebration”) are dedicated to it.
Spanish Culture
The Spanish culture has a great influence on Latin American countries. Majority of the Spanish people speak Spanish or Castellano while there are other languages like Basque, Catalan, Valencian and Galician spoken by some groups in the poplation (Godoy, 2021). Greeting is a very important aspect of Spanish culture and simple handshake is normally used wwhen greeting someone one is not familiar with. When familiarity becomes stronger, greetings come with a hug or a double kiss on the cheek.
The Spanish have a series of festivals and celebrations which are elaborately carried out as prominent in their tradition. Some of these festivals are identified by Godoy (2021) below.
Semana Santa (Holy Week) is one of the largest celebrations. It’s known for having processions that commemorate the Passion of Christ.
El Día de Reyes Magos (Day of the Three Kings) is widely celebrated across the country and is a favorite holiday for children. They receive gifts and there’s colorful parades in the cities where they celebrate their long awaited arrival.
Spanish “fiestas” (festivals) are large celebrations and carnivals devoted to a specific Saint or City. These fiestas have traditional foods, fireworks, dancing, handmade decorations, parades, concerts, and theater.
Other traditions like the running of the bulls of San Fermín in Pamplona, and the tomato fights of la Tomatina are experiences that draw millions of people and tourists to celebrate Spanish culture.
Spanish traditional clothing patterns are often showcased in Torero (bull-fighting), Flamenco dancer and festivals. Godoy (2021) also identified some of the traditional wears below.
- El traje corto (short suit): short jackets, combined with a white shirt, and high-waisted trousers. It’s usually worn by men with a Spanish sombrero (hat).
- La mantilla (veil): a long lace or silk veil that covers women’s head and shoulders. It was once a requirement to wear it before entering a church.
- La peineta (comb):a tortoise-shell comb worn by women to secure the mantilla in their hair.
Moreover, music is a very important aspect of Spanish culture and it varies based on the regions. The Flamenco dance represent the image of Spain and it is often greeted by a mix of traditional music. Other Spanish dances include: Sardana from Catalona, Muineira from Galicia, Fandango, Zambra from Andalusia, Jota from Valencia, and Sevillna from Sevilla (Godoy, 2021; La Moncloa, nd). Also, Spanish people believe in superstition. They believe having a hat on your bed connote something evil and that bringing old broom to a new house would bring bad-luck. So, when moving to a new house or apartment, they get new brooms.
End of Session Assignment
- Colonial master from Europe claimed that African culture is primitive and inferior to that of Europe. Succinctly explain your stand on this claim?
- The universality of European culture is the bases for globalization and global culture. Explain this view?
Policy Paper
Acculturation of African Immigrant into European Culture and the Effects on African Culture
COURSE MODULE FOR
EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTION AND GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
By
Efem N. Ubi, PhD.
Associate Professor and Director of Research and Studies
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Lagos, Nigeria
Introduction
The European Union is run by its institutions and an understanding of this institutional structure is essential to understanding the European Union. This module therefore focuses on the European Union institutions and Governance Mechanism. Importance will be given to the key roles each EU institutions play within the EU structure and the relationships between them. The module will start by introducing what the European Union is all about, this will be followed by examining and studying the four central institutions as well as other institutions of the EU. The focus will be first, on their functions and roles within the European Union – i.e., what they do and how they relate to each other. And second, it aims to introduce participants to the essential foundations of EU governance, analyzing the ways in which decisions and rules in the EU are made in various institutional arrangements. The format of the module will combine discussions among participants with interactive lectures.
Objectives of the Course
The main objectives of the program are for participant to gain access to specific knowledge, useful and relevant information and networks that helps understanding how the European Union as an entity works through extant institutions and relevant governance mechanisms. The program will also give participants the necessary technical knowledge in contributing to the overall European-African political, economic and socio-cultural relations and how these relations can contribute to the overall Africa-EU economic growth and development. At the end of the course, participants will:
- Have an unprecedented world view and demonstrable understanding of the European Union
- Demonstrate in-depth knowledge and understanding European Union governance structure and how they function.
- Be able to Identify, differentiate and analyze the main institutions of the European Union and how they relate and complement each other.
- Apply theoretical knowledge acquired during the Summer School in their different field of endeavor, professional capacities, and even formulations of policies now and in the future.
In light of the above, the module will take the following structure/breakdown as shown below for lucid understanding of how the EU institutions work and what lessons Africa can learn from
European institutions to build its own integration process.
- Introduction to the European Union?
- The four Central Institutions of the European Institutions
- Other Institutions of EU
At the end of each lesson, Participants will be divided into groups and will be given assignment to do. This is in other to examine their knowledge of the module.
Brief Introduction to European Union
In the beginning, only 6 countries in Europe; Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands started working together. Later more and more countries in Europe joined them and the European Union was created. Today, the European Union (EU) comprises 27 European countries, governing common economic, social, and security policies. The countries that made up the EU are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
The EU was created by the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on November 1, 1993. The treaty was designed to enhance European political and economic integration by creating a single currency (the euro), a unified foreign and security policy, and common citizenship rights and to further advanced cooperation in the areas of immigration, asylum, and judicial affairs (Gabel 2022).
Types of institutions and bodies
The European Union’s institutional set-up is unique and its decision-making system is constantly evolving. There are 7 European institutions, 7 European Union bodies and over 30 decentralized agencies which are spread across the EU. These institutions work together to address the common interests of the EU and European people. There are 4 main decision-making institutions which lead the EU’s administration. These institutions collectively provide the EU with policy direction and play different roles in the law-making process:
- The European Parliament (Brussels/Strasbourg/Luxembourg)
- The European Council (Brussels)
- The Council of the European Union (Brussels/Luxembourg)
- The European Commission (Brussels/Luxembourg/Representations across the EU)
The work of the above 4 main EU institutions, which covers the legislative and executive tasks of the EU, is complemented by the work of another 3 EU institutions as listed below. These 3 institutions are responsible for managing the judicial, financial and external audit aspects of the European Union. We shall examine them briefly for lucidness.
- the Court of Justice of the European Union (Luxembourg)
- the European Central Bank (Frankfurt)
- the European Court of Auditors (Luxembourg)
1. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The European Parliament represents the citizens of EU countries and is directly elected by them. The European Parliament is the legislative assembly of the European Union (EU). It was inaugurated in 1958 as the Common Assembly, which was later renamed the European Parliament in 1962.
It takes decisions on European laws jointly with the Council of the European Union. It also approves the EU budget. It runs a network of liaison offices in EU capitals, London, Edinburgh and Washington D.C. The size of members’ delegations varies depending on population of the country. The European Parliament is made up of 705 Members, who are directly elected. It is important to note here that, the MEPs are not organized by nationality, but by political affiliation. In other words, they are organized into transnational party groups based on political ideology – of the following groupings below:
- Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats),
- Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament,
- Renew Europe Group, Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance,
- Identity and Democracy Group,
- European Conservatives and Reformists Group,
- The Left group in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL
ASSIGNMENT
Participants will be divided into six groups and each group will write briefly on each political group of the European Parliament
- The European Council is one of the EU’s 7 official institutions and is located in Brussels (Belgium) and was established in 1974 at the time it was an informal forum. However, it was formalized in 1992 and became an official EU institution in 2009. The European Council brings together EU leaders to set the EU’s political agenda and defines the EU’s overall political direction and priorities, traditionally by adopting conclusions. For instance, at its meeting in Brussels on 20 June 2019, the European Council agreed on an agenda for the EU for the next five years. ‘A new strategic agenda 2019-2024’ sets out the priority areas that will steer the work of the European Council and provide guidance for the work programmes of other EU institutions. The strategic agenda focuses on four main priorities:
- Protecting citizens and freedoms
- Developing a strong and vibrant economic base
- Building a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe
- Promoting European interests and values on the global stage.
How the European Council works
In line with the EU treaty, EU leaders meet at least four times a year (usually quarterly), usually in March, June, October and December. These meetings, often referred to as ‘EU summits’, are held in Brussels, in the Europa building. They usually take place over two days, on a Thursday and a Friday. Only the heads of state/government can vote during the meetings. The meetings are chaired by the President of the European Council. The President can also convene special European Council meetings or informal meetings as necessary.
The European Council does not negotiate or adopt EU laws. It only sets the EU’s policy agenda and usually adopts ‘conclusions’ during European Council meetings which identify issues of concern and actions to take. And issues are decided by consensus – but by unanimity or qualified majority in some cases.
Decision-making process of the EU Council
The European Council usually decides by consensus (i.e., no member opposes the adoption). This is also the decision-making modality the European Council uses to adopt conclusions. However, in certain specific cases provided for in the EU treaties (such as for the adoption of legal acts), the European Council decides by vote. A vote on a given agenda item may be initiated by the president. It may also take place on the initiative of any other member, provided that a majority of members are in favor. There are three voting modalities:
- Unanimity
- Qualified majority
- Simple majority
Unanimity is required, for example, when the European Council takes a decision regarding the number of members of the European Commission. When the European Council acts by unanimity, abstentions do not prevent the adoption.
Qualified majority is used by the European Council, for example, when establishing the list of Council configurations, or when proposing to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission.
Simple majority is employed when the EU adopt procedural decisions by virtue of its rules of procedure.
Note:
- EU Council Members are made up of the Heads of state or government of EU countries, European Council President, European Commission President.
- The European Council is chaired by a president who is elected for a 2.5-year term, renewable once.
- The EU Council usually meets 4 times a year – but the President can convene additional meetings to address urgent issues.
- It does not adopt laws except for possible EU Treaty amendments.
- In fact, it represents the highest level of political cooperation between EU countries.
What does the European Council do?
According to the EU website, the European Council
- Decides on the EU’s overall direction and political priorities – but does not pass laws
- Deals with complex or sensitive issues that cannot be resolved at lower levels of intergovernmental cooperation
- Sets the EU’s common foreign & security policy, taking into account EU strategic interests and defense implications
- Nominates and appoints candidates to certain high profile EU level roles, such as the ECB and the Commission.
On each issue, the European Council can:
- Ask the European Commission to make a proposal to address it
- Pass it on to the Council of the EU to deal with.
- The Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union (originally the Council of Ministers), is the main decision-making institution of the EU. The Council of the European Union represents the governments of EU countries. The Council of the EU is where national ministers from each government meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies. Ministers meet in different configurations depending on the topic to be discussed. The Council of the EU takes decisions on European laws jointly with the European Parliament (European Union, 2022).
The composition of the council changes frequently, as governments send different representatives depending on the policy area under discussion. All community legislation
requires the approval of the council. The president of the council, whose office rotates among council members every six months, manages the legislative agenda. Council meetings are chaired by a minister from the country that currently holds the presidency. The exception to this rule is the Foreign Affairs Council, which, since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, is under the permanent supervision of the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy.
- The European Commission
The European Commission represents the common interests of the EU and is the EU’s main executive body. The EC has legislative functions, such as proposing new laws which are scrutinized and adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. It also has a judicial function, such as finding legal solutions to business and trade issues between countries within the EU. The EC further manages EU policies (except for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is conducted by the High Representative for CFSP, Vice-President of the European Commission), and the EU’s budget and ensures that countries apply EU law correctly. This is done by the EC representation offices which act as the Commission’s voice across the EU. They monitor and analyze public opinion in their host country, provide information about EU policies and the way the EU works, and facilitate the Commission’s cooperation with the host member country.
The EC is composed of members called commissioners, who are citizens of and are nominated by the respective governments of each member state. However, the EC is charged with representing the EU or community interest, not the interests of the member states, and the commissioners are called to act independently in that interest. They are expressly forbidden to take instructions from their member state. Because of its responsibility to represent the
European interest and enforce the treaties and legislation that provide the legal foundation for the EU and communities, the EC is known as the guardian of the treaties.
Note: in nutshell, the EC’s primary tasks, include:
- Administration and implementation of EU and community policies and legislation, including formulation and spending of the budget
- Initiation and drafting of community legislation
- Enforcement of EU and community law
- Representation of the EU and the communities at the international level, including negotiation of international treaties.
OTHERS (COMPLIMENTARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE EU
- The Court of Justice of the European Union
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), also called European Court of Justice (ECJ), with its headquarters are in Luxembourg, is the judicial branch of the European Union (EU). Its basic mission is to ensure the observance and uniform application and interpretation of EU law within EU member states and institutions.
The CJEU originated in the individual courts of justice established in the 1950s for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). The Court ensures that EU law is followed, and that the Treaties are correctly interpreted and applied: it reviews the legality of the acts of the EU institutions, ensures that EU countries comply with their obligations under the Treaties, and interprets EU law at the request of national courts. It further interprets
community law, settles conflicts between the organization’s institutions, and determines whether members have fulfilled their treaty obligations.
Each member State selects one judge, who serves a renewable six-year term; to increase efficiency, after the accession of 10 additional countries in 2004 the ECJ was allowed to sit in a “grand chamber” of only 13 judges. Eight impartial advocates-general assist the ECJ by presenting opinions on cases before the court. In 1989 an additional court, the Court of First Instance, was established to assist with the community’s increasing caseload.
The ECJ has established two important legal doctrines. The first is that, European law has “direct effect,” which means that treaty provisions and legislation are directly binding on individual citizens, regardless of whether their governments have modified national laws accordingly. And the second is that, community law has “supremacy” over national law in cases where the two conflict.
2. The European Central Bank (ECB)
The ECB and the European System of Central Banks conducts monetary policy by controlling the supply of euros in the region and are responsible for keeping prices stable in the euro area. For example, if the euro zone begins to experience price increases—owing, for example, to an unexpected increase in demand or a sudden reduction in supply—the ECB responds by pulling euros from the market to relieve the pressure on the prices. Conversely, if the euro-zone economies experience a recession—an economic downturn associated with declining output and economic activity—the ECB steps in by pumping more euros into the market in order to fuel economic activity and revert the effects of the recession.
The ECB and the European System of Central Banks are also responsible for the monetary and exchange rate policy in the Eurozone and support EU economic policies. The ECB and the national central banks of EU member countries make up what is known as the Eurosystem. The ECB is responsible for the supervision of lending institutions in the Eurosystem and in participating non-euro-area member states. The ECB is overseen by a governing council consisting of six executive board members, with one serving as the president, and the 19 governors of the national central banks of the euro-zone countries. Executive board members are appointed by the European Council.
The ECB is the only institution that can authorize the printing of euro banknotes. Unlike the Federal Reserve—which, as the central banking authority of the United States, uses the buying and selling of U.S. government bonds to influence the money supply—the ECB influences the supply of euros in the market by directly controlling the amount of euros available to eligible member banks.
3. The European Court of Auditors
The ECA contributes to improving EU financial management, and promoting accountability and transparency, and acts as the independent guardian of the financial interests of EU citizens. It checks that EU funds are correctly accounted for, that they are raised and spent in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations, and that they deliver value for money.
How the EU and its governance mechanism work diagrammatically.
ASSIGNMENT:
The Participants will be divided into seven groups. And each group will wite briefly on the Structure and function of each European Institutions.
Course Module for Economic Integration Concept, Types, Benefits and Cost
Course: Economic Integration Concept, Types, Benefits and Cost
Contents Page
Introduction 2
Course Objectives 2
Course Materials 2
Study Units 3
Working through the Course 4
Assessments 4
Textbooks and References 5
Introduction and Course Description
This course offers an introductory discourse on the concept of economic integration, its types, benefits and cost. Also, comparative perspective on the place of regional integration, as well as its role within the global economic order are dissected. More so, the case studies are focused majorly on European and African regional institutions, with little coverage and highlights on Asian Regional Integrations. This course is developed on three main topics: (1) origins and concepts of economic integrations, especially in the context of the competing ideas of universalism and regionalism in the post-World War II period; (2) comparative assessment of variations in the design and performance of regional economic integration institutions; (3) the future of economic integration in the post-American era, particularly the place of regional integration in the ongoing global power shift.
Courses Objectives
Economic Integration is an important course in the EU-African Connect Summer school. It is designed to explore primarily economic integration processes in Africa and European regions. The main objective of this course is to simplify and aid comprehension of the concepts, types, benefits and costs of economic integration; as well as they evolved after the WW II. Importantly, through the course, an insight is provided describing the trajectory through which different regional integration institutions have been employed to promote growth and development via resource flows and intra-regional trade. The objectives and outlines are specified at the beginning of the summer class, and are employed as measures to evaluate degree of progress in the course. At the end of each module, the objectives are also utilized in evaluating if the progress made are in tandem with the stated objectives of the module. The entire modules are sufficient to completely achieve our stipulated course objectives.
The Course materials comprises major components including:
(i) Course Guide
(ii) Study Units
(iii) Textbooks
(iv) Assignments
Study Units
There are 10 study units in this course: They include:
Module 1: Economic Integration
Unit 1 Introduction, Definitions and Concepts
Unit 2 Theories of Economic Integration
Unit 3 Benefits and Costs of Economic Integration
Module 2: Regional Integration in Europe
Unit 4 The European Union
Unit 5 Competence and responsibilities of the European Union
Module 3: Regional Economic Integration in Africa
Unit 6 The Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)
Unit 7 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
Unit 8 The Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS)
Module 4 Challenges and Successes
Unit 9 The EU Successes and Challenges
Unit 10 Successes and Challenges of Regional Economic Integration in Africa
Working through the Course
Owing from the above, the course commences with basic introduction to the nature of economic integrations and progresses subsequently into comprehensive analysis of the various regional integrative systems in Europe after the WW II. Also, the evolution of regional economic integration in Africa since the early 90’s is x-rayed. The course also examined the successes and challenges of these unions, drawing comparative analysis. The course module expressly contains study objectives, course contents and reading materials. In addition, there would be self-assessment exercise and Tutor-Marked Assignments at the end of every lecture week to assess the progress of students and delivery efficiency of facilitators. All these are intended at assisting in achieving the aims and objectives of the program.
Students’ Assessments
The assessment for this course during the summer school are in the form of weekly assessments and examination at the end of the course. Also, students would be assessed both from class discussions, individual and group assignments. The scores would be distributed as follows:
Assignments: 20 percent
Tests: 20 percent
Examination: 60 percent
List of Reading Materials and Textbooks
Adeniran, T. (1983). Introduction to International Relations Ibadan: Macmillan Nig. Ltd.
Asante, S. B. (1989). The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A decade of ECOWAS. Boulder: West view Press.
Balassa, B. (1961). The Theory of Economic Integration Homewood III: Irwin.
Bellassa, B. (1964). Theory of Economic Integration Homewood Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc.
Breslin, S. Hughes, C. Philips, N. & Rosamond, B. (2001) Regionalism in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases. London: Routledge.
Burley, A. M. & Mattli, W. (1993) ―Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration‖ International Organization Number 47, Volume 1.
Cameron, D. (1992). ―The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences. In Sbragia, A. (Ed.) Euro-Politics Institutions and Policy making in the ‘New’ European Community Washington: The Brookings Institute.
Camilleri, J. (2003). Regionalism in the new Asia-Pacific Order Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Coleman, W. D. & Underhill, G.R. (1998) Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and the Americas. London: Routledge.
Davidson, B. (1966) A History of West Africa Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor books.
De Grauwe, P. (1992). The Economics of Monetary Integration New York: Oxford University Press.
De Melo, J. & Panagariya, A. (Eds) (1993) New Dimensions in Regional Integration Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge.
Deutsch, K. W. et. al (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Deutsch, K.W. (1957) et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area Princeton: University Press. Princeton
Dike, K. O. (1965) Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta Oxford: Oxford University Press.
El-Agraa, A. M. (1989) The Theory and Measurement of International Economic Integration New York: St. Martins.
Eze, O. & Sesay, A. (2010) Africa and Europe in the Twenty First Century. Lagos: NIIA.
Fage, J. D, (1969). A History of West Africa Cambridge: University of London Press.
Farrell, M. & Hettne, B. (2005) Global Politics of Regionalism London: Pluto Press.
Francois, C.A. & Subramaniam A. (1998) ―Beyond Trade: Regional Arrangements as a Window on Globalization‖. In Igbal, Z. and Khan, M. S. (Eds) Trade Reform and Regional Integration in Africa IMF Washington DC IMF
Frankel, J. (1973) Contemporary International Theory and the Behavior of States London: Oxford University Press.
Giovannini, Aberto (1990). The Transition to European Monetary Union Rome: Bank of Italy.
Gould, J. & Kolb, W. L. (1964) A Dictionary of the Social Sciences New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.
Haas, E. B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political Social and Economic Forces. Stanford Califonia: University Press.
Hall, P. A. (1989). The Political Power of Economic ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hargreave, J. D. (1969) (Ed.) France and West Africa New York: St. Martins Press.
Hazelwood, A. (1967). ―Problems of Integration among African State‖ in Hazelwood, A. (Ed.) Africa Integration and Disintegration London: Oxford University Press.
Hazlewood, A. (1975). Economic Integration: The East African Experience. London: Heinemann.
Ingram, J. (1973). ―The Case for European Monetary Integration‖ Essays in International Finance No 98 Princetons New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kisanya, E. J. (1984). ―Regional Cooperation: Challenge for the Continent Africa now‖. Africa Now
Lindberg, L. (1963) The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration Stanford Calif: Stanford University Press.
Machlup, F. (1976) ―A History of Thought on Economic Integration‖ In Fritz Machlup (Ed.) Economic Integration: World Wide, Regional and Sectoral. London: Macmillan Press.
Mambara, J. L. (2007), Assessment of Benefits of Regional Integration in SADC and COMESA-A Gender Analysis, Harare: Trade and Development Studies Centre.
Mytelka, L. K. (1979). Regional Development in a Global Economy Yale: Yale University Press.
Nyongo, P. A. (1993) (Ed.) ―Regional Integration, Security and Development in Africa‖ In Obasanjo O, and Mosha, F. G. (Eds) Africa Rise to Challenge Ota: Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) Publications.
Ogunkoya, E. O. (1993) ―An Empirical Evaluation of Trade Potential in Tanzania, Memeo Nairobi: AERC.
Ojo, O. (1980). ―Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS International Organization, 344 (Auturm) Onwuka, R.I. & Sessay, A. (1985) (Eds) The Future of Regionalism in Africa London: Macmillan Press.
Richard, H. (1975) (Ed.) The Political Economy of Africa Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Publishing Co.
Robson, P. (1983). Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa. London:
Allen and Unwin. Rosamond, B. (2000). Theories of European Integration Palgrave: Macmillan Press. Sbragia, A. (Ed.) Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policy making in the ‘New’ European Community. Washington: The Brookings Institute.
Scitovsky, T. (1958) Economic Theory and Western European Integration London:
Allen and Urwin Seligson, M. A. ―The Dual Gap: An Overview of Theory and Research. In Seligson, M. A. and Passe-Smith, J. T. (Eds.) Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Global Inequality. London: Boulder.
Sesay, A., Olayode, O. & Omotosho, M. (2008) ―Africa and South-South Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges‖. In Dargin, J. (Ed.) South-South Cooperation in the Global System Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. (1992) Structuring Politics Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Sullivan, D. & Radebaugh, L. (2003) International business: Environments and Operations‖. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Tokuta, R. A. (1984). ―ECOWAS Treaty and the East African Common Market Compared. In Akinyemi, A. B. et al. (Eds) Reading and Documents in ECOWAS
Viner, J. (1950) The Custom Union Issue New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Wallerstein, E, (1961). Africa: The Politics of Independence. New York: Vintage Books.
Weigall, D. & Stirk, P. (1992) (Eds) The Origins and Development of the European Community Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (2004) European Integration Theory Oxford: Oxford University Press
Wright, S. & Okolo, J. E. (Eds.) West Africa: Regional Cooperation and Development. Boulder: West view.
UNIT 1 INTRODUCTION DEFINITION AND THEORIES
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Definition of Regional Integration
3.2 Deep Integration Recognition
3.3 Theories of Integration
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This is the first among the four units that constitute the module. As an introduction the unit defines regional integration and goes ahead to examine its formation through supranational institutional structures and via intergovernmental decision making or a combination of both. Discussions in this unit take a broad overview of the conceptual and theoretical clarifications of and also form the foundations upon whish specific issues are built.
2.0. Objectives
At the end of this unit you should be able to: a. Define Regional Integration in your own words or adapt various definitions drawn from various authors. b. Discuss at least five important functions that a good regional integration initiative must fulfill c. Explain the theoretical foundations of conventional approaches to regional integration which dates back to three important schools of economic thought in the 1960s: Neoclassical economics, Marxism and development economics.
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Definition/Description
Regional integration is a process in which neighbouring states enter into an agreement in order to upgrade cooperation through common institutions and rules. The objectives of the agreement could range from economic to political to environmental, although it has typically taken the form of a political economy initiative where commercial interests are the focus for achieving broader socio-political and security objectives, as defined by national governments. Regional integration has been organized either via supranational institutional structures or through intergovernmental decision-making, or a combination of both. Past efforts at regional integration have often focused on removing barriers to free trade in the region, increasing the free movement of people, labour, goods, and capital across national borders, reducing the possibility of regional armed conflict (for example, through Confidence and Security-Building Measures), and adopting cohesive regional stances on policy issues, such as the environment, climate change and migration.
Intra-regional trade refers to trade which focuses on economic exchange primarily between countries of the same region or economic zone. In recent years countries within economic-trade regimes such as ASEAN in Southeast Asia for example have increased the level of trade and commodity exchange between themselves which reduces the inflation and tariff barriers associated with foreign markets resulting in growing prosperity Regional integration has been defined as the process through which national states voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts among themselves. De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove describe it as a worldwide phenomenon of territorial systems that increases the interactions between their components and creates new forms of organization, co-existing with traditional forms of state-led organisation at the national level. Some scholars see regional integration simply as the process by which states within a particular region increase their level of interaction with regard to economic, security, political, or social and cultural issues.[3] In short, regional integration is the joining of individual states within a region into a larger whole. The degree of integration depends upon the willingness and commitment of independent sovereign states to share their sovereignty. Deep integration that focuses on regulating the business environment in a more general sense is faced with many difficulties. Regional integration initiatives, according to Van Langenhove, should fulfil at least eight important functions:
the strengthening of trade integration in the region the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector development the development of infrastructure programmes in support of economic growth and regional integration the development of strong public sector institutions and good governance; the reduction of social exclusion and the development of an inclusive civil society contribution to peace and security in the region the building of environment programmes at the regional level the strengthening of the region‘s interaction with other regions of the world.
The crisis of the post-war order led to the emergence of a new global political structure. This new global political structure made obsolete the classical Westphalian concept of a system of sovereign states to conceptualise world politics. The concept of sovereignty became looser and the old legal definitions of the ultimate and fully autonomous power of a nation-state are no longer meaningful. Sovereignty, which gained meaning as an affirmation of cultural identity, has lost meaning as power over the economy. All regional integration projects during the Cold War were built on the Westphalia state system and were designed to serve economic growth as well as security motives in their assistance to state building goals. Regional integration and globalisation are two phenomena that have challenged the pre-existing global order based upon sovereign states since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The two processes deeply affect the stability of the Westphalia state system, thus contributing to both disorder and a new global order.
Closer integration of neighbouring economies has often been seen by governments as a first step in creating a larger regional market for trade and investment. This is claimed to spur greater efficiency, productivity gain and competitiveness, not just by lowering border barriers, but by reducing other costs and risks of trade and investment. Bilateral and sub-regional trading arrangements have been advocated by governments as economic development tools, as they been designed to promote economic deregulation. Such agreements have also aimed to reduce the risk of reversion towards protectionism, locking in reforms already made and encouraging further structural adjustment.
Some claim the desire for closer integration is usually related to a larger desire for opening nation states to the outside world, or that regional economic cooperation is pursued as a means of promoting development through greater efficiency, rather than as a means of disadvantaging others. It is also claimed that the members of these arrangements hope that they will succeed as building blocks for progress with a growing range of partners and towards a generally freer and open global environment for trade and investment and that integration is not an end in itself, but a process to support economic growth strategies, greater social equality and democratisation. However, regional integration strategies as pursued by economic and national interests, particularly in the last 30 years, have also been highly contested across civil society. There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the strategies of economic deregulation or increased investor protection implemented as forms of regional integration have succeeded in contributing to “progress” in sustainable economic growth, as the number of economic crises around the world have increased in frequency and intensity over the past decades. Also, there is increasing evidence that the forms of regional integration employed by nation states have actually worsened social inequality and diminished democratic accountability. As a result of the persisting contradiction between the old promises of regional integration and real-world experience, the demand from across global civil society for alternative forms of regional integration has grown.
Regional integration arrangements are a part and parcel of the present global economic order and this trend is now an acknowledged future of the international scene. It has achieved a new meaning and new significance. Regional integration arrangements are mainly the outcome of necessity felt by nation-states to integrate their economies in order to achieve rapid economic development, decrease conflict, and build mutual trusts between the integrated units. The nation-state system, which has been the predominant pattern of international relations since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is evolving towards a system in which regional groupings of states is becoming increasingly important vis-a-vis sovereign states. Some have argued that the idea of the state and its sovereignty has been made irrelevant by processes that are taking place at both the global and local level. Walter Lippmann believes that, “the true constituent members of the international order of the future are communities of states.” E.H. Carr shares Lippmann view about the rise of regionalism and regional arrangements and commented that, “the concept of sovereignty is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at present.”
Regional Integration Agreements Regional integration agreements (RIAs) have led to major developments in international relations between and among many countries specifically increases in international trade and investment and in the formation of regional trading blocs. As fundamental to the multi-faceted process of globalization, regional integration has been a major development in the international relations of recent years. As such, Regional Integration Agreements has gained high importance. Not only are almost all the industrial nations part of such agreements, but also a huge number of developing nations too are a part of at least one, and in cases, more than one such agreement. The amount of trade that takes place within the scope of such agreements is about 35%, which accounts to more than one-third of the trade in the world. The main objective of these agreements is to reduce trade barriers among those nations concerned, but the structure may vary from one agreement to another. The removal of the trade barriers or liberalization of many economies has had multiple impacts, in some cases increasing Gross domestic product (GDP), but also resulting in greater global inequality, concentration of wealth and an increasing frequency and intensity of economic crises.
The number of agreements agreed under the rules of the GATT and the WTO and signed in each year has dramatically increased since the 1990s. There were 194 agreements ratified in 1999 and it contained 94 agreements form the early 1990s. The last few years have experienced huge qualitative as well as quantitative changes in the agreements related to the Regional Integration Scheme. The top three major changes were:
- Deep Integration Recognition
- Closed regionalism to open model
- Advent of trade blocs
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
What is regional Integration?
3.2 Deep Integration Recognition
Deep Integration Recognition analyses the aspect that effective integration is a much broader aspect, surpassing the idea that reducing tariffs, quotas and barriers will provide effective solutions. Rather, it recognizes the concept that additional barriers tend to segment the markets. This in turn impedes the free flow of goods and services, along with ideas and investments. Hence, it is now recognized that the current framework of traditional trade policies are not adequate enough to tackle these barriers. Such deep-integration was first implemented in the Single Market Program in the European Union. However, in the light of the modern context, this debate is being propounded into the clauses of different regional integration agreements arising out of increase in international trade.
3.3 Closed regionalism to Open Model
The change from a system of Closed regionalism to a more Open Model had arisen out of the fact that the section of trading blocs that were created among the developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s were based on certain specific models such as those of import substitution as well as regional agreements coupled with the prevalence generally high external trade barriers. The positive aspects of such shifting is that there has been some restructuring of certain old agreements. These agreements tend to be more forward in their outward approach as well as show commitment in trying to advance international trade and commerce instead to trying to put a cap on it by way of strict control.
3.4 Advent of Trade Blocs
The Advent of Trade Blocs tend to draw in some parity between high-income industrial countries and developing countries with a much lower income base in that they tend to serve as equal partners under such a system. The concept of equal partners grew out of the concept of providing reinforcement to the economies to all the member countries. Under this section the various countries agree upon the fact that they will help economies to maintain the balance of trade between and prohibit the entry of other countries in their trade process.
An important example of this would be the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), formed in 1994 when the Canada – U. S. Free Trade Agreement was extended to Mexico. Another vibrant example would entail as to how EU has formed linkages incorporating the transition economies of Eastern Europe through the Europe Agreements. It has signed agreements with the majority of Mediterranean countries by highly developing the EU-Turkey customs union and a Mediterranean policy.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
Differentiate between a Closed model and an Open model of regionalism
3.3 Theories of Integration
The theoretical foundations of conventional approaches to regional integration date back to three important schools of economic thought in the 1960s: Neoclassical economics, Marxism and development economics. The earliest theoretical work on regional integration emanated from the theory of comparative advantage in international trade, and the interest of liberal economists in promoting the reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade. At issue was the choice of modalities for implementing such policies and the effectiveness of regional integration as a mechanism of trade liberalization.
Viner‘s classic article on the subject pointed out that regional economic integration could lead to either ―trade creation‖ or ―trade diversion‖ (Viner 1950). By reducing trade barriers between neighbouring countries, customs unions and free trade areas could promote economic efficiency in the allocation of resources by contributing to the gradual strengthening of international trade. However, the emergence of such economic entities could also promote trade ―diversion‖ and become a source of economic inefficiency, if the most competitive producers of a particular product suddenly found themselves excluded from the regional market as a result of the customs union.
This approach continues to inspire the economics profession even today, and the issue of integration seen from the point of view of comparative advantage and the trade creation/diversion dichotomy is still prevalent in the specialized literature, as reflected in contemporary debate on whether the formation of major economic blocs constitutes progress or a hinderance to the liberalization of international trade. However, there are serious analytic limitations to this model, with its focus on static efficiency in the allocation of resources, for countries whose main interest lies in the dynamics of development and industrialization.
Marxist-Leninist thinkers have adopted a different approach (see Inotai 1982; Benallègue 1987). In their view, integration emerges as a reflection of the internationalization of capital and is intrinsic to the evolution of the capitalist economy. For example, the creation of a single European market is seen to reflect the concentration of capital and the internationalization of European firms, rather than the desire of welfare-maximizing governments to rationalize the allocation of resources among the countries concerned. The integration of the European market is thus the consequence, not the precursor, of the transformation of production and trade in favour of larger firms. Regional integration, so conceived, is a source of exclusion and impoverishment of small-scale enterprise and a range of social groups through the usual mechanisms of market displacement. Developing countries intent on actively promoting development through the initiative of the state are urged not to rely on free market forces. Integration among developing countries, in this view, should be geared toward the rational use of available resources according to a planned and centralized approach to production for the satisfaction of the region‘s own needs.
Although appealing in its dynamic vision of development, this approach is based on some questionable assumptions, notably about the effectiveness of planning in relation to markets. The rapid collapse of the Eastern Bloc‘s Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) after the break up of the Soviet Union has largely relegated to the history books an approach to economic cooperation and integration based on centralized planning and government directives.
The analysis adopted by Marchal (1965) and Perroux (1966) seemed to mark a watershed in thinking about integration. These authors proposed an alternative approach that would take into account the historical dimension of economic and social phenomena. According to Marchal, integration as the result of development is distinct from integration as an instrument or precondition of development. Economic integration can be perceived as the historical product of evolving technical, economic, and social structures; or it can be the product of conscious efforts on the part of human societies, acting collectively to improve their economic condition as a matter of policy choice. Marchal shows that integration taken as a product of history is first and foremost the result of social transformation. It cannot occur just anywhere or under just any conditions. Perroux (1966) follows a similar approach, centred upon three questions: who integrates? through what process? and to whose advantage?
However, in operational terms, these two authors do not stray very far from the voluntarist approach of their predecessors or from related development thinking prevalent at the time. For Marchal (1965), integration must be based on industrialization as its driving force, and it must be sustained by those social forces capable of supporting and organizing the industrialization process. Similarly, borrowing from development and industrialization thinking of the 1960s, Perroux (1966) builds his model around the concepts of growth poles, strategic investments, and industrialization. Industrialization is presented here as a collective instrument of development, based on import protection. He draws a distinction between three models of integration and industrialization, based respectively on the use of markets, productive investments, or institutional mechanisms.
This developmentalist and industrializing view of integration ends up assigning a secondary role to the social dimension of the issue, thus abandoning the approach initially adopted and replacing it with a technocratic and geographically focused one. Perroux (1966) thus begins by proposing a socioeconomic and political approach to integration, but allows it to be deformed by the influence of existing development theories.
This brief overview suffices to illustrate the voluntaristic thread of these various approaches. Each of these models is based on the absence, or at least the neutrality, of extra-economic factors in decision-making, thus ignoring the social and political dynamics likely to have an impact on the integration process. Such an approach may be of some use in the design of theoretical constructs, but it is hopelessly inadequate if the aim is to design actual economic policies or strategies for change.
In most cases of regional economic integration among Third World countries, research in this field is dominated by theories based on the European experience. The European Economic Community (EEC), now European Union (the EU), has become ―a living laboratory for the integration theory‖ (Asante 2002:5). Not surprisingly, the literature on economic integration and development has pointed out that developing countries do not satisfy the criteria of neo-classical customs union theory and that they will not reap the traditional welfare gains from integration. Hence, economist such as Viner and Lipsey deny that integration schemes will benefit developing countries (Viner, 1950 and Lipsey, 1960: 496-513). Their argument is based on the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion.
Viner (1950) defines trade creation as a shift in trade from high cost to a low cost source of supply within the integration area, and trade diversion as shift from a low cost source of supply outside the integration area to a high cost producer within it. In Viner‘s view, if there is more trade diversion than trade creation within a customs union, then the net effect on world welfare and the welfare of members will be negative. Since trade diversion (at least in the short run) will obviously prevail over trade creation in Third World customs union, argues Asante, as the members shift from low cost producers in the developed world to high cost producers among their neighbors, Viner and Lipsey are opposed to the creation of customs union among developing countries. However, there has been a growing criticism about applying Viner‘s criteria and Lipsey‘s general conclusions to the possible effects of customs union among developing countries. Therefore, on a synoptic conception of several authors (Atsain, 1983; Robson, 1968; Nowzad, 1969), economic integration connotes a process of economic development which involves the elimination of discriminatory barriers among economic units of nation-state. For easy operational community arrangements, such economic units are expected notably to be units within a regional/sub-regional setting e.g., African, European, West African, East African and Central African settings. Put simply, economic integration in an economic region involves pure economic and political unification, economic/political cooperation and free trade areas (Nwabuzor, 1982).
Theoretically and empirically too, the main concern of the theory of economic integration is the gains from changes from the isolationist approach in development efforts to the collective and cooperative regional arrangements (Robson, 1980: 145). However, the relevant aspect of that theory which informs the establishment of African, European and American economic communities, also as earlier noted, is the ―Customs Union Theory‖ which proposes trade creation among member states based on comparative cost advantages (Viner 1950; Robson, 1980).
Whereas, the Custom Union Theory seems to have underpinned the cooperative and collective economic arrangements among the nations within an eco-political region/sub-region in both the developed and developing nations alike, nonetheless, its adoption in different zones tends to focus on divergent goals. In Africa, quite unlike Europe, the overriding necessity to accelerate, foster and encourage the socioeconomic development of African countries was seen as major development priorities at independence (OAU, 1963; ECOWAS, 1975). This therefore explains the need for the promotion of harmonious economic development of the region and the subsequent call for effective regional/sub-regional economic cooperation via the elimination of all types of obstacles to the free movement of goods/services and factors of production. In this regard, African regional groupings are couched under the efficacy of the theory of Customs Union focused on trade liberalization and its attendant benefits and also collective self-reliance, within the scope of economic prosperity.
Integration in the West African sub-region has largely been informed by integration process in Western Europe, Latin America, Asia and elsewhere in Africa. The main objectives of integration in these areas have generally been both economic and political. It has been economic where the immediate preoccupation has been the promotion of better economic welfare or economic development. Where it has been political, the ultimate concern is the political unity of the component states. The emergence of a federal or confederate system is to cater better for the political and economic interests of the member states in a highly competitive global system.
The inevitability of political unity has been underscored by the fact that economic integration has been a political process: it requires the surrender of the major national economic instruments to the supranational authority; also, it involves the government of the Member States as the major actors as far as the initiation and implementation of sub-regional policies are concerned. The integration objectives in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are essentially the same although the political aspect has not been overtly proclaimed as in the case of European Economic Community (EEC). Many West African leaders are first concerned with the promotion of economic development as the first step to ensure political independence.
Accordingly, most studies adopt the Functionalist approach to the study of regional integration because theorists are concerned about integration as a contractual form of interdependent relations of states that share common experiences, values, interests and aspirations and that agreed to work together for the realisation of commonly set goals. (Haas, 1976) This is preferred because it provides institutional mechanism that promotes regional integration as is seen in ECOWAS. The functionalist- neofunctionalist approach, stresses the way in which supranational institutions possessing binding decision-making power emerge from a convergence of self-interest on the part of various significant groups in society.
Mitrany (1965) observes that integration by any means is a long and arduous process. Although, some observers have predicted integration through federation, most hold that integration is a testing process tied to compiled successes. Functional model of integration rejects rapid constitutional consolidation and looks instead to progress in specific sectors. The functionalist view holds that even compatible societies cannot integrate all public functions simultaneously. Gradual and parallel progress in several sectors may converge into general, cross sectoral integration. Without this convergence, integration is encapsulated or isolated as having no carry over effects in other sectors. It is Mitrany‘s theory that they felt the need in one particular sector generates a felt need for functional collaboration in another sector. He, therefore, felt and concluded that functional activity could change international activity and give it a new orientation in such a way that people think more and more of working together rather than getting engaged in activities that conflict and lead to confrontation.
The Functionalist thesis like Oyewunmi lays much emphasis on an apolitical approach to integration. The argument of the functionalist thesis according to Oyewunmi (2002) therefore, is that integration is best achieved through a gradual and incremental process which will gain a momentum of its own as the interests of member states converge and as they become more and more independent, in other words, integration by stealth, a case of one thing leading inexorably to the other. Neofunctionalism which is regarded as off-shoot of functionalism (though there are contestations on whether functionalism preceded integration or functionalism is part of integration theory) relies on organization by functions but it brings about new functions, consequences and relations, as the spill-over effect. ‗Spill-over‖ refers to demonstration effects and to aspects of sector integration. People through a learning process as the experience of one endeavor leads to task expansion and diversification or spill-over so as to bring about greater collaboration and peace. A leading NeoFunctionalist, Haas (1964) has especially used the ―spill over‖ to show how functions can eventually lead to the demise of the nation-state. By this, he meant a situation whereby, through peace and non-coercive means, people are brought together from different nation-states and they begin to work and do things together. However, several criticisms have been leveled against neo-functionalism showing its limitations in explaining what actually goes on in the international system, it would be wise to agree with scholars like Adeniran, (1983) that integration is an outgrowth of functionalism. It is the coming together at a high level, within the international system of certain units from a lower level. Integration implies the shift of allegiance from, one‘s tribe or ethnic group to the nation or from one‘s nation to an international community or regional association. This occurs mostly in expectation of joint rewards or for fear of likely penalties.
Integration has long been identified by states men and leaders around the world as strategy for development, the evidence being the different regional groups that have been formed especially since the wake of the 1970s. Even the largest world economic power, the United States of America and other industrialized nations of the world find it necessary to integrate and have different groups formed for this purpose. It then means that the benefits of integration cannot be over-emphasized. Tokuta, (1984) particularly states that integration has been proposed with much fervor, particularly in developing countries, as a major response to the problems of underdevelopment. As the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries increases, integration is conceived as a defensive reaction by the developing countries to harness their limited resources for development purposes as well as a source of barging power in their relations with the developed world. This gap has become more widened with intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across international boundaries and especially the current economic dominance in form of globalization.
In the view of David Mitrany, the leading exponent of functionalism shortly after 1945, integration could be effected through the creation of a transactional complex of economic and social organization. International activities could be organized around basic functional needs such as transportation, health and welfare necessities, cultural activities, trade and production. This process would not involve the surrender of national sovereignty but would promote global peace and security.
In organizing these thoughts and model, Mitrany assumes first that politics and economics cannot be separated in the functions of the state but that both could be internationalized without any visible loss of sovereignty by the state. However, it is difficult to internationalize political and socio-economic issues in the affairs among the state. This is particularly so in the cases of newly independent countries which are generally sensitive to the full control over economic development and therefore of legitimizing governments. It was in this vein that I.L. Claude (Jr.) argued that states are not likely to be induced to participate in functional endeavours where they have unsettled political and security issues which divide them.
Also, Mitrany assumes that the internationalization of politics and economics would ultimately shift loyalty and sovereignty from states to international organizations. This, he said, would occur as a result of specifying the technical and noncontroversial aspects of governmental conducts and weaving an ever-spreading web of international institutional relationships with initial concentration on commonly experienced or non-controversial needs and the expansion of these at the expense of the political needs.
Again, this assumption is fraught with certain difficulties. The establishment of new international organizations may not lead to the shift of loyalties from states. This was for example, well-illustrated in the case of the defunct East African Community. The community had a well-organized East African Airways which served the three Member States, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In spite of this however, Kenyan industrialists persistently argued for a separate-operated national airways on the grounds that the sub-regional one was inefficient and did not adequately serve their growing requirements.
4.0 Conclusion
Integration has long been identified by states men and leaders around the world as strategy for development, the evidence being the different regional groups that have been formed especially since the wake of the 1970s. Even the largest world economic power, the United States of America and other industrialized nations of the world find it necessary to integrate and have different groups formed for this purpose. It then means that the benefits of integration cannot be over-emphasized.
5.0 Summary
Discussions in this unit have focused primarily defining regional integration and explaining its origin in Europe and the different theoretical conceptualizations surrounding it. It should be obvious to you now as a student that regional integration is all about economic development and growth around the globe. Also, that the forces
of globalization have deepened interdependency between and among states making it impossible for any state or nation to exist in isolation
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
Explain what you understand the “Custom Union theory” to mean and what theory do the developing countries base their integration upon and why.
7.0 References/Further Reading
Bellassa, B. (1964) ―Theory of Economic Integration Homewood‖, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc Deutsch, K. W. (1957) et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area Princeton University Press: Princeton. Etzioni, A. (1965) Political Unification. New York: Holt Rinchart and Winston.
Haas, E.B. (1964) Beyond the National State. Stanford California: Standard University Press.
Hazelwood, A. (1967) ―Problems of Integration among African State‖ In Hazelwood, A. (Eds.) Africa Integration and Disintegration London: Oxford University Press.
Lipsey, R.G. (1960) ―The Theory of Customs Union: A General Survey‖. Economic Journal Vol. 70 Pp 496 – 513
Machlup, F. (1976) ―A History of Thought on Economic Integration‖ In Machlup (Eds) Economic Integration World Wide” Regional, Sectoral London: Macmillan Press.
Military, D. (1965) ―The prospects of Integration: Federal or functional‖, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.4.
Mytelka, L. (1994) ―Regional Cooperation and the New Logic of International Competition‖ In Mytelka, L. (Ed.) South-South Cooperation in a Global Perspective Paris: OECD pp 21-54.
Myelka, L. K. (1979). ―Regional Development in a Global Economy‖ Yale University Press Vaitos, C. V. (1978) ―Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A survey‖ World Development.
Viner, J. (1950) The Custom Union Issues New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
UNIT 2 REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main content
3.1 History of regional integration in Europe
3.2 Objectives of the European Union
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-marked assignment
7.0 References/further reading
- INTRODUCTION
In the first unit, we defined regional Integration and examined in great detail what we mean by the term Integration pointing out what Closed and Open integration is all about. The unit further went into the theories of regional integration examining the various arguments of different theorists. In this unit, we are going to examine the history and objectives of the European Union in other to find out what actually brought the members of these communities together to form a Union.
- OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: a. State when and how regional integration came about in Europe b. Mention and discuss the various objectives of the EU.
3.0 Main Content
3.1 History of Regional Integration in Europe
In 1951, a few Western European states agreed to confer powers over their steel and coal production to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris, which came into force on 23 July, 1952. Coal and steel production was essential for the reconstruction of countries in Europe after the second World War and this sector of the national economy had been important for warfare in the first and second World Wars. Therefore, France had originally maintained its occupation of the Saarland with its steel companies after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1949 by transferring national powers over the coal and steel production to a newly created ECSC Commission, the member states of the ECSC were able to provide for greater transparency and trust among themselves. This transfer of national powers to a Community to be exercised by its Commission was paralleled under the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (or Euro atom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in Brussels.
In 1967, the Merger Treaty (or Brussels Treaty) combines the institutions of the ECSC and Eura-tom into that of the EEC. They already shared a Parliamentary Assembly and Courts. Collectively, they were known as the European Communities. In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) was the first known revision of the Treaty of Rome that formally established the single European market and the European Political Cooperation. The Communities still had independent personalities although were increasingly integrated, and over the years were transformed into what is now called the European Union.
The six states that founded the three Communities were known as the ―inner six‖ (the ―outer seven‖ were those countries who formed the European Free Trade Association). These were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The first enlargement was in 1973, with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Greece joined in 1981, while Portugal and Spain did the same in 1986. On 3 October 1990 East Germany and West Germany were reunified, hence East Germany became part of the Community in the new reunified Germany (not increasing the number of states). The European Union
The European Union (EU) is an association of twenty-seven sovereign member states that by treaty have delegated certain of their competences to common institutions, in order to coordinate their policies in a number of areas, without however constituting a new state on top of the member states. It was officially established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 upon the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community.
Thus, 12 states are founding members, namely, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia became members in 2004. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania gained access in 2007. Official candidate states include Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, and Turkey. Applications have been submitted by Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. Morocco‘s application was rejected by the EEC and Switzerland‘s is frozen. Norway rejected membership in two referendums.
The institutions of the European Union, its parliamentarians, judges, commissioners and secretariat, the governments of its member states as well as their people, all playing a role in European integration. Nevertheless, the question of who plays the key role is disputed as there are different theories on European integration focusing on different actors and agency. The European Union has a number of relationships with nations that are not formally part of the Union. According to the European Union‘s official site, and a statement by Commissioner Günter Verheugen, the aim is to have a ring of countries, sharing EU‘s democratic ideals and joining them in further integration without necessarily becoming full member states. The European Union operates a single economic market across the territory of all its members, and uses a single currency between the Euro zone members further the EU has a number of economic relationships with nations that are not formally part of the Union through the European economic area and Custom Union agreements.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines certain political, social, and economic rights for European Union (EU) citizens and residents into EU law. It was drafted by the European Convention and solemnly proclaimed on 7 December 2000 by the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. However, its then legal status was uncertain and it did not have full legal effect until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009.
Under the Charter, the European Union must act and legislate consistently with the Charter and the EU’s courts will strike down legislation adopted by the EU’s institutions that contravenes it. The Charter applies to the Institutions of the European Union and its member states when implementing European Union law.
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) did not include any reference to fundamental or human rights. The EEC Treaty was written a few years after the failure of the European Defence Community Treaty and the European Political Community Treaty. The latter treaty had included rights provisions and Craig and de Búrca argue that, in light of that failure, the drafters of the EEC Treaty wished to eschew any implicitly political elements. However, the idea that the purely economic end of the new EEC Treaty would be unlikely to have any implications for fundamental rights was soon to be tested.
Court cases
Soon after the entry into force of the EEC Treaty, the Community established itself as a major political entity with policy ramifications beyond its economic aims. In 1964, the European Court of Justice handed down its decision in Costa v ENEL, in which the Court decided that Union law should take precedence over conflicting national law. This meant that national governments could not escape what they had agreed to at a European level by enacting conflicting domestic measures, but it also potentially meant that the EEC legislator could legislate unhindered by the restrictions imposed by fundamental rights provisions enshrined in the constitutions of member states. This issue came to a head in 1970 in the Handelsgesellschaft case when a German court ruled that a piece of EEC legislation infringed the German Basic Law. On a reference from the German court, the ECJ ruled that whilst the application of Union law could not depend on its consistency with national constitutions, fundamental rights did form an “integral part of the general principles of [European Community] law” and that inconsistency with fundamental rights could form the basis of a successful challenge to a European law.
In ruling as it did in the Handelsgesellschaft case the ECJ had- in effect- created a doctrine of unwritten rights which bound the Community institutions. While the court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence was approved by the institutions in 1977 and a statement to that effect was inserted into the Maastricht Treaty, and it was only in 1999 that the European Council formally went about the initiating the process of drafting a codified catalogue of fundamental rights for the EU.
Proclamation
In 1999 the European Council proposed that a “body composed of representatives of the Heads of State and Government and of the President of the Commission as well as of members of the European Parliament and national parliaments” should be formed to draft a fundamental rights charter. On being constituted in December of that year the “body” entitled itself the European Convention.
The Convention adopted the draft on 2 October 2000 and it was solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission on 7 December 2000. It was at the same time, however, decided to defer making a decision on the Charter’s legal status. However, it did come with the political weight of having been approved by three powerful institutions and as such was regularly cited by the ECJ as a source of fundamental rights.
Legal force
A modified Charter formed part of the defunct European Constitution (2004). After that treaty’s failure, its replacement, the Lisbon Treaty (2007), also gave force to the Charter albeit by referencing it as an independent document rather than by incorporating it into the treaty itself. However, both the version included in the Constitution and the one referenced in the Lisbon Treaty were amended versions of the Charter.
On the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding proposed that Commissioners should swear to uphold all EU treaties and the Charter. On 3 May 2010, the European Commission swore a solemn declaration at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, pledging to respect the EU Treaties and to be completely independent in carrying out their duties during their mandate. For the first time, the Commissioners also explicitly pledged to respect the new Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Several states insisted upon an opt-out from national application of the charter (see below for details).
Legal status
Article 2 of the Charter affirms the prohibition on capital punishment in the EU
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the fundamental rights charter has the same legal value as the European Union treaties. The Charter referred to in the Treaty is an amended version of the 2000 document which was solemnly declared by the same three institutions a day before the signing of the Lisbon Treaty itself.
Article 51(1) of the Charter addresses the Charter to the EU’s institutions, bodies established under EU law and, when implementing EU laws, the EU’s member states. In addition both Article 6 of the amended Treaty of European Union and Article 51(2) of the Charter itself restrict the Charter from extending the competences of the EU. A consequence of this is that the EU will not be able to legislate to vindicate a right set out in the Charter unless the power to do such is set out in the Treaties proper. Furthermore, individuals will not be able to take a member state to court for failing to uphold the rights in the Charter unless the member state in question was implementing EU law. It is this last point that has been subject to the most debate.
The Charter is not the first attempt to place human rights principles at the core of European Union law. All EU member states are, and candidate states are required to be, signatories to the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights, so that many principles from the Convention, such as the right to a fair trial, were taken as the baseline for European Court of Justice jurisprudence even before their formal reiteration in Charter. In interpreting the human rights protections provided by the general principles of EU law (described in the Court cases section above), the ECJ had already dealt with the issue of whether the rights protected by those general principles applied to member states. Having ruled in Johnston v Royal Ulster Constabulary that a right to fair procedures was one of the general principles of EU law, in Kremzow v Austria the ECJ had to decide whether or not a member state was obliged to apply that principle in relation to a wrongful conviction for murder. Kremzow’s lawyers argued that his case came within the scope of EU law on the grounds that his wrongful conviction and sentence had breached his right to free movement within the EU. The ECJ responded by saying that since the laws under which Kremzow had been convicted were not enacted to secure compliance with EU law, his predicament fell outside the scope of EU law.
The wording in Kremzow v Austria, referring to the “field of application of EU law”, differs from the wording in the Charter which refers to the implementation of EU law. However, the amended explanatory memorandum issued alongside the Charter in 2007 describes the wording used in the Charter as reflecting ECJ precedent.
The British and Polish protocol
In the negotiations leading up to the signing to the Lisbon Treaty, Poland and the United Kingdom secured a protocol to the treaty relating to the application of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights in their respective countries.
The protocol, in article 1(1) states that the “Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or actions of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.” Article 1(2) then says that the Title IV of the Charter, which contains economic and social rights, does not create justiciable rights, unless Poland and the UK have provided for such rights in its national law.
Both countries to which the protocol currently applies had different reasons for negotiating the protocol. The United Kingdom originally opposed a legally binding charter over concerns that it would result in a stream of British citizens going to the European Court of Justice in attempts to enforce their Charter rights in the UK, and in increased costs for business. While the British accepted a legally binding rights charter during the negotiations of the failed European Constitution, they negotiated a protocol during the Lisbon negotiations which, according to the then British Minister for Europe, would ensure that the Charter would not extend the powers of the European Court of Justice over United Kingdom law. Although their problems with the Charter related to its perceived liberal stance on social issues, in September 2007 the Polish government indicated that they wished to be included in the British protocol.
There is considerable debate concerning the legal effect of the protocol. One view, shared by Jan Jirásek, is that the protocol is an opt-out that excludes the application of the Charter to Poland and the United Kingdom. Another, shared by Ingolf Pernice, is that the protocol is only an interpretative protocol which will either have limited or no legal consequence.Craig and de Burcá argue that the protocol is merely declaratory. It says that the “Charter does not extend the ability” of the ECJ or other court to overturn UK or Polish law, but the ECJ already had the power to do this in any case. Accordingly, the Protocol is “unlikely that it will have any significant effect in practice.
In NS v Home Secretary, the European Court of Justice ruled that Article 1(1) of Protocol “explains Article 51 of the Charter with regard to the scope thereof and does not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland or the United Kingdom from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a court of one of those Member States from ensuring compliance with those provisions.”
Proposed Czech protocol
During the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, Czech President Václav Klaus expressed concern that the Charter would allow families of Germans who were expelled from territory in modern-day Czech Republic after the Second World War to challenge the expulsion before the EU’s courts, though legal experts have suggested that the laws under which the German were expelled, the Beneš decrees, did not fall under the jurisdiction of EU law. After Klaus refused to finalize the Czech Republic’s ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon unless the country was excluded from the Charter, as Poland and the United Kingdom had been, EU leaders agreed in October 2009 to amend the protocol to include the Czech Republic at the time of the next accession treaty in a measure designed to persuade Klaus to sign the treaty. He subsequently signed the treaty.
In September 2011, the Czech government formally submitted a request to the Council that the promised treaty revisions be made to extend the protocol to the Czech Republic, and a draft amendment to this effect was proposed by the European Council. However, the Czech Senate passed a resolution in October 2011 opposing their accession to the protocol. When Croatia’s Treaty of Accession 2011 was signed in late 2011, the Czech protocol amendment was not included. During the Czech Republic’s parliamentary ratification of the accession treaty in the spring of 2012, the government attempted to combine the approval of the Charter opt-out with the ratification bill. However, with the Senate controlled by the opposition parties, their objections to the opt-out could have led to the accession treaty being rejected. As a result, the government decided to separate the proposed opt-out from the accession treaty bill.
A vote on a draft report by the European Parliament Constitutional Affairs Committee in January 2012 recommending against granting the Czech Republic’s request to be added to Protocol 30 resulted in a tie. The report argued that Protocol 30 was not functioning as a general opt-out from the Charter, but only allowed the countries to limit the application of subsequent EU laws based solely on the charter. Thus, the Czech Republic would still be bound by the Charter even if they were added to the Protocol. In October 2012, the committee approved the report. and a third draft of the report was published on 11 December 2012. The report was tabled in Parliament during its session on 22 May 2013, and the Parliament voted in favour of calling on the European Council “not to examine the proposed amendment of the Treaties”. The Parliament did, however, give its consent in advance that a treaty revision to add the Czech Republic to Protocol 30 would not require a new convention.
In January 2014, after presidential and parliamentary elections the previous year had resulted in new leadership in the country, new Czech Human Rights Minister Jiří Dienstbier said that he would attempt to have his country’s request for an opt-out withdrawn. This was confirmed on 20 February 2014 by the new Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka, who withdrew the request for an opt-out during a meeting with President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso shortly after his newly elected government won the confidence of Parliament. In May 2014, the Council of the European Union formally withdrew their recommendation to hold a Intergovernmental Conference of member states to consider the proposed amendments to the treaties.
The text
The Charter contains some 54 articles divided into seven titles. The first six titles deal with substantive rights under the headings: dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights and justice, while the last title deals with the interpretation and application of the Charter. Much of Charter is based on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Justice and pre-existing provisions of European Union law.
- The first title (Dignity) guarantees the right to life and prohibits torture, slavery, the death penalty, eugenic practices and human cloning. Its provisions are mostly based on the ECHR, although Article 1 closely reflects Article 1 of the German Basic Law.
- The second title (Freedoms) covers liberty, personal integrity, privacy, protection of personal data, marriage, thought, religion, expression, assembly, education, work, property and asylum.
- The third title (Equality) covers equality before the law, prohibition of all discrimination including on basis of disability, age and sexual orientation, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, the rights of children and the elderly.
- The fourth title (Solidarity) covers social and workers’ rights including the right to fair working conditions, protection against unjustified dismissal, and access to health care, social and housing assistance.
- The fifth title (Citizen’s Rights) covers the rights of the EU citizens such as the right to vote in election to the European Parliament and to move freely within the EU. It also includes several administrative rights such as a right to good administration, to access documents and to petition the European Parliament.
- The sixth title (Justice) covers justice issues such as the right to an effective remedy, a fair trial, to the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality, non-retrospectivity and double jeopardy.
- The seventh title (General Provisions) concerns the interpretation and application of the Charter. These issues are dealt with above.
Raising the Charter’s profile
The EU has attempted to raise the profile of the Charter so that citizens are more aware of their rights. For example, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) has produced apps for and Android with the text of the Charter in all EU languages and related information. It has also published mini-versions of the Charter in all EU languages.
In 2010, the FRA put out a tender for poets to turn the Charter into an 80-minute long epic poem, with music, dance and multimedia elements. This was also to raise awareness and to simplify the legal text into more understandable language. However, Viviane Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom & Security, wrote to the director of the FRA slamming the idea on cost and dignity grounds and instructing him to cancel the project.
3.2 The Objectives of the Union
Article I-3 of the Constitutional Treaty, which covers the internal and external objectives of the Union, merges the provisions of the EU Treaty and those of the EC Treaty. These objectives must guide the Union in the defining and implementation of all its policies. The main objectives of the Union are now to promote peace, the Union’s values and the well-being of its peoples. These general objectives are supplemented by a list of more detailed objectives which include the promotion of:
- an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers;
- an internal market where competition is free and undistorted;
- sustainable development, based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment;
- scientific and technological advancement;
- social inclusion and indiscrimination, and the promotion of social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child;
- economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.
In addition to the above, the Union respects cultural and linguistic diversity and ensures that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. Furthermore, apart from the objectives in the Union‘s Treaties, the Constitution thus adds the promotion of scientific and technological advance, of solidarity between generations and of the protection of children’s rights. Economic and social cohesion now additionally acquires a territorial dimension. Cultural and linguistic diversity, and the safeguarding and enhancing of Europe’s cultural heritage, also become Union objectives. Paragraph 4 of Article I-3 is devoted to the Union’s promotion of its values and interests in its relations with the rest of the world. This paragraph brings together the objectives from the EU Treaty relating to the common foreign and security policy, and the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to development cooperation, peace, security, sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty, protection of human rights (in particular the rights of the child) and development of international law (respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter). The Constitution includes as a new objective the protection of children’s rights on the international stage. Finally, in Part III of the Constitutional Treaty, Articles III-115 to III-122 contain provisions relating to more specific requirements which the Union must fulfill in implementing the Constitution, in particular, equality between men and women, the combating of discrimination, requirements relating to employment and social policy, protection of the environment and consumers and consideration for the specific nature of services of general economic interest.
3.3 The Free Trade Area (FTA)
The creation of the Free Trade Area (FTA) eliminated tariffs, quotas and preferences on goods among member states. Numerous countries have signed a European Union Association Agreement (AA) with FTA provisions. These mainly include Mediterranean countries (Algeria in 2005, Egypt in 2004, Israel in 2000, Jordan in 2002, Lebanon in 2006, Morocco in 2000, Palestinian National Authority in 1997, and Tunisia in 1998), albeit some countries from other trade blocs have also signed one (such as Chile in 2003, Mexico in 2000, and South Africa in 2000). Further, many Balkan states have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with FTA provisions such as Albania (signed 2006), Croatia (2005), Montenegro (2007), Macedonia (2004), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (both 2008, entry into force pending). In 2008, Poland and Sweden proposed the Eastern Partnership which would include setting a FTA between the EU and eastern countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
- Conclusion
In 1951, only a few Western European states agreed to confer powers over their steel and coal production to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris but after the WW 11 Coal and steel production was essential for the reconstruction of countries in Europe. More of the European Countries came together in 1949 to form the European Economic Community. In addition to the above, the Union respects cultural and linguistic diversity and ensures that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. Economic and social cohesion now additionally acquires a territorial dimension.
- Summary
Discussions in this unit largely focused on the history of the formation of the European Economic Community and their early Objectives. It was pointed out how the European Communities were reluctant before WW11 to give up power over their Iron and Steel and coal production to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris but were much more interested to do so after the WW 11. We also looked at their stated objectives when they eventually came together for in 1949 to form the EEC.
- Tutor-marked assignment
How did the European Union come about and mention at least four of its main objectives.
7.0 References/further reading
Bellassa, B. (1964) ―Theory of Economic Integration Homewood‖, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc Deutsch, K. W. (1957) et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Etzioni, A. (1965) Political Unification. New York: Holt Rinchart and Winston.
Haas, E.B. (1964) Beyond the National State. Stanford California: Standard University Press.
Hazelwood, A. (1967) ―Problems of Integration among African State‖ In Hazelwood, A. (Eds.) Africa Integration and Disintegration London: Oxford University Press.
Kisanga, E. J. (1984) ―Regional Cooperation: Challenge for the Continent‖ Africa Now, London.
Lipsey, R.G. (1960) ―The Theory of Customs Union: A General Survey‖. Economic Journal Vol. 70 Pp 496 – 513
Mytelka, L. (1994) ―Regional Cooperation and the New Logic of International Competition‖ In Mytelka, L. (Ed.) South-South Cooperation in a Global Perspective Paris: OECD pp 21-54.
Myelka, L. K. (1979). ―Regional Development in a Global Economy‖ Yale University Press
Vaitos, C. V. (1978) ―Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A survey‖ World Development.
Viner, J. (1950) The Custom Union Issues New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
UNIT 3 THE EUROPEAN UNION COMPETENCE/RESPONSIBILITIES
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main content
3.1 The European Union Competence/responsibility
3.2 Membership in European Union agreements
3.3 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-marked assignment
7.0 References/further reading
- INTRODUCTION
We have examined the history and objectives of the EU in the previous unit pointing out the year of establishment and the merger that brought about the Union. We went further to identify the objectives and discussed them in details. In this unit, we shall examine the Exclusive and the Supporting competences of the EU and go a long way in identifying its major partnerships and agreements.
- OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit you should be able to
- Identify the areas of Exclusive, Supporting and shared Competences in the EU
- Write small essays on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and
- The Schengen zone
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Competence/Responsibility of the EU
Whilst most responsibilities (competences) are retained by the member states, some competences are conferred exclusive on the Union for collective decision, some are shared pending Union action and some receive Union support. The European Customs Union defines an area where no customs are levied on goods travelling within it. It includes all European Union member states. The abolition of internal tariff barriers between EEC member states was achieved in 1968. Andorra and San Marino belong to the EU customs unions with third states. Turkey is linked by the European Union-Turkey Customs Union. A prominent goal of the EU since its creation by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 is establishing and maintaining a single market. This seeks to guarantee the four basic freedoms, which are related to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital and people around the EU‘s internal market.
The European Economic Area (EEA) agreement allows Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to participate in the European Single Market without joining the EU. The four basic freedoms apply. However, some restrictions on fisheries and agriculture take place. Switzerland is linked to the European Union by Swiss-EU bilateral agreements, with a different content from that of the EEA agreement.
The Euro zone refers to the European Union member states that have adopted the euro currency union as the third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Further, certain states outside the EU have adopted the euro as their currency, despite not belonging to the EMU. Thus, a total of 22 states, including 16 European Union states and six non-EU members, currently use the Euro. The Euro-zone came into existence with the official launch of the Euro on 1 January 1999. Physical coins and banknotes were introduced on 1 January 2002. The original members were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece adopted the euro on 1 January 2001. Slovenia joined on 1 January 2007, Cyprus and Malta were admitted on 1 January 2008, and Slovakia joined 1 January 2009. Outside the EU, agreements have been concluded with Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City for formal adoption, including the right to mint their own coins. Andorra, Montenegro and Kosovo have also used the euro since its launch.
The European Union first started with economic integration which brought about prosperity among the member states and then moved on to also cooperate with one another in the areas of education, culture, health, politics and a whole lot of other areas as we will see in the following: Education: The European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS) program seeks to encourage and support free movement of the academic community. It was established in 1987. A total of 31 states (including all European Union states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Turkey) are involved. Switzerland is again eligible for membership as from 2007, after a period of absence following the rejection by that country of closer links with the European Union. The European Higher Education Area (EHEA) aims to integrate education systems in Europe. Thus, degrees and study periods are recognized mutually. This is done by following the Bologna process, and under the Lisbon Recognition Convention of the Council of Europe. The Bologna declaration (in full, Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education convened in Bologna on 19 June 1999 is the main guiding document of the Bologna process. It was adopted by ministers of education of 29 European countries at their meeting in Bologna in 1999. It proposed a European Higher Education Area in which students and graduates could move freely between countries, using prior qualifications in one country as acceptable entry requirements for further study in another.
The principal aims agreed were:
- “Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees”. That is to say, countries should adopt common terminology and standards 2. “Adoption of a system essentially based on two main cycles, undergraduate and graduate. Access to the second cycle shall require successful completion of first cycle studies, lasting a minimum of three years. The degree awarded after the first cycle shall also be relevant to the European labour market as an appropriate level of qualification. The second cycle should lead to the master and/or doctorate degree as in many European countries.”
The Bergen meeting subsequently refined the second point, and produced a three cycle framework of qualifications, which in the UK terminology (adopted, at least partially, by many European countries) would be Bachelor for a first degree of three years, Master for subsequent study, and Doctor for a degree which has “made a contribution through original research that extends the frontier of knowledge by developing a substantial body of work”.
The Bologna declaration has later been followed up a series of meetings between EU ministers. Each meeting has produced a communiqué based on their deliberations. To date these include the Prague communiqué (2001), the Berlin communiqué (2003), the Bergen communiqué (2005), the London communiqué (2007) the Leuven & Louvain-la-Neuve communiqué (2009). European Commission has published (European Communities, Feb. 2009) an “ECTS Users‘ Guide”, including one “Overview of national regulations (…)” and “Status of the proclamation”. The Bologna Ministerial Anniversary Conference 2010 in Budapest and Vienna was held in March 2010. It issued the Budapest-Vienna Declaration. The communiqués indicate that progress is being made towards the Bologna Declaration’s aim of a European Higher Education Area, however such an area is not universally accepted as being a desirable outcome. According to the Busapest-Vienna declaration, the next Ministerial Meeting was held in Bucharest on 26–27 April 2012.
All EU members or candidates at the moment (except Cyprus which joined later) and three out of four EFTA countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom, Croatia, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and Turkey joined in 2001. In 2003, Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Holy See (a Council of Europe permanent observer), Macedonia, Russia and Serbia signed the convention. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine followed in 2005. Finally, Montenegro joined in 2007. This makes a total of 46 member states. Monaco and San Marino are the only members of the Council of Europe which have not adopted the convention. The other two European nations that are eligible to join, but have not, are Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Health: The SOS project, also known as Smart Open Services, aims to promote free movement of patients. It will allow health professionals to electronically access the data from patients from other countries, to electronically process prescriptions in all involved countries, or to provide treatment in another EU state to a patient on a waiting list. The project has been launched by 12 EU state including Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is a document enshrining certain fundamental rights. The wording of the document has been agreed at ministerial level and has been incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon. The Czech Republic, Poland and the United Kingdom have negotiated an opt-out from the Charter. Furthermore, the European integration process has extended the right of foreigners to vote. Thus, European Union citizens were given voting rights in local elections by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Several member states (Belgium, Luxembourg, Lithuania, and Slovenia) have extended since then the right to vote to all foreign residents. This was already the case in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. Further, voting and eligibility rights are granted among citizens of the Nordic Passport Union, and between numerous countries through bilateral treaties (i.e. between Norway and Spain, or between Portugal and Brazil, Cape Verde, Iceland, Norway, Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile and Argentina), or without them (i.e. United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland). Finally, within the EEA, Iceland and Norway also grant the right to vote to all foreign residents. There is also the Schengen Zone. The main purpose of the establishment of the Schengen Agreements is the abolition of physical borders among European countries. Total of 29 states, including 25 European Union states (all except Ireland and United Kingdom) and four non-EU members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), are subject to the Schengen rules. Twenty Six states have already implemented its provisions, leaving just Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania to do so among signatory‘s states. Liechtenstein still has to fully implement the rules. Further Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City are de-facto members.
The European Union is not a state and as such does not have its own dedicated military forces. However, there are a number of multi-national military and peace keeping forces which are ultimately under the command of the EU, and therefore can be seen as the core for a future European Union army. These corps includes forces from 25 EU states – all except Denmark, which has an opt-out clause in its accession treaty and is not obliged to participate in the common defense policy; and Malta, which currently does not participate in any battle group – Norway and Turkey. Also, the Western European Union (WEU) capabilities and functions have been transferred to the European Union, under its developing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
The EU also has close ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), according to the Berlin Plus agreement. This is a comprehensive package of agreements made between NATO and the EU on 16 December 2002. With this agreement the EU is given the possibility to use NATO assets in case it wanted to act independently in an international crisis, on the condition that NATO does not want to act itself – the so-called ‗right of first refusal‘. In fact, many EU member states are among the 28 NATO members. The Treaty of Brussels is considered the precursor to NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D. C. in 1949. It included the five Treaty of Brussels states, as well as the United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952, and West Germany did the same in 1955. Spain entered in 1982. In 1999, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland became NATO members. Finally, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia joined in 2004. In 2009m Croatia and Albania joined Ukraine and Georgia were told that they will also eventually become members in 2008. The Republic of Macedonia‘s application process is finished, but it is blocked by Greece. Thus, 21 out of 28 NATO states are among the 27 EU members, another two are members of the EEA, and two more are EU candidates (one of those is member of the EU customs space).
On 22 May, 2007, the member states of the European Union have agreed to create a Common political framework for space activities in Europe by unifying the approach of the European Space Agency (ESA) with those of the individual European Union member states. However, ESA is an intergovernmental organization with no formal organic link to the EU; indeed, the two institutions have different Member States and are governed by different rules and procedures. ESA was created in 1975 by merging ELDO with ESRO. The 10 founding members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The Republic of Ireland joined on 31 December 1975. In 1987, Austria and Norway became member states. Finland joined in 1995, Portugal in 2000, Greece and Luxembourg in 2005, and the Czech Republic in 2008. Thus, currently, it has 18 member states: all the EU member states before 2004, plus Czech Republic, Norway and Switzerland. Further, Canada has had the special status of a Cooperating State under a cooperation agreement since 1979. ESA is likely to expand in the coming years with the countries which joined the EU in both 2004 and 2007. Thus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia have already signed a European Cooperating State (ECS) Agreement; Cyprus, Latvia and Slovakia have signed Cooperation Agreements with ESA; and finally, Lithuania and Malta have also announced its intention to join ESA.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
What do you understand as the Bologna Declaration and the Schengen zone?
3.2 Membership in European Union Agreements
A small group of EU member states have joined all European treaties, instead of opting out on some. They drive the development of a federal model for the European integration. This is linked to the concept of Multi-speed Europe where some countries would create a core union; and goes back to the Inner Six references to the founding member states of the European Communities. At present the formation of a formal Core Europe Federation ―A federation within the confederation‖ had been held off at every occasion that such a federation treaty had been discussed. Instead supranational institutions are created that govern more areas in ―Inner Europe‖ than the existing European integration provides for. Among the 27 EU state members, nine states have signed all integration agreements. These are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
The agreement considered include the fifth stage of economic integration or EMU, the Shengen agreement, the Common Security and Defense Policy, and education initiatives such as the ERASMUS programme or the European Higher Education Area. They are also members of the European Space Agency and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus, among the 27 EU countries, 16 have joined the Euro-zone, 25 have joined Shengen, and 25 compose the European Military.
Furthermore, some countries which do not belong to the EU have joined several of these initiatives, albeit sometimes at a lower stage such as the Customs Union, the Common Market (EEA), or even adopting unilaterally the euro; by taking part in Shengen, either as a signatory state, or de-facto; or by joining some common military forces. Thus, six non-EU countries have adopted the euro unilaterally, three the Shengen agreement officially and another three ones as de-facto, and other countries have joined common military corps. Some territories of EFTA member states also have a special status in regard to EU laws applied as is the case with some European microstates. For member states that do not have special status territories the EU law applied as is the case with some European microstates. For member states that do not have special status territories the EU law applies fully with the exception of the optouts in the European Union.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
What is the ERASMUS programme of the EU?
3.3 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process was organized by the European Union to strengthen its relations with the countries in the Mashriq and Maghreb regions. It started in 1995 with the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference, and it has been developed in successive annual meetings. The European Union enlargement of 2004 brought two more Mediterranean countries (Cyrus and Malta) into the Union, while adding a total of 10 to the number of Member States. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership today comprises 43 members: 27 European Union member states, and 16 partner countries (Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia as well as the Palestinian Territories). Libya has had observer status since 1999.
The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EU-MEFTA) is based on the Barcelona Process and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It will cover the EU, the EFTA, the EU customs unions with third states (Turkey, Andorra, San Marino), the EU candidate states, and the partners of the Barcelona Process. There is no fixed end result of the process of integration. Integration and enlargement of the European Union are major issues in the politics of Europe, both at European, national and local level. Integration may conflict with national sovereignty and cultural identity, and is opposed by Euro skeptics.
- Conclusion
A small group of EU member states have joined all European treaties, instead of opting out on some. They drive the development of a federal model for the European integration. This is linked to the concept of Multi-speed Europe where some countries would create a core union; and goes back to the Inner Six references to the founding member states of the European Communities. There is no fixed end result of the process of integration. Integration and enlargement of the European Union are major issues in the politics of Europe, both at European, national and local level.
- Summary
Discussions in this unit have focused on the Institutions of the EU, their membership, functions and when they were established. Thus, among the EU countries, some have joined the Euro-zone, some have joined Shengen, and some compose the European Military. Thus, Integration may conflict with national sovereignty and cultural identity, and is opposed by Euro skeptics.
- Tutor-marked assignment
Mention the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and discuss the significance of the partnership.
- References/further reading
Bellassa, B. (1964) ―Theory of Economic Integration Homewood‖, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc Deutsch, K. W. (1957) et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Etzioni, A. (1965) Political Unification. New York: Holt Rinchart and Winston.
Haas, E.B. (1964) Beyond the National State. Stanford California: Standard University Press.
Hazelwood, A. (1967) ―Problems of Integration among African State‖ In Hazelwood, A. (Eds.) Africa Integration and Disintegration London: Oxford University Press.
Kisanga, E. J. (1984) ―Regional Cooperation: Challenge for the Continent‖ Africa Now, London.
Lipsey, R.G. (1960) ―The Theory of Customs Union: A General Survey‖. Economic Journal Vol. 70 Pp 496 – 513
Machlup, F. (1976) ―A History of Thought on Economic Integration‖ In Machlup (Eds) Economic Integration World Wide” Regional, Sectoral London: Macmillan Press.
Military, D. (1965) ―The prospects of Integration: Federal or functional‖, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.4.
Mytelka, L. (1994) ―Regional Cooperation and the New Logic of International Competition‖ In Mytelka, L. (Ed.) South-South Cooperation in a Global Perspective Paris: OECD pp 21-54.
Myelka, L. K. (1979). ―Regional Development in a Global Economy‖ Yale University Press
Vaitos, C. V. (1978) ―Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing Countries: A survey‖ World Development.
Viner, J. (1950) The Custom Union Issues New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
MODULE 3 REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
In the last module, much has been made concerning the rise of Asia – led by China and India – and the continent‘s increasingly important role. The announcement by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last year that the 21st century would be America‘s ―Pacific Century‖ further strengthened the belief that the epicentre of 21st century global politics and economics would be located within Asia. And, as has been well-documented, ongoing economic turmoil has also led to growing numbers of Western countries looking at Asia – particularly China and ASEAN – for financial assistance. Module 3 now focuses on Africa and the different regional integrative systems operating in the continent.
Unit1 The Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) Unit 2 Regional Integration in Southern Africa (SADC)
Unit 3 The Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS)
Unit 4 ECGLC
UNIT 1 THE CENTRAL AFRICA ECONOMIC AND MONETARY COMMUNITY (CEMAC)
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 History of Regional Integration in Africa
3.2 CEMAC
3.3 ECGLC
3.4 ECCAS
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading
- INTRODUCTION
The 1980 Final Act of Lagos was the first continent-wide effort by the African governments towards regional integration through forging a comprehensive unified approach to economic development. The drive towards regional integration was given a further boost in 1991 with the adoption, by the OAU summit, of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), which stipulated a stage by stage modus operandi that must be put in place to achieve this goal.
- OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit you should be able to: a. Explain the origin of Regional Integration in Africa b. Give a background history of the formation of CEMAC and its operations
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Regional Integration in Africa
African leaders have long recognized the significant opportunities presented by a regional approach to development and have supported regional efforts for many years to sustain advances made in economic policy reform and democratic governance. With the current challenges of debt crisis, regional integration in Africa is no longer a subject of academic debate or mere political expression; it is an imperative if the goals of integrated economic development and a debt-free continent are to be realized. The 1980 Final Act of Lagos was the first continent-wide effort by the African governments towards regional integration through forging a comprehensive unified approach to economic development. The drive towards regional integration was given a further boost in 1991 with the adoption, by the OAU summit, of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), which stipulated a stage by stage modus operandi that must be put in place to achieve this goal. First, is the strengthening of existing sub-regional economic groupings and establishing new ones where deemed desirable. Second is the consolidation of tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as the strengthening of sectoral integration at the continental level. And, this is the promotion of the coordination and harmonization among the existing and future economic groupings for a gradual establishment of an African Common Market. To this end, it authorized the drafting of the treaty for the establishment of the African Economic Community whose aims is to promote collective and accelerated self-reliant and self-sustaining development cooperation among the states and their integration in the economic, social and cultural fields. That treaty was subsequently signed in Abuja in June 1991.
So far, the African Economic Community (AEC) has established direct working relations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West African region, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central region. In the Southern African Region the AEC has been dealing with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East Africa with the East Africa Community (EAC) as well as Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). In North Africa, there is the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) that has no direct contact with the AEC, so far. Apart from these Regional Economic Communities (RECs), there are other groupings like the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) and the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), all of which are engaged in the promotion of integration. All these organizations were already in existence and operating when the AEC Treaty was signed in Abuja in June 1991.
In examining past experiences and present orientation with regard to regional integration, it is in fact very difficult in the space of a sub-section of a chapter. We would however select a number of integration schemes, most especially in the different regions of Africa with the aim of drawing policy lessons for advancing the processes of economic cooperation and regional integration.
An overall assessment of Africa‘s experience with regional integration reveals, however, that regional integration and cooperation groupings have achieved limited success (African Development Report 2000). While the existence of informal border trade between countries is acknowledged, the consensus is that there has been no significant increase in inter-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of member countries between 1970 and 1 990s, intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of member has actually declined in all major regional groupings with the exception of Arab Maghreb Union (AMLI), ECOWAS and WAEMU‘s predecessor, the West African Economic Community (CEAO). In these three cases, intra-regional trade has increased marginally by a range of between 1.4 and 4.9 percentage points. While intra-regional trade remained stagnant, the continent also experienced increased marginalization in international trade. This is visible in its shares of exports and output in the world and in the developing community. Africa‘s share in global exports fell from 4.5 percent in 1977 o 2 percent in 1997 (in current dollar terms), in contrast with the fact that developing countries as a whole increased their presence in world trade. Similarly, the share of exports in total developing regions export dropped from 15.5 percent in 1981 to 10 percent in 1997 (World Development indicators, 1999).
Also evident is the failure of Africa‘s regional economic groupings to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). By enlarging markets, improving the proximity to resources inputs, and increasing the potential output size of the firm, integration is expected to play an instrumental role in attracting investment, but, despite the creation of numerous regional economic groupings, Africa‘s share in global private capital flows decline gradually up to the latter half of the 1980s, from which time the speed of marginalization in world investment became alarming. With the collapse in oil prices in the first half of the 1980s, FDI flows to Africa halted almost at once. Its share in the total FDI flows to developing countries in 1997 was 4.7 percent as opposed to 23 percent in 1970 (WDI, 1999).
The factors responsible for the limited results achieved to date are normally grouped into three categories. The structural characteristics of the integrating economies and regions can be placed in one category of factors militating against successful regional integration. Design deficiencies belong to the second category; while implementation constitutes the third category. The relevance and significance of these factors are perhaps, more easily grasped against the experience of individual regional schemes and their specific formulation. The regional integration arrangement in Central Africa are the Central African Monetary and Economic Community (CEMAC) formerly known as the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), the Economic Community of the countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What are the structural characteristics of CEMAC? Outline the regional integration communities of Africa.
3.2 The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)
The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) was founded in 1998 to replace the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC). It has the same six members states as UDEAC (Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea) established in 1964, UDEAC was an outgrowth of the equatorial customs union (Union Donaniere Equatorials or UDEAC), which was initially created by former French colonies in Central Africa to facilitate economic cooperation among themselves. The objective of UDEAC was to create a customs union with a common external tariff (CET) and subsequently a monetary union, as part of the Franc zone which has been in existence since 1948.
On trade, the arrangements established by UDEAC included a CET and a single tax (Tax Unique or TU). The CET regulates extra-regional trade. There are also various non-tariff barriers under national jurisdiction. The CET was established at the creation of UDEAC and reformed in 1994. The CET concerned only import duties as specified by article 34 of the UDEAC accord. Export taxes are within the national jurisdiction. The essential flair in the conception of the CET was the possibility given to member states to adjust taxes not covered by the CET and thereby ensure differential protection. Although this possibility was meant to be temporary, no date was set for its removal. The tax unique (I‘U) was put in place at the creation of the UDE and aimed at fostering regional industrial production and trade in manufactured goods. The instrument employed for this purpose is reduction of domestic and import taxes on regionally — produced goods relative to — regional goods. This replaced all other domestic indirect taxes and import duties for industrial products sold in the region by registered firms. It was paid at the frontier by the importer. For domestic sales, it was paid directly by the producer. To export within the region, firms were required to have TU status, All UDEAC member states were obliged to allow goods produced by TU registered firms to circulate freely, as long as the TU was paid, while applying the CET on imports of regional goods produced by non-TU firms. The TU regime was, however, abolished in 1994 — when UDEAC was reformed.
On the monetary side TIDEAC and CEMAC have had a fixed exchange rate n the regional currency (the CFA franc) and the French franc (now linked to the euro); the pooling of foreign reserves in an account at the French Treasury; full convertibility of CFA franc to French franc (now to euro), and henceforth to any convertible currency; and a common central bank (Bank of Central African States). Before its transformation to CEMAC, UDEAC has not succeeded in increasing intra-regional trade. Trade between member countries had declined from 5 percent in 1970 to about 2 percent in the mid-1990s (ADR, 2000). The existence of a monetary union, which implies free mobility of capital, has not been sufficient to increase trade flows. Low intra-regional trade is also the result of trade barriers as well as the narrow export basket of member countries. The pattern of trade in the region is highly influenced by that of the relatively— off oil exporting countries in the group (Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon). In Congo, the economy relies extensively on oil, which account for 47 percent of GDP, and 2 percent of total export earnings. A similar pattern is found in Gabon with 44 percent and 66 percent respectively.
Cameroon, however, is the only member that has achieved a measure of success in deve1oping its agricultural and industrial bases together with its oil production. Cameroon accounts for almost half of the total UDEAC/CEMAC GDP. All member states increased their trade with Cameroon after the creation of UDEAC. Trade with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries is larger than intra-regional trade. Gabon trades more with Nigeria and Cote d‘Ivoire than with member states of the union. Over 65 percent of its trade on the African continent is with those two countries. A similar pattern is found for Cameroon with 45 percent of its trade on the continent being with Cote d‘Ivoire, Guinea and Nigeria combined. The smaller countries in the union, namely CAR, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea, have over 90 percent of their trade within the union.
3.3 The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC)
The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC) scheme was established in 1976 and comprises Burundi, Rwanda and Congo Democratic Report bloc. The objectives of the Union were the removal of trade barrier, free movement of labour and cooperation in the development and implementation of joint project. None of these objectives has been achieved (ADR, 2000). Intra-ECGLC trade remains very low and the regions share in Africa‘s trade negligible. Member countries have very low per capita income and are presently experiencing serious socio-political instability. There is, therefore, little possibility of increased trade in the union in the short term.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE
What is the full meaning of UDEAC?
3.4 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
The treaty instituting the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was adopted in 1983 with the objective of establishing a customs union and harmonizing policies to promote joint development activities in several sectors. Members of the union are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon., Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe. After a long period of inactivity, the ECCAS members held a three-day meeting in Equatorial Guinea in early 1999 to discuss the integration programme in the pertinent issues addressed in the meeting included the re-establishment of peace and stability in the region and reform of the integration institutions.
History Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa The Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (or UDEAC from its name in French, Union Douanière et Économique de l‘Afrique Centrale), (in Spanish: Unión Aduanera y Económica de África Central, UAEAC), (in Portuguese: União Aduaneira e Económica da África Central, UAEAC), established by the Brazzaville Treaty in 1964, formed a customs union with free trade between members and a common external tariff for imports from other countries. The treaty became effective in 1966 after it was ratified by the then five member countries—Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, and Gabon. Equatorial Guinea joined the Union on 19 December 1983. UDEAC signed a treaty for the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) to promote the entire process of sub-regional integration through the forming of monetary union with the Central Africa CFA franc as a common currency; it was officially superseded by CEMAC in June 1999 (through agreement from 1994). To date CEMAC has not achieved its objective of creating a customs union.
Foundation At a summit meeting in December 1981, the leaders of the UDEAC agreed in principle to form a wider economic community of Central African states. ECCAS was established on 18 October 1983 by the UDEAC members, São Tomé and Príncipe and the members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL established in 1976 by the DR Congo, Burundi and Rwanda). Angola remained an observer until 1999, when it became a full member.
ECCAS began functioning in 1985, but was inactive for several years because of financial difficulties (non-payment of membership fees by the member states) and the conflict in the Great Lakes area. The war in the DR Congo was particularly divisive, as Rwanda and Angola fought on opposing sides. ECCAS has been designated a pillar of the African Economic Community (AEC), but formal contact between the AEC and ECCAS was only established in October 1999 due to the inactivity of ECCAS since 1992 (ECCAS signed the Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the regional blocs (RECs) in October 1999). The AEC again confirmed the importance of ECCAS as the major economic community in Central Africa at the third preparatory meeting of its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in June 1999.
Presided over by President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, the summit was held in Libreville on 6 February 1998. The Heads of State and Government present at the summit committed themselves to the resurrection of the organisation. The Prime Minister of Angola also indicated that his country would become a fully fledged member. The summit approved a budget of 10 million French francs for 1998 and requested the Secretariat to:
Obtain assistance from UNECA to evaluate the operational activities of the secretariat; to evaluate the contributions due by member states; and the salaries and salary structures of employees of the secretariat. Convene an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers as soon as possible to evaluate the recommendations of UNECA; the Council should then draw up proposals for a new administrative structure for the secretariat and revised contributions due by each member state. The summit also requested countries in the region to find lasting and peaceful solutions to their political problems. The chairman also appealed to member countries to support the complete lifting of the embargo placed on his country. During the inauguration of President Bongo of Gabon on 21 January 1999, a mini-summit of ECCAS leaders was held. The leaders discussed problems concerning the functioning of ECCAS and the creation of a third Deputy Secretary-General post designated for Angola. Angola formally joined the Community during this summit.
Recent events
The 10th Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government took place in Malabo in June 2002. This Summit decided to adopt a protocol on the establishment of a Network of Parliamentarians of Central Africa (REPAC) and to adopt the standing orders of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), including the Defence and Security Commission (CDC), Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) and the Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa (MARAC). Rwanda was also officially welcomed upon its return as a full member of ECCAS.
On January 24, 2003, the European Union (EU) concluded a financial agreement with ECCAS and CEMAC, conditional on ECCAS and CEMAC merging into one organization, with ECCAS taking responsibility for the peace and security of the subregion through its security pact COPAX. CEMAC is not one of the pillars of the African Economic Community, but its members are associated with it through Economic Community of Central African States. The EU had multiple peacekeeping missions in the DR Congo: Operation Artemis (June to September 2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (from October 2003) and EUSEC DR Congo (from May 2005).
The 11th Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government in Brazzaville during January 2004 welcomed the fact that the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) had received the required number of ratifications to enter into force. The Summit also adopted a declaration on the implementation of NEPAD in Central Africa as well as a declaration on gender equality.
On September 23, 2009, pursuant to Presidential Determination 2009-26 and as published in the Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 183 (Presidential Documents 48363) ECCAS was made eligible under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act for the furnishing of defense articles and defense services. This makes the ECCAS organization and (theoretically) the countries under their charter eligible for U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program (i.e. government to government sales and assistance) pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and for other such U.S. assistance as directed by a USG contract to U.S. industry for such support pursuant to the (ITAR).
In 2007, Rwanda decided to leave the organization in order to remove overlap in its membership in regional trade blocks and so that it could better focus on its membership in the EAC and COMESA. Rwanda was a founding member of the organisation and had been a part of it since 18 October 1981. Economic integration Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (or CEMAC from its name in French: Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, in Spanish: Comunidad Económica y Monetaria de África Central, and in Portuguese: Comunidade Económica e Monetária da África Central) is an organization of states of Central Africa established by Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to promote economic integration among countries that share a common currency, the CFA franc. UDEAC signed a treaty for the establishment of CEMAC to promote the entire process of sub-regional integration through the forming of monetary union with the Central Africa CFA franc as a common currency; it was officially superseded by CEMAC in June 1999 (through agreement from 1994).
CEMAC’s objectives are the promotion of trade, the institution of a genuine common market, and greater solidarity among peoples and towards under-privileged countries and regions. In 1994, it succeeded in introducing quota restrictions and reductions in the range and amount of tariffs. Currently, CEMAC countries share a common financial, regulatory, and legal structure, and maintain a common external tariff on imports from non-CEMAC countries. In theory, tariffs have been eliminated on trade within CEMAC, but full implementation of this has been delayed. Movement of capital within CEMAC is free.
The ultimate goal is to establish a Central African Common Market. At the Malabo Heads of State and Government Conference in 1999, four priority fields for the organization were identified: to develop capacities to maintain peace, security and stability – as essential prerequisites for economic and social development to develop physical, economic and monetary integration to develop a culture of human integration to establish an autonomous financing mechanism for ECCAS.
Structure Conference of Heads of State and Government Council of Ministers Secretariat General (one secretary-general elected for four years and three assistant secretaries-general) Court of Justice Consultative Commission.
Treaties and protocols Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Protocol Establishing the Network of Parliamentarians of ECCAS (REPAC) Mutual Assistance Pact between Member States of ECCAS Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa (COPAX).
Peace and security activities Central African states adopted a pact of non-aggression at the end of the fifth meeting of the UN Consultative Committee on Security in Central Africa held in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The pact, adopted on 9 September 1994, was arrived at after five days of meeting and discussions between military experts and ministers of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe. At a summit conference of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa which took place in Yaoundé on 25–26 February 1999, member states decided to create an organisation for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, which would be called the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). The COPAX Protocol has now entered into force.
Technical organs of the COPAX council The Central African Early-Warning System (MARAC), which collects and analyses data for the early detection and prevention of crises. The Defence and Security Commission (CDS), which is the meeting of chiefs of staff of national armies and commanders-in-chief of police and gendarmerie forces from the different member states. Its role is to plan, organize and provide advice to the decision-making bodies of the community in order to initiate military operations if needed.
The Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) which is a non-permanent force consisting of military contingents from member states whose purpose is to accomplish missions of peace, security and humanitarian relief. The standing orders for COPAX, including those of CDS, MARAC and FOMAC were adopted in June 2002 at the 10th Ordinary Summit in Malabo.
In January 2000, Gabon hosted a regional peacekeeping exercise “Gabon 2000” with the objective of increasing the capacity of ECCAS states in the field of peacekeeping and conflict prevention and management. This exercise represented a direct application of the French RECAMP-concept (reinforcement of African peacekeeping capacities).
Extraordinary Summits of both ECCAS and CEMAC took place in Libreville on 23 June 2000. Foreign ministers from 10 Central African states met in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 16 and 17 August 2001 to discuss security in their war-torn region. The meeting was sponsored by the United Nations, and only Rwanda declined to attend.
A meeting of Defence Chiefs of Staff was held in Brazzaville in October 2003, at which it was decided that a brigade-size peacekeeping force would be created in order to intervene in unstable Central African areas.[11] This could then form one of the African Union’s five planned brigades of the African Standby Force, one brigade for each region (North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa). The meeting recommended that military planners from each of the ECCAS states form a group to work out the details for the force. They also suggested the establishment of a joint peacekeeping training centre and military exercises every two years. The first of these is to take place in Chad.
MICOPAX
The Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) is a peace operation in the Central African Republic led by the ECCAS.[12] It’s involved in the Central African Republic Bush War and 2012–2013 Central African Republic conflict.
Appendices to the ECCAS Treaty Protocol on the Rules of Origin for products to be traded between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Non-Tariff Trade Barriers Protocol on the Re-export of goods within the ECCAS Protocol on Transit and Transit facilities Protocol on Customs cooperation within the ECCAS Protocol on the Fund for Compensation for Loss of Revenue Protocol on Freedom of movement and Rights of Establishment of nationals of member states within the ECCAS Protocol on the Clearing House for the ECCAS Protocol on Cooperation in Agricultural development between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Cooperation in Industrial development between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Cooperation in Transport and Communications between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Cooperation in Science and Technology between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Energy cooperation between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Cooperation in Natural resources between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Cooperation in the development of Human resources, Education, Training and Culture between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on Cooperation in Tourism between member states of the ECCAS Protocol on the Simplification and Harmonization of Trade documents and Procedures within the ECCAS Protocol on the Situation of Landlocked, Semi-Landlocked, Island, Part-Island and/or Least Advanced Countries.
Apart from structural weakness which characterizes the Central African region, progress with regional integration is hindered by political instability and armed conflicts over the period 1990-1998 the average GDP growth of UDEAC members was only 0.9 percent, implying a decline of per capita income of about 2.1 percent per annum. Conditions were even worse in the smaller ECGLC group, where average GDP growth deteriorated by 3.1 percent between 1990 and 1998, implying a more than 6 percent decline in per capita income per annum (ADR, 2000). However, because of economic activity and trade patterns depicted by those of the exporting countries in the region (Cameroon, Congo and Gabon), growth prospects slightly improve in view of the rebound in oil prices. Importantly, conflict resolution in the establishment of peace and security in the region are fundamental conditions for the resumption of economic activity and progress within their scheme of regional integration.
4.0Conclusion
An overall assessment of Africa‘s experience with regional integration reveals, however, that regional integration and cooperation groupings have achieved limited success (African Development Report 2000). While the existence of informal border trade between countries is acknowledged, the consensus is that there has been no significant increase in inter-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of member countries between 1970 and 1 990s, intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of member has actually declined in all major regional groupings with the exception of Arab Maghreb Union (AMLI), ECOWAS and WAEMU‘s predecessor, the West African Economic Community (CEAO).
5.0 Summary
Apart from structural weakness which characterizes the Central African region, progress with regional integration is hindered by political instability and armed conflicts over the period 1990-1998 the average GDP growth of UDEAC members was only 0.9 percent, implying a decline of per capita income of about 2.1 percent per annum. Conditions were even worse in the smaller ECGLC group, where average GDP growth deteriorated by 3.1 percent between 1990 and 1998, implying a more than 6 percent decline in per capita income per annum (ADR, 2000).
- Tutor-Marked Assignment
What is the full meaning of MICOPAX?
7.0 References
“Traité instituant une Union douanière et économique de l‘Afrique centrale” (PDF) (in French). CEMAC. Retrieved 22 July 2012. “CEMAC EN BREF” (in French). CEMAC. Retrieved 22 July 2012.
Alen Angok. “PRÉSENTATION”. Ge-Infonet (in French). Retrieved 22 July 2012. http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-23086.htm “SADC, COMESA and the EAC: Conflicting regional and trade agendas”. Institute for Global Dialogue. October 2008. Retrieved 7 May 2011.
CEMAC website
CEMAC Treaty (in French)
Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) “National Trade Estimates Report – Cameroon” US Fed News, 31 March 2006 “Etats Membres”. Economic Community of Central African States. Archived from the original on 2013-08-24.
UK House of Commons, House of Commons Written Answers 28 April 2004, part 37, accessed March 2009 “MICOPAX”. EuropeAid – European Commission. 2012-05-15.
UNIT 2 REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 History and membership of Regional Integration in Southern Africa
3.2 Structure and decision-making procedures
3.3 Challenges facing member countries
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading
- INTRODUCTION
Unit 1 examined the history and the formation of regional integration in East and Central Africa with its attendant challenges. We shall examine regional integration in South Africa in this unit.
- OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, students should be able to:
- Name the member states that make up SADC
- Mention its institutions and give a background history of it formation.
- Analyse its successes and challenges.
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Southern African Development Community (SADC)
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an inter-governmental organization headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana. Its goal is to further socioeconomic cooperation and integration as well as political and security cooperation among 15 southern African states. It complements the role of the African Union. SADC has 15 member states:
Angola, Botswana
Democratic Republic of the Congo – since 8 September 1997
Lesotho
Madagascar – membership reinstated on 30 January 2014 after an imposed suspension in 2009
Malawi
Mauritius – since 28 August 1995
Mozambique
Namibia – since 21 March 1990 (since independence)
Seychelles – also previously a member of SADC from 8 September 1997 until 1 July 2004 then joined again in 2008.
South Africa – since 30 August 1994
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
History The origins of SADC lie in the 1960s and 1970s, when the leaders of majority-ruled countries and national liberation movements coordinated their political, diplomatic and military struggles to bring an end to colonial and white-minority rule in southern Africa. The immediate forerunner of the political and security cooperation leg of today’s SADC was the informal Frontline States (FLS) grouping. It was formed in 1980. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was the forerunner of the socio-economic cooperation leg of today’s SADC. The adoption by nine majority-ruled southern African countries of the Lusaka declaration on 1 April 1980 paved the way for the formal establishment of SADCC in April 1980.
Membership of the FLS and SADCC sometimes differed. SADCC was transformed into SADC on 17 August 1992, with the adoption by the founding members of SADCC and newly independent Namibia of the Windhoek declaration and treaty establishing SADC. The 1992 SADC provided for both socioeconomic cooperation and political and security cooperation. In reality, the FLS was dissolved only in 1994, after South Africa’s first democratic elections. Subsequent efforts to place political and security cooperation on a firm institutional footing under SADC’s umbrella failed.
On 14 August 2001, the 1992 SADC treaty was amended. The amendment heralded the overhaul of the structures, policies and procedures of SADC, a process which is ongoing. One of the changes is that political and security cooperation is institutionalised in the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). One of the principal SADC bodies, it is subject to the oversight of the organisation’s supreme body, the Summit, which comprises the heads of state or government.
The organisation holds its own multi-sport event in the form of the SADC Games, which was first held in 2004 in Maputo. Originally planned for an earlier date in Malawi and Lesotho, organisational issues led to abandonment of the plan and the SADC issuing a fine of $100,000 against Malawi. The first event in 2004 in Maputo resulted in over 1000 youths under-20 from 10 countries taking part in a sports programme including athletics, football, netball, boxing and basketball.
SADC Protocols SADC has 27 legally binding protocols dealing with issues such as Defence, Development, Illicit Drug Trade, Free Trade and Movement of People. Protocol on Energy (1996) – Intended to promote harmonious development of national energy policies. These development strategies set out tangible objectives for SADC and its Member States for infrastructure development in energy and its subsectors of wood fuel, petroleum and natural gas, electricity, goal, renewable energy, and energy efficiency and conservation. Protocol on Gender and Development – Member states are urged to accelerate implementation efforts towards the achievements of concrete and transformative changes in the lives of women and girls in our region. H.E. President Mutharika also expressed concern on the escalating incidents of gender-based violence in the region especially those perpetrated against women and girls, and used this occasion to sign a commitment to end child marriages, as part of the AU campaign to end Child Marriages in Africa.
SADC FTA The SADC Free Trade Area was established in August 2008, after the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade in 2000 laid the foundation for its formation.[7][8] Its original members were Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with Malawi joining later. Of the 15 SADC member states, only Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles are not yet participating.
On Wednesday 22 October 2008, SADC joined with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the East African Community to form the African Free Trade Zone, including all members of each of the organizations. The leaders of the three trading blocs agreed to create a single free trade zone, the African Free Trade Zone, consisting of 26 countries with a GDP of an estimated $624bn (£382.9bn). It is hoped the African Free Trade Zone agreement would ease access to markets within the zone and end problems arising from the fact that several of the member countries belong to multiple groups. The African Free Trade Zone effective has been more than a hundred years in the making–a trade zone spanning the whole African continent from Cape to Cairo and envisioned by Cecil Rhodes and other British imperialists in the 1890s. The only difference is that the African Free Trade Zone is the creation of independent African Countries. The idea is a free trade zone spanning the whole continent from the Cape to Cairo (Cape Town in the Republic of South Africa to Cairo in Egypt).
In addition to eliminating duplicative membership and the problem member states also participating in other regional economic cooperation schemes and regional political and security cooperation schemes that may compete with or undermine each other, the African Free Trade Zone further aims to strengthen the bloc’s bargaining power when negotiating international deals
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
Mention the members of the African Free Trade Zone
3.2 Challenges facing member countries
SADC countries face many social, development, economic, trade, education, health, diplomatic, defence, security and political challenges. Some of these challenges cannot be tackled effectively by individual members. Cattle diseases and organized crime gangs know no boundaries. War in one country can suck in its neighbours and damage their economies. The sustainable development that trade could bring is threatened by the existence of different product standards and tariff regimes, weak customs infrastructure and bad roads. The socio-economic and political and security cooperation aims of SADC are equally wide-ranging, and intended to address the various common challenges.
One significant challenge is that member states also participate in other regional economic cooperation schemes and regional political and security cooperation schemes that may compete with or undermine SADC’s aims. For example, South Africa and Botswana both belong to the Southern Africa Customs Union, Zambia is a part of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and Tanzania is a member of the East African Community.
Aims SADC’s aims are set out in different sources. The sources include the treaty establishing the organisation (SADC treaty); various protocols (other SADC treaties, such as the corruption protocol, the firearms protocol, the OPDS protocol, the health protocol and the education protocol); development and cooperation plans such as the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO); and declarations such as those on HIV and AIDS and food security. Not all of the pre-2001 treaties and plans have been harmonised with the more detailed and recent plans such as the RISDP and SIPO.
In some areas, mere coordination of national activities and policies is the aim of cooperation. In others, the member states aim at more far-reaching forms of cooperation. For example, on foreign policy the main aim is coordination and cooperation, but in terms of trade and economic policy, a tighter coordination is in progress with a view to one day establishing a common market with common regulatory institutions. The sustainable use of natural resources is commonly shared by member states.
SADC has recently received the top position in a global comparison of indicators of Water Cooperation prepared by international think-tank Strategic Foresight Group. SADC has scored 100 in the Water Cooperation Quotient, which examines active cooperation by riparian countries in the management of water resources using 10 parameters, including legal, political, technical, environmental, economic and institutional aspects. High performance in the Water Cooperation Quotient also means low risk of war between countries in the concerned river basic to reduce economic dependence of SADC countries on South Africa.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
Identify and discuss some of the sources in which some of SADC aims are set.
3.3 Structure and decision-making procedures
The organisation has six principal bodies: The Summit, comprising heads of state or heads of government Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Council of Ministers SADC Tribunal SADC National Committees (SNCs) Secretariat Except for the Tribunal (based in Windhoek, Namibia), SNCs and Secretariat, decision-making is by consensus.
Leaders SADC headquarters building in Gaborone, Botswana.
Chairperson Country Chairperson Term
Zambia Levy Mwanawasa 2007–2008
South Africa Kgalema Motlanthe 2008–2009
Democratic Republic of the Congo Joseph Kabila 2009-2010
Namibia Hage Geingob 2010–2011
Angola Jose Eduardo dos Santos 2011–2012
Mozambique Armando Guebuza 2012–2013 Peter Mutharika 2013 – 31 May 2014, 31 May – 17 August 2014
Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe 2014 – 17 August 2015
Botswana Seretse Ian Khama 17 August 2015 – Executive Secretary
Zimbabwe Simba Makoni 1984–1994
Namibia Kaire Mbuende 1994–2000
Mauritius Prega Ramsamy 2000–2001 (Acting) 2001–2005
Mozambique Thomas Salomao 2005–2013
Tanzania Stergomena Tax Incumbent
1 Economic bloc inside a pillar REC
2 Proposed for pillar REC, but objecting participation
3 Non-African members of GAFTA are excluded from figures smallest value among the blocs compared largest value among the blocs compared During 2004.
Timeline 2 November – rail link from Chipata to Mpika proposed, providing shorter access to sea at Nacala. 12 April “Confusion surrounds Mugabe’s appearance at crisis meeting” 12 August – Germany commits €300m for development to SADC Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) East African Community (EAC) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
4.0Conclusion
SADC countries face many social, development, economic, trade, education, health, diplomatic, defence, security and political challenges. Some of these challenges cannot be tackled effectively by individual members. Cattle diseases and organisedcrime gangs know no boundaries. War in one country can suck in its neighbours and damage their economies.
5.0 Summary
SADC has recently received the top position in a global comparison of indicators of Water Cooperation prepared by international think-tank Strategic Foresight Group. SADC has scored 100 in the Water Cooperation Quotient, which examines active cooperation by riparian countries in the management of water resources using 10 parameters, including legal, political, technical, environmental, economic and institutional aspects.
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
Critically analyse the operations of SADC and compare it to that of ASEAN
- References
“SADC Lifts Madagascar Suspension”. SADC. Retrieved 30 January 2014.
Organisation of SADC Games to cost a million dollars. Panapress (2003-05-11) Retrieved on 2014-09-15.
Valy, Bayano (June 2004). The first Under-20 Zone Six SADC Games. SADC Today, Vol.7 No.2 June 2004. Retrieved on 2014-09-15.
Southern African Development Community :: SADC Protocols. Sadc.int. Retrieved on 2013-08-09. “South African Development Community”. www.sadc.int. Retrieved 3 November 2014. “Southern African Development Community”. www.sadc.int. Retrieved 3 November 2014. “Free Trade Area”. Southern African Development Community. Retrieved 14 Mar 2014. “Southern African Development Community Protocol on Trade” (PDF). Southern African Development Community. 1996. Retrieved 14 Mar 2015.
Mbola, Bathandwa (18 Aug 2008). “SADC launches free trade area”. Southafrica.info – Brand South Africa portal website. Retrieved 14 Mar 2015. “Free Trade Area”. Southern African Development Community. Retrieved 14 Mar 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7684903.stm Deep Integration
Water Cooperation for a Secure World, Strategic Foresight Group, http://www.strategicforesight.com/publications.php#.UoW1ZXCnq_Q
Railways Africa – EXTENDING BEYOND CHIPATA Confusion surrounds Mugabe’s appearance at crisis meeting – ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) “The Southern Times”.
UNIT 3 REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA (ECOWAS)
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 History of Regional Integration in West Africa
3.2 West African experience with Regional Integration
3.3 ECOWAS Initiatives
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading
- INTRODUCTION
The previous unit has examined regional integration in Southern Africa, its history, institutions, aims and objective and its achievement and successes. In this unit we will also examine regional integration in West Africa, explore its origins, aims and objectives and find out if it has achieved integration in the West African sub region.
- OBJECTIVE
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- Discuss the nature and origin of ECOWAS
- Mention the states that are members of the union
- Identify its obstacles and challenges
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Regional Integration in West Africa Institutional
Background
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formally established in May 1975 by the ECOWAS Treaty. In 1993, the ECOWAS Treaty was revised to accelerate the process of integration and establish an economic and monetary union to stimulate economic growth and development in West Africa with the following objectives: (i) the removal of customs duties for intra-ECOWAS trade and taxes having equivalent effect, (ii) the establishment of a common external tariff; (iii) the harmonization of economic and financial policies; and (iv) the creation of a single monetary zone. As Mauritania decided to withdraw in 1999, ECOWAS is now a regional grouping of fifteen countries (including the eight WAEMU country members): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d‘Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS; French: Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, CEDEAO) is a regional group of fifteen West African countries. Founded on 28 May 1975, with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos, its mission is to promote economic integration across the region.
Considered one of the pillars of the African Economic Community, the organization was founded in order to achieve “collective self-sufficiency” for its member states by creating a single large trading bloc through an economic and trading union. It also serves as a peacekeeping force in the region. The organization operates officially in three co-equal languages—French, English, and Portuguese.
The ECOWAS consists of two institutions to implement policies—the ECOWAS Commission and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, formerly known as the Fund for Cooperation until it was renamed in 2001.
A few members of the organization have come and gone over the years. In 1976 Cape Verde joined ECOWAS, and in December 2000 Mauritania withdrew, having announced its intention to do so in December 1999.
Regional security cooperation
See also: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
The ECOWAS nations assigned a non-aggression protocol in 1990 along with two earlier agreements in 1978 and 1981. They also signed a Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981 that provided for the establishment of an Allied Armed Force of the Community.
Expanded ECOWAS Commission
For the third time since its inception in 1975, ECOWAS is undergoing institutional reforms. The first was when it revised its treaty on 24 July 1993; the second was in 2007, when the Secretariat was transformed into a Commission. As of July 2013, ECOWAS now has six new departments (Human Resources Management; Education, Science and Culture; Energy and Mines; Telecommunications and IT; Industry and Private Sector Promotion. Finance and Administration to Sierra Leone has been decoupled, to give the incoming Ghana Commissioner the new portfolio of Administration and Conferences)
The Community Court of Justice
The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice was created by a protocol signed in 1991 and was later included in Article 6 of the Revised Treaty of the Community in 1993. However, the Court did not officially begin operations until the 1991 protocol came into effect on 5 November 1996. The jurisdiction of the court is outlined in Article 9 and Articles 76 of the Revised Treaty and allows rulings on disputes between states over interpretations of the Revised Treaty. It also provides the ECOWAS Council with advisory opinions on legal issues (Article 10). Like its companion courts the European Court of Human Rights and East African Court of Justice, it has jurisdiction to rule on fundamental human rights breaches.
Sporting and cultural exchange
ECOWAS nations organize a broad array of cultural and sports event under the auspices of the body, including the CEDEAO Cup in football, the 2012 ECOWAS Games and the Miss CEDEAO beauty pageant.
Economic integration
West African Economic and Monetary Union
UEMOA
WAMZ
ECOWAS only (Cape Verde)
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (also known as UEMOA from its name in French, Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine) is an organization of eight West African states. It was established to promote economic integration among countries that share the CFA franc as a common currency. UEMOA was created by a Treaty signed at Dakar, Senegal, on 10 January 1994, by the heads of state and governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d‘Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. On 2 May 1997, Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony, became the organization‘s eighth (and only non-Francophone) member state.
UEMOA is a customs union and currency union between the members of ECOWAS. Its objectives include the following:
- Greater economic competitiveness, through open markets, in addition to the rationalization and harmonization of the legal environment
- The convergence of macro-economic policies and indicators
- The creation of a common market
- The coordination of sectoral policies
- The harmonization of fiscal policies
Among its achievements, the UEMOA has successfully implemented macroeconomic convergence criteria and an effective surveillance mechanism. It has adopted a customs union and common external tariff and has combined indirect taxation regulations, in addition to initiating regional structural and sectoral policies. A September 2002 IMF survey cited the UEMOA as “the furthest along the path toward integration” of all the regional groupings in Africa.
ECOWAS and UEMOA have developed a common plan of action on trade liberalization and macroeconomic policy convergence. The organizations have also agreed on common rules of origin to enhance trade, and ECOWAS has agreed to adopt UEMOA‘s customs declaration forms and compensation mechanisms.
Membership
ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development headquarters in Lome.
- Benin (Founding Member)
- Burkina Faso (Founding Member)
- Ivory Coast (Founding Member)
- Guinea-Bissau (Joined on 2 May 1997)
- Mali (Founding Member)
- Niger (Founding Member) Senegal (Founding Member)
- Togo (Founding Member)
West African Monetary Zone
See also: Eco (currency)
Formed in 2000, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) is a group of six countries within ECOWAS that plan to introduce a common currency, the Eco, by the year 2015. The six member states of WAMZ are Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone who founded the organisation together in 2000 and Liberia who joined on 16 February 2010. Apart from Guinea, which is Francophone, they are all English speaking countries. Along with Mauritania, Guinea opted out of the CFA franc currency shared by all other former French colonies in West and Central Africa.
The WAMZ attempts to establish a strong stable currency to rival the CFA franc, whose exchange rate is tied to that of the Euro and is guaranteed by the French Treasury. The eventual goal is for the CFA franc and Eco to merge, giving all of West and Central Africa a single, stable currency. The launch of the new currency is being developed by the West African Monetary Institute based in Accra, Ghana.
Membership
- Gambia (Founding Member)
- Ghana (Founding Member)
- Guinea (Founding Member)
- Liberia (Joined on 16 February 2010)
- Nigeria (Founding Member)
- Sierra Leone (Founding Member)
Transport
Main article:
ECOWAS rail
A Trans-ECOWAS project, established in 2007, plans to upgrade railways in this zone.
ECOWAS Institutions
ECOWAS institutional design is loosely patterned after the European Union. Besides the Executive Secretariat, ECOWAS institutions include: The Authority of Heads of State and Government led by the President of Senegal for 2002, a Council of Ministers, a Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development. Other Institutions include a Parliament, an Economic and Social Council and a Court of Justice.
Economic Background
The ECOWAS region had a population of 245 million in 2002 with a dominant Nigeria economy, counting for half of the population and half of the regional aggregate GDP. It consists broadly of two distinct zones – a Sahelian zone, largely landlocked, and a more humid, forested coastal zone. Besides, this geographic specificity, eight ECOWAS members also belong to WAEMU, a customs and monetary union. ECOWAS‘s exports are mostly comprised of a limited range of agricultural commodities. This reliance on internationally traded commodities leaves ECOWAS countries vulnerable to the external shocks of international market price fluctuations. Since all countries but Nigeria are net oil importers, fluctuations in oil prices on the import side are often combined with commodity price shocks on the export side. Manufactured exports are negligible. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade remains marginal, at some 10 percent reflecting the lack of complementarities of the economies.
The ECOWAS sub-region has benefited from the improvement of performance achieved in the WAEMU zone during 1994-1998 after the positive impact of the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. However, beginning in 1998, the economic performance of the sub-region as a whole has weakened, primarily because of a sharp decline in the terms of trade (-3.3% in 1999), and political uncertainties in several countries, notably Côte d’Ivoire. Growth resumed since 2000 with a growth rate of 2.6% and 3.5% in 2001. It was estimated at 0.9% in 2002.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
In what year was ECOWAS formed and who were the founding fathers?
3.2 West African experience with Regional Integration
Although the concepts and practice of regional integration and cooperation as they have come to be known in the international community are of relatively recent vintage, West Africa should be counted among the regions of the world with a certain experience in this area. There are some 40 IGOs in this region, some of which have their origins in the colonial past. Most of them are subject-specific or represent loose forms of regional cooperation, but there are also three economic communities, each pursuing the economic integration of its member countries. The first of these to be established was the West African Economic Community (CEAO) in 1972, through the conversion of the much older customs and economic grouping, the Union douanière et économique de l‘Afrique de l‘Ouest (UDEAO). Disbanded on 14 March 1994, CEAO has been supplanted by the West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA). The other economic communities are the Mano River Union (MRU), established in 1973, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), formed in 1975. Membership in these communities just prior to CEAO‘s disbandment consisted respectively of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d‘Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal for CEAO Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone for MRU; and all 16 West African countries, from Cape Verde to Nigeria for ECOWAS.
The major emphasis in creating each of the three communities was the liberalization of intra community trade and related forms of cooperation, such as the regional roads and telecommunications networks supported by ECOWAS. Other areas of ECOWAS activity have included measures to facilitate the free flow of people, through the introduction of visa-free travel for citizens of West African countries throughout the region, and recognition of people‘s right to reside and settle in any country of the region. ECOWAS has also adopted agricultural and industrial cooperation programmes designed to expand the regional production base and foster greater complementarity among the various national production systems.
The three communities have also promoted some specific projects. CEAO has established a management institute in Dakar (CESAG), a fisheries institute in Nouadhibou, Mauritania, and the Regional Centre for Solar Energy (CRES) in Bamako. MRU has similarly created a number of institutes at the service of the union: telecommunications in Freetown, maritime training in Monrovia, and forestry training in Bomi Hills, Liberia. Financial institutions responsible for funding regional integration projects and programs have been part of both the CEAO and ECOWAS initiatives (FOSIDEC and the ECOWAS Fund, respectively).
Unlike the three economic communities, other West African IGOs have more specialized ambitions. Each of them was established to help its member countries solve a common problem or promote the development of shared resources (see ECA/MULPOC 1993).
In the area of monetary cooperation, the West African Monetary Union (UMOA) has now become UEMOA, as of January 1994. It groups seven francophone countries under the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), which is the issuing authority of the Union‘s common currency, the CFA franc. Relatively successful, thanks to the supranational nature of the institution and external support from France, the Union has now expanded its functions beyond that of monetary cooperation, into the economic sphere. For West Africa as a whole, the central banks of the region established the West African Clearing House (WACH) to facilitate intraregional transactions and economize on the use of foreign convertible currencies. The scope of WACH is now being enlarged, and it is being transformed into the West African Monetary Agency. This Agency will be a specialized ECOWAS institution responsible for the ECOWAS monetary program, whose objective is the creation of a single monetary zone, with a single common currency replacing the ten existing ones (the CFA franc and nine inconvertible currencies).
Several IGOs are active in the fields of agriculture and natural resource management. These include: the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), created in 1973 to address the growing menace of drought and desertification; this organization has been the focal point for both external and local efforts at controlling ecological degradation and promoting sustainable development in the Sahel; the Communauté économique du bétail et de la viande (CEBV) set up in 1970 to strengthen the livestock industry (a major economic sector in the savannah zone) and better organise the cattle trade between the producing and consuming countries of the region; the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), established in 1970 to improve the production of rice, a staple in West Africa; two major pest-management organizations, the Organisation internationale de lutte contre le criquet migrateur africain (OICMA) and the Organisation commune de lutte anti-acridienne et de lutte anti-aviaire (OCLALAV), created to address the widespread destruction of crops by locusts and other migratory pests, in the Sahelian region especially; river and lake basin organizations, such as the Niger Basin Authority, the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), the Gambia River Development Organization (OMVG), and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC); and the Liptako Gourma Authority, an organization for the coordinated and accelerated development of the resources of a region shared by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
In the area of human resource development, there are two West African organisations in the health sector: the West African Health Community (WAHC) and the Coordination and Cooperation Organization for the Control for the Major Endemic Disease (OCCGE). They are being merged into the West African Health Organization, a specialized agency of ECOWAS. In the field of education, there are the West African Examinations Council (WAEC) and its francophone equivalent, the African and Malagasy Council on Higher Education (CAMES).
Finally, ECOWAS has encouraged the formation of a number of associations to involve the citizens of West Africa in the integration process; these include the West African Youth Union, the West African Women‘s Association, and the West African Workers‘ Union. There are also regional business associations like the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of West African Manufacturers Associations, the West African Banks‘ Association, and the Union of West African Road Transporters. This is an impressive array of regional organizations, and the policies and programmes initiated by these various IGOs provide a ready foundation on which to build the integration process. It is an achievement for 16 developing countries to have agreed on schemes for a free-trade area, the free movement of people, monetary union, regional defense cooperation, and the joint development of regional transport and communications networks, as ECOWAS member states have done. This is a mark of the solidarity and the community spirit that have evolved over the years among West African countries, despite the different colonial experiences, linguistic and cultural backgrounds, and legal and administrative systems that have divided the region.
A question frequently asked is how the coexistence of so many different IGOs affects the regional integration process. Although the multiplicity of IGOs may be indicative of the desire of West African countries to cooperate, the resultant duplication and financial burden must also be kept in mind. The ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government first addressed this issue in 1983, and proposed the rationalization of these IGOs. A joint ECA-ECOWAS study on rationalization was completed in 1987 (ECA and ECOWAS 1987) and its proposals for institutional reform were adopted by the ECOWAS Authority in 1991. It was decided that there should be a single regional economic community whose responsibility it would be to set integration policies and monitor the general process of regional integration. Specialized institutions of ECOWAS were to evolve out of certain existing sector specific IGOs to manage regional programmes in such areas as monetary integration, the mobilization of development finance, environmental protection (particularly drought and desertification control), regional food security (cereal production, livestock development, and pest control), development of river basins, human health, and human resource development.
The rationalization issue is of particular relevance for the three economic communities, ECOWAS, CEAO/UEMOA, and MRU, which overlap and compete with each other, each with a different scheme for the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers. These three schemes were conceived to operate with different rules of origin, customs documents and compensation schemes, so it should come as no surprise that the operation of three trade liberalization schemes in the same region has created certain difficulties and impeded the development of trade between member countries. Some efforts at coordination have been made, and the secretariats of the three economic communities developed a single regional scheme that was adopted by the 16 ECOWAS countries in 1983. The scheme was reviewed in June 1992, and certain modifications were adopted by the member countries. However, there has been little progress since then.
Resolutions such as the 1991 decision to designate ECOWAS as the sole economic community in West Africa and to rationalize the other IGOs under its umbrella, accomplish little if they are not actually implemented, and efforts should be made to deepen our understanding of the politics behind this and similar decisions. As Bourenane argues elsewhere such analysis is fundamental to the definition of a realistic set of objectives and strategies for regional integration and cooperation in West Africa. Why was the relationship between ECOWAS and the other two communities not defined in 1975 and incorporated into the ECOWAS Treaty from the start? Why, less than 3 years after the 1991 decision to make ECOWAS the sole economic community in West Africa, did the francophone countries decide to establish the competing UEMOA? Issues such as these, relating to the motivations and expectations of countries involved in regional cooperation and integration schemes, but do merit further attention, because they condition the realistic expectations that one may have of the possibilities for closer cooperation or the acceleration of the integration process. That the current trade liberalization schemes have had little impact on trade flows within the region is readily acknowledged. Trade liberalization has been largely insignificant under MRU, negligible under ECOWAS, and somewhat limited even under CEAO, which has had the most success in this area. Intra-ECOWAS trade has stagnated since the creation of the Community. It finally increased as a proportion of total trade during the recessionary years of the late 1980s, rising from about 7% to 10% (Hess 1991, vol. II, p. 8), but this cannot be attributed to ECOWAS, in the absence of effective implementation of the trade-liberalization program under that regional body. Intra-CEAO trade increased rapidly in the early years, but then stabilized. At the end of the 1980s, it stood at about 10% of officially recorded trade among those countries (Hess 1991, vol. II, p. 11).
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
Where is the headquarters of ECOWAS?
3.3 ECOWAS
Initiatives Progress on other ECOWAS initiatives has been mixed. Highlights include the impressive progress in the transport and communications sector thanks to external funding of the coastal highway (now 82% complete), the trans-Sahelian highway (76% complete), and the West African portion of the Pan African Telecommunications Network that now links all the countries in the region. Much has also been achieved under the first two phases of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of people. Visa-free travel has been achieved since 1986, and the right of residence is now fairly widely applied. The third d last phase, the right of establishment, is yet to be widely applied in the region.
A development that augurs well for the future of regional integration is the establishment of regular dialogue among West African economic and financial policymakers since 1987. ECOWAS ministers of planning and finance have been involved in discussions aimed at greater harmonization of national approaches to macroeconomic issues, such as external indebtedness and the effects of the European Common Market on West African countries. They have also attempted to reassess national structural adjustment programs from a regional perspective with a view to developing a regional program for economic recovery. The governors of central banks also meet regularly to evaluate and reorient the ECOWAS monetary integration program, whose objective is to establish a single West African monetary zone by the year 2000. A Consultative Forum was finally established in 1992 to formalize meetings between central bank governors and ministers of planning and finance as a mechanism for the harmonization of economic and financial policies of ECOWAS member states. The Forum met for the first time during the Council of Ministers‘ session of July 1993, thus launching the regional process of economic harmonization to ensure that future structural adjustment or economic reform programs are better suited to the development and integration needs of member states.
In the monetary sphere, UMOA stands as an example of successful cooperation that has remained intact from the colonial era, but for West Africa as a whole, the record is dismal. So far, WACH has accomplished little of substance and has been described as ―practically defunct‖ (Hess 1991, vol. II). One can only hope for better results from the new West African Monetary Agency, which has set itself the role of greater coordination of monetary policy as a first task, in preparation for eventual monetary union in the region.
ECOWAS, CEAO, and other regional institutions have been involved in such a wide range of activities that one can hardly hope to do justice to their achievements in an overview such as this one. However, there is general consensus that the various regional cooperation and integration schemes in West Africa have not had a significant impact on development in the region. For the most part, it would appear that IGOs have succeeded in getting their member countries to adopt their various programs and schemes while falling short of actual implementation. Among the problems encountered within ECOWAS has been the slow rate of ratification of Community conventions and protocols, the low rate of implementation of Community acts and decisions, delays in reacting to requests for information from member states, poor attendance at
ECOWAS meetings and delays in payment of contributions
Obviously, not all West African countries have come to terms with what regional integration entails and what contributions and sacrifices are expected of the partner states. Some observers have tried to attribute such apparent indifference and apathy to the economic crisis, which emptied governments and interrupted national long-term development programs. However, the problem is not so simple. The rest of this chapter discusses some of the other factors that have affected the process and how these problems are being addressed in the revised ECOWAS Treaty.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
Name and discuss some of ECOWAS initiatives
3.4 Constitutionalism and Regional Integration in West Africa
Africa‘s deficit of constitutionalism has undermined the process of regional integration in several ways. Just as the habit of shared power has facilitated the transition to supranational forms of authority in Europe, so its absence in Africa has undermined that process. The concentration of power in the hands of personal rules in African countries has made the sharing of that power especially difficult, due to the jealousy with which those rulers have guarded their personal fiefdoms. Politically, a system of governance that is devoid of defined mechanisms and structures of representation or participation undermines the kind of consistent political commitment and long-term legitimacy that regional integration demands, because a change of ruler is sufficient to undermine agreements arrived at by his predecessor. Concentration of power also makes it difficult to promote healthy intergovernmental relations at levels other than the very top. Finally, a system of personal rule precludes the useful role which pressure groups can play in moulding the character and direction of an integration movement, as they did in the development of the European Union (Aziz 1993, pp. 4–5).
Economically, the engine of integration must be the private sector of the national economies — if the experience of Europe is, again, any guide. Peter Drucker‘s ―new pluralisms,‖ referred to earlier, have played no small part in the economic integration of Western Europe. In the form of transnational enterprises, they have been instrumental in knitting Europe‘s economies together, giving applied meaning to the notions of economic community or of European Union. In West Africa, the lack of constitutionalism is impeding the possibility of similar development. The subregion lacks the atmosphere of predictable laws and institutions necessary to the stability and independence of the private sector that explains the success of Europe‘s transnational enterprises. The absence of predictability and the difficulties associated with contract enforcement, in particular, make regional economic ventures risky. Thus, most indigenous economic institutions and enterprises remain locked within existing national boundaries (Ojo 1993, p. 16), awaiting the day when the sub-regional atmosphere, in terms of constitutionalist practice, will be conducive to transborder expansion.
The absence of constitutionalist underpinnings also affects the economy in some fairly general ways, with negative consequences for regional integration. Repressive regimes stifle economic, as well as political, initiative. Repression or coercion saps human energy and leads to economic stagnation. Under such conditions, one cannot hope to galvanize the population to productive efforts, or to inspire the citizenry to look beyond the narrow confines of the national state. A constitutionalist framework creates an open society which liberates human energy, enhances creativity, and stimulates competition, to the benefit of the economy. The more developed the economies of a region, the easier it is likely to be for them to integrate, due to the larger number of products and services that can be exchanged, the greater ease of communications and transport, higher levels of education and information, etc. Economic integration thus seems more likely to flourish in the context of economic prosperity such as might be expected to emerge in a constitutionalist environment.
Arbitrary economic policies such as often accompany personal rule discourage the development of long-term economic relations between countries and tend to distort the nature of entrepreneurial activity in favour of rent-seeking behaviour, through smuggling and black market dealings, as both Meagher and Bach show in this volume. Restricted freedoms and arbitrariness at the national level are reflected at the regional level in the form of obstacles to free movement across national borders and regional trade, which are all too often of an arbitrary or extraordinary character.
With the tentative wave of democratization and economic liberalization that has spread over much of the region since the late 1980s may come greater progress in the realm of regional integration. The road yet to be traveled is a long one however, the political changes we have seen so far are often of limited substance, where they have taken place at all. What is required is not only the trappings of democratic change, but a change of mentality, consistent with constitutional rule, and a better appreciation of the role of the law in modern society.
Two suggestions can be made from a regional perspective. One is to seek a better understanding of the law in different countries and a greater degree of harmonization across linguistic boundaries. West African law schools should consider reinforcing their curriculum through teaching and research of a comparative nature on the legal systems of the subregion. Funding should be mobilized for institutions like the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and similar research centres in the subregion to embark on studies to produce standard laws and practice across linguistic boundaries in specific areas of economic interaction among the peoples of West Africa. Every standardized law on any subject adopted by the states would be a move toward the dream of a virile West African community.
Second, in the struggle for the enthronement of constitutionalism in the subregion, the ECOWAS framework can itself be usefully exploited, through reinforcement of its tribunal. A new kind of tribunal should be set up for the Community, different from the one provided for in article 11 of the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty. Given the rather tentative nature of ECOWAS as fashioned by its founding fathers, no greater function was envisaged for the tribunal than to ensure ―the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty‖ in settling disputes that may be referred to it by member state. Unfortunately, even this limited tribunal has not been established, illustrating the weak commitment of participating governments to any sort of measure capable of undermining national sovereignty.
Given the present precarious state of constitutionalism in West Africa, the sort of tribunal that is required is one that would be empowered to enforce human rights and check abuses of power on the part of governments, in addition to adjudicating issues relating to regional integration. All West African countries are signatories to the African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights adopted by the 18th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in June 1981 in Nairobi. The fact that the Charter has now been given formal recognition in the ECOWAS Revised Treaty (West Africa, 19–25 July 1993, p. 1248) is a further step in the right direction.
The next, and more important, step would be to create a tribunal to check on the infringement of the rights so established. The creation of such a tribunal would amount to a partial surrender of sovereignty on the part of participating states and an acceptance of the notion of limited government — the beginning of wisdom in matters of governance. Like the European Court of Justice, the West African tribunal would, in time, develop a stature of its own and contribute substantially to the process of integration in the subregion. The colonial period offered a precedent for such a tribunal, in Commonwealth West Africa, through the operation of the West Africa Court of Appeal between 1928 and 1954 (Elias 1963, pp. 149–151). In its appellate jurisdiction, it dealt with substantive matters of law, opening up the possibility of the development of West African common law.
4.0 CONCLUSION
Genuine progress can only be made in West Africa in an atmosphere of constitutionalism undergirded by such human values as would promote the full flowering of the human personality. Freedom is basic to development, for it is the key to releasing human energy, whether the goal is building strong national economies or the economic integration of the West African subregion. Constitutionalism was fundamental to the success of regional integration in Europe and will be a necessary ingredient to the success of regional integration in Africa.
5.0 SUMMARY
The current process of democratization and economic liberalization in the subregion moves us in the required direction, and it may be possible to build on that momentum through the creation of a regional tribunal for enforcing basic human rights in the subregion.
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
Lack of Constitutionalism has affected regional integration in West Africa. Discuss.
7.0 References/Further Readings
Alexyev, S. 1990. Socialism and law. Progress Publishers, Moscow, Russia. Awolowo, O. 1977. The problems of Africa. Macmillan, London, UK.
Burke, E. 1846. Works II. Henry G. Bohn, London, UK.
Dahrendorf, R. 1964. Recent changes in the class structure of European societies. Daedalus, Winter.
ECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa); ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). 1987. Proposals for the rationalisation of West African integration efforts. ECA, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
ECA/MULPOC (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Multinational Programming and Operational Centre). 1993. Directory of West African intergovernmental organisations. UNECA/MULPOC, Niamey, Niger.
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). 1992. Final report of the Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty. ECOWAS Secretariat, Lagos, Nigeria.
Hencken, H.L. (ed.). 1952. A new dictionary of quotations. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY, USA.
Hurwitz, L.; Lesquesne, C. (ed.). 1991. The state of the European community. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, USA. International Commission of Jurists. 1991. Justice in Guinea. The Review, 7 (December), 4–9.
Jackson, R.H.; Rosberg, C.G. 1982. Personal rule in Black Africa. University of Berkeley Press, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Kiralfy, A.R. 1958. Potter‘s historical introduction to English law and its institutions (4th ed.). Sweet and Maxwell, London, UK.
Legum, C. (ed.). 1970–71, 1972–73, 1974–75, 1975–76. Africa contemporary record. Rex Collings, London, UK. Machiavelli, N. 1940. The prince and the discourses. The Modern Library, New York, NY, USA.
Nwabueze, B.A. 1973. Constitutionalism in the emergent states. C. Hurst, London, UK. Pp. 1–21.
Ojo, O. 1992. The role of pressure groups in the growth and development of ECOWAS. Presented at the International conference on regional integration in West Africa, 11–15 January, Dakar. Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Document E/ECA/CM.17/2.
Voltaire 1926. The age of Louis XIV (translated by M.P. Pollack). Dent, London, UK.
Welch, C.E. Jr. 1990. Human rights in francophone West Africa. In Naim, A.A.;
Deng, F.M. (ed.). Human rights in Africa. Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, USA.
UNIT 4 A CRITIQUE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Objectives
3.0 Main Content
3.1 Factors Affecting Regional Integration in West Africa
3.2 Institutional Arrangements at the National level
3.3 Prospects for the Future
3.4 The building blocks of a Realistic and Dynamic Integration Strategy
4.0 Conclusion
5.0 Summary
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0 References/Further Reading
- INTRODUCTION
In the last unit we examined regional integration in West Africa, explored its origins, aims and objectives and looked into the achievement of regional integration in the West African sub region so far. In this unit, we are going to examine the challenges facing regional integration, the institutional arrangements at the national level and the prospects for the future of integration in the West Africa.
- OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you should be able to:
- Discuss the factors affecting regional integration in West Africa
- Analyse the future of regional integration in West Africa
- State how the absence of a development culture affects integration in the region.
3.0 Main content Factors affecting the Integration Process
Like the economic development that it is meant to promote, the regional integration process cannot be understood without careful consideration of the basic factors that shape and influence West African society – its ideological, socio-cultural, political, economic, institutional, and administrative dimensions — studied with regard to their impact on the regional integration process. Several issue-areas emerge as particularly relevant to an understanding of the limited progress of regional integration to date or the conditions of renewed dialogue in defining new approaches for the future. The present section systematically addresses each of these issue-areas.
The absence of a Development and Integration Culture For economic integration in West Africa to succeed in its role as an instrument for fostering the development of the partner states requires that these countries have a clear sense of their own development objectives and strategies and be fully committed to the pursuit of these goals. A development culture must be fostered, both within government and among the people, so that concern for a better future replaces preoccupation with the satisfaction of immediate needs. With development objectives placed high on the national agenda, well thought-out development strategies would not be so easily replaced with ad hoc economic management decisions, and regional integration would more easily come to the fore as a necessary component of such strategies.
Since 1975, when the countries of West Africa committed themselves to forming an economic community, how many member states have drawn up national development plans or programs with regional considerations or the regional market as their point of reference? What measures have been introduced by governments as incentives for their business communities to venture into cross-border investments and transactions, and what encouragement are ordinary people offered to think in West African terms? An integration culture is not yet conspicuous in the region nor is integration accorded the high priority it deserves on national economic agendas.
The required level of regional solidarity and community spirit can be expected to develop by itself, over time, through the accumulation of shared experiences, growing awareness of the advantages of belonging to the Community, or a clearer perception of common interests. However, this process could be actively reinforced through national mechanisms to promote the virtues of regional integration while propagating knowledge and understanding of how regional cooperation can be used in support of national development goals.
The political Dimension It was the rise of nationalism that inspired the peoples of the colonies to seek political independence. Subsequently, the creation of a national identity and the exercise of national sovereignty have been prominent features of the post-independence political agenda. Today, that legacy of national sovereignty and the jealousy with which it is guarded have become obstacles to progress on the road to regional integration, which requires a certain sharing of sovereignty among members of the community. Exacerbating this tendency are other aspects of the colonial heritage that continue to influence national institutions and attitudes in the political as in other fields, including differences in legal and educational systems or administrative structures or the North South orientation of national economic structures.
Differences in political ideology have also influenced attitudes and approaches to regional integration. For example, during the negotiation of the ECOWAS rules of origin and the Protocol on Community Enterprises, socialist governments and national administrations that were pursuing strong indigenization policies fought for a regional policy that encouraged greater state or indigenous participation. Against this were member states wedded to the laissez-faire ideology, who advocated a more liberal approach to the issue of third country participation in Community projects. The latter ideological school eventually won the day, since the rules have recently been revised, by lowering to 25% the share of indigenous equity participation required for goods to qualify as originating from the Community.
Always lurking in the political shadows is the unexpressed fear of domination by Nigeria: the ―big country‘ issue. Nigeria overshadows every other country in the region several times over in terms of population, gross domestic product, and natural resource endowment. An effort has been made to counterbalance this by‘ placing ECOWAS member states on an equal footing in all things except their financial contributions to the Community (which are prorated), but the concern remains. The French tend to provoke and sustain this fear of domination, as they strive to maintain their sphere of influence in the region. It is in the interests of the Community that this issue be carefully dealt with to dispel any remaining fears and promote greater commitment to the regional integration process.
The wave of reforms currently sweeping the region in favour of political pluralism and economic liberalism should help to narrow political and ideological differences among member states. This tendency may be reinforced by the Community‘s adoption in 1991 of the Abuja Declaration of Political Principles, which enshrines a minimum set of democratic principles as guidance to member states in their quest for a well-established democratic society. This is a modest beginning of political cooperation, but constitutes a vital step nonetheless. The revised Treaty also envisages the establishment of a West African parliament to promote grassroots involvement and popular participation in regional integration and cooperation. More democratic rule should bring about a more stable and congenial political atmosphere, which is a sine qua non for regional integration. The establishment of liberal democracy throughout the region would also enhance free enterprise, freedom of association, and the free flow of information and ideas, all of which are fundamental to the viability of an economic community.
The revised ECOWAS Treaty also postulates a degree of supranationality for the Community, and member states must attune themselves to this new perspective. The wrangling that accompanied the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, Britain, Germany, and France are indicative of the difficulty of selling the idea of supranationality to national governments and their electorates. However, this should not blind ECOWAS countries to the precedent set by the European Union (EU) in according important supranational powers to the European Commission and other EU institutions in economic matters.
The Economic Dimension The poor economic health of member states since the early 1980s has been a major impediment to integration efforts. Severe economic recession has obliged member states to abandon all plans for long-term economic development, including regional integration, in the pursuit of short-term stabilization. The economic crisis has also emptied government coffers. The limited revenue that has been available to the public sector has thus had to be rationed in accordance with short-term priorities that excluded regional integration or gave it only token recognition. After the deep decline of the early 1980s, national economies are only now barely achieving a measure of stabilization. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the reforms have had the desired effect of restructuring the region‘s economies, and the need to transform and diversify the regional economic base is more acute than ever. The establishment of a more stable economic environment, capable of encouraging long-term investment and development, should be one of the preoccupations of the ECOWAS Consultative Forum mentioned earlier.
Regional Peace and Security
No provision was made in the ECOWAS Treaty for regional cooperation in political and defence matters. However, the need to create an atmosphere of confidence and trust throughout the region as a precondition for regional integration was felt soon after the Community became operational. This led to the adoption of the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence.
Unfortunately, neither protocol was ever implemented, while political tensions within and among member states continued to mount.
The climax of these developments was the outbreak of civil war in Liberia and the establishment of an ECOWAS mediation mechanism for regional disputes. The usefulness of concerted action by member states in the Liberian conflict can be gauged by the contribution that the ECOWAS peace initiative has made: arrest of the carnage, restoration of peace, and initiation of the electoral process in Liberia. However, the ECOWAS peace initiative is only an ad hoc arrangement designed to address a specific problem. It was not meant as a recipe to meet the future needs of the Community.
The disruption of regional integration programmes by political tensions is apparent. Regional instability also retards the economic growth and development of member states and acts as a disincentive to invest- ment. What is needed, therefore, is some sort of common security arrangement that would safeguard and guarantee the long-term peace and security of the region and meet the needs of all member states. The two protocols mentioned above address conflicts between member states as well as aggression by external forces, and could form the basis for the establishment of such a system. With the limited resources at their disposal, member states could extend on-going public expenditure reforms to cover national defence spending, in the context of such a regional security system.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
How does poverty among West African states affect integration in the region?
3.2 Institutional Arrangements at the National level
Public administration in West Africa was a creation of the colonial powers and an instrument for taxation, coercion, and general administration. Developmental functions were added when Africans took over the reins of government in the 1960s. Despite their limited technical and managerial capabilities, governments of the time were more inclined to keep a tight rein on the economy than to foster a congenial economic environment for the private sector. This could not but hamper the regional integration process. Recent liberalization measures are lowering the profile of government in the economy and encouraging its adoption of a more positive and supportive role in its dealings with the private sector. This should have a positive affluence on the regional integration process, through the reduction of administrative barriers and restrictions to international trade, investment, and migration. Economic liberalization should also influence the character of regional politics. In the past, decision-making for regional integration was carried out by heads of state, with business conducted on a strictly government-to-government basis. As liberalization proceeds, governments can be expected to encourage a more active role for the private sector in the integration process, through the close involvement of regional private sector organizations, such as the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of West African Manufacturers Associations, and the West African Banks‘ Association, in the ECOWAS decision-making process.
For regional integration to flourish as an instrument of economic development also calls for a restructuring of national institutional arrangements. The importance of regional integration requires that a key ministry be established in each country to act as a focal point. It should be mandated to assume the coordination of all forms of regional integration and cooperation and should ensure that national development policies and decisions are cast in a regional perspective. Although attempts of this sort have been made in a number of member states, such arrangements are not effective anywhere in the region. Instead, one finds small coordination units, created in certain ministries as token gestures representative of how peripheral regional integration remains to the national economic agenda. Such deficiencies have a deleterious effect on the attention accorded to regional integration matters and the level of preparation and participation at ECOWAS meetings.
Participation of the sectoral ministries in the integration process should be encouraged through the creation and proper functioning of inter-ministerial coordination committees. Regional development policies and strategies have been adopted at the national level in almost all sectors of economic activity, but these must be pulled together into a national strategy and their implementation must be ensured. Support should likewise be provided for regional efforts to mobilize and create community awareness among the different strata and socio-professional groups of West African society. This requires that the relevant ministries be involved in the organization of these groups at the national level and that they actively promote their participation in regional integration programs.
External support Since the adoption of the Second United Nations Development Decade in the 1970s, African countries have repeatedly reaffirmed that the main responsibility for the development of their economies rests with them. However, considerable support from the rest of the world remains necessary, especially in the area of regional cooperation, where the lack of an independent tax base reduces access to financial resources. Donor attitudes regarding regional cooperation among developing countries have been improving. The signing of the AEC Treaty in 1991 gave impetus to this trend, and many international organizations are currently looking for ways to promote economic integration in Africa (see Lavergne and Daddieh, chapter 6). These initiatives should be coordinated to ensure a more positive contribution to the continental economic integration process. Inadequate funding continues to plague regional cooperation efforts, and the growing interest of the donor community in regional integration will hopefully be translated into financial support. What is certain is that external support will be forthcoming only when the donor community is convinced of the strong commitment of member states to the process.
The need for renewed Leadership It has been said that Africa‘s current political instability, economic decline, and social discontent reflect a leadership crisis on the Continent. If this is true of individual countries, it is equally valid for the regional integration process. The emergence of stronger leadership could supply the vision and necessary direction and demonstrate the sacrifice and commitment that are essential in any cooperative endeavor.
Not all countries have the same appreciation of the need for cooperation; some have to be coaxed and pulled along by others. West Africa has been fortunate in having certain leaders and countries that are strongly committed to the ideal of regional integration. Some member states have always been more assiduous in meeting their financial obligations to the community; and some have taken the lead in initiating important regional cooperation projects and programs. Some community arrangements have required special sacrifices from certain member states (regarding formulas for determining financial contributions, trade liberalization schedules, or compensation formulas for the loss of tariff revenue), and the acceptance of these arrangements is a clear manifestation of solidarity and community spirit. At this stage in West African integration, when many bold and new initiatives are required to propel the process forward, there is an urgent need for such leadership qualities. Each member country should be able to determine its obligations to the community. Each should define an area where it can make some unique contribution and set an example by assuming a leadership role. Such an attitude would permit member states that have not participated as fully or actively as they are capable of doing to redress the imbalance.
Revised ECOWAS Treaty Certain initiatives have been undertaken in the early 1990s to revitalize the regional integration process in West Africa. In 1991, the ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State recognized that the 1975 Treaty was in need of overhaul, and a Committee of Eminent Persons was created to examine most of the issue-areas identified above and make appropriate recommendations in the form of revised Treaty provisions. In carrying out its assignment, the Committee interpreted its mandate to include consideration of institutional matters, regional economic integration, political cooperation, regional peace and security, and the financing of regional integration efforts (ECOWAS 1992). The revised Treaty was submitted to the Summit of Heads of State held in Cotonou in July 1993, and was adopted at that level. Although there were delays in securing ratification of the Treaty, and ratification in itself does not guarantee implementation, the revised Treaty lays out some clear directions for progress on regional integration in West Africa, and reaffirms in different ways the priority that should be given to regional integration by all 16 West African countries (ECOWAS 1993b).
- It defines ECOWAS as ultimately the sole economic community in the region and clearly spells out the relationship between ECOWAS and all other West African IGOs.
- A certain change of orientation is evident in the supranational status accorded the Community and the undertaking to pool national sovereignties through measures that would strengthen community institutions and make community decisions directly enforceable in member states.
- The powers of the community institutions and the executive secretary are enhanced to reflect the greater priority being placed on regional integration. Instead of a community tribunal, the revised Treaty provides for a court of justice to reflect the important role this body has to play. A West African parliament will be part of the political cooperation program to be developed. Similarly, the expected greater involvement of the professions and interest groups in general has led to the inclusion of an economic and social council in the revised Treaty.
- Sector ministers will be more involved in the decision-making process and the technical commissions have been reclassified to ensure better representation at meetings as well as a more efficient organization of the corresponding technical departments of the executive secretariat. Rationalization of IGOs is expected to lead to the creation of specialized agencies to handle specific sectoral programs.
- The institutions provided for in the two existing protocols on defense matters will be reviewed and made operational to handle the defense cooperation program and ensure regional peace and security.
- The revised Treaty proposes that the perennial problem of arrears in contributions should be overcome by instituting a system for generating an independent resource base. A community levy, representing a percentage of the value of total imports from third countries, would be imposed to generate sufficient funds for both the operational budget of the Community and the development assistance extended to member countries by the ECOWAS fund.
- In the field of economic integration, the objective is the achievement of a common market and a monetary union. Equal attention is given to all economic sectors and activities, including the service sector. The revised Treaty aims to ensure that not only market integration, but also production and physical integration are achieved.
- Emphasis is placed on private-sector participation. The private sector is to be encouraged to participate actively in community decision-making and is assigned a bigger role in the implementation of community programs. The ECOWAS protocol on community enterprises is expected to be revised to reflect greater reliance on the private sector, and a community investment code is proposed, to favour private-sector involvement in cross-border investments.
- Building on the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, which recognized the need for regional cooperation in the social and cultural sector, the revised Treaty spells out measures to be adopted in various fields. Important areas of cooperation, such as science and technology, information, and defence, which did not feature in the 1975 Treaty but were included in the community work program are now provided for in the revised Treaty, and the democratic principles contained in the Abuja Declaration of Political Principles form part of the general undertaking by member states in the preamble to the revised Treaty.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
In which ways would renewed leadership in West Africa affect integration?
3.3 Prospects for the Future
With the adoption of the AEC Treaty and the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty, West Africa seems to possess the institutional framework necessary to move forward on regional integration. The future course and success of that process cannot, of course, be taken for granted, if experience to date is any guide. Some commentators have argued that West Africa‘s low level of economic development and the indifference of some governments to regional integration under ECOWAS make it necessary for West Africa to adopt only a loose form of regional cooperation conducted on a pragmatic and ad hoc basis. The successes of the Southern African Development Community (SADC, formerly SADCC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the loose arrangement within the Latin American Economic System (SELA) have been cited in support of this argument. One may want to argue for a more ambitious approach, in light of the limitations on economic development imposed by the small size of national markets and the limited resource base. Already, West African countries have slipped far behind in the development race, and unless a more serious attempt at economic development is made, the current sociopolitical crises will continue to threaten the very survival of most West African states. A well-structured approach to regional integration and cooperation holds the promise of accelerated development through the coordinated exploitation of the region‘s human, natural and capital resources.
Regional economic integration involves more than market liberalization. The ECOWAS experience illustrates the importance of investments in physical infrastructure, and direct interventions of various sorts are required to promote the development and diversification of the regional production base. Monetary integration is also needed in order to harmonize monetary policies, improve macro-economic management, and eventually replace the weak inconvertible domestic currencies of the region with a single regional currency. Regional integration should also embrace cooperation in the social, cultural, defense, and political fields, if only because the absence of stable and compatible policies in these areas militates against the success of regional integration in other respects. Developments in the European Union amply demonstrate the need for serious consideration of these other dimensions of regional integration.
The time has come for the region to embark on a viable development strategy. The functioning of ECOWAS and the problems that regional integration has encountered clearly indicate that member countries have not completely accepted regional integration as a development tool and have yet to accord it the necessary priority. Hopefully, the signing of the revised ECOWAS Treaty will mark an important step in the redynamization and reorientation of ECOWAS. The success of implementation of the new Treaty will depend on many factors, including a change of attitude on the part of all the actors involved in the integration process.
Limitations of the Instrumental Approach in Africa and Elements of a new Approach The primacy accorded to the instrumental approach in dealing with community issues has severely handicapped past attempts at economic integration. The application of this approach has been characterized by excessive state control in the definition and implementation of regional integration schemes, inordinate voluntarism in the face of operational constraints, and the mimicry of approaches used elsewhere, particularly in Europe. Regional integration has come to be identified with the definition of technical and bureaucratic modalities and institutional mechanisms for enhancing economic cooperation between neighbouring countries. The potential for conflict in the pursuit of different partners‘ socioeconomic objectives is overlooked or glossed over, along with the need for setting priorities in the timing and geographic impact of various actions. It is only through studies such as those by the Club du Sahel, the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), or the Conference of Ministers of Agriculture on problems of food security that new and more realistic ways of thinking are emerging.
From an historical point of view, this instrumental approach can be attributed to two myths carried over from colonial times and the national liberation movements: the idea that certain areas are naturally amenable to integration due to their historical past as colonies of the same foreign power; and the notion of fraternal bonds of solidarity among states and peoples as‘ a result of their struggles for political independence. The first of these two myths continues to influence the thinking of numerous researchers with regard to French-speaking Africa (Diouf 1993). However, the notion of regional integration is misapplied in this context, because the subjugated and pacified areas in question were united by force of the colonial authorities, and not by choice of the original inhabitants. The resulting unity was short-lived in many ways, because the very purpose of the struggle for independence was to abolish the dominant relationships established by the colonial regimes. As for the liberation movements, they covered a wide range of opinions and political philosophies whose only common feature was their opposition to the colonial state and its socially discriminatory and repressive nature. This accounted for the opposing views that surrounded the discussions leading up to the creation of the Organization of African Unity following independence.
The instrumental stance taken in most scholarly treatments of regional integration led to a dearth of analysis regarding the socio-economic, political, cultural, and spatial feasibility of integration projects and helped to reinforce the voluntarism of state-led initiatives. This helps to account for the excessive optimism of government leaders and high officials at summit meetings of intergovernmental organizations. Heads of state were thus reinforced in their apparent belief that it was sufficient to agree among themselves at the highest level for regional integration to magically occur over the short or medium term. Everything was done as though the authority of heads of state was absolute, as though they were the total masters of their respective societies and totally independent of their regional and international environments, and only had to copy the experience of others to succeed.
The idea of indiscriminately copying institutions found in Europe and elsewhere is not only a delusion, but an obstacle to progress in building a regional community in West Africa or elsewhere on the continent. The institutional choices made by the European Union resulted from specific historical circumstances based on high growth rates, low income differentials among the various countries, considerable local managerial and technological capability, high levels of economic trade, government structures with a high degree of legitimacy, a strong desire to end generations of war and conflict, and access to massive external support through the Marshall Plan. None of these conditions exist in Africa!
A regional community cannot be constructed without taking into account the specificities of the countries and stakeholders involved, including their own historical experiences, in identifying the errors of the past and new paths for the future. Only in this way will it be possible to overcome the limits of existing models that remain totally divorced from socio historical realities, despite all their apparent pragmatism in focusing on concrete modalities and timetables for action. Efforts to develop a general theory of regional integration and community-building should not blind us to the specific problems of each region, in light of its own social and economic reality, history, and culture.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXCERCISE
Who is the current Chairman of ECOWAS?
3.4 The building blocks of a Realistic and Dynamic Integration Strategy
We propose a progressive approach to the construction of regional communities focused on what is strategically useful and possible at the social and technical levels. The choice and design of instruments and modalities so central to conventional approaches become secondary in this context. The type of institution to be established, the specific measures to be applied, and the time-table to be followed will depend on the nature and content‘ of the strategy chosen, the context in which it is to be applied, the nature of the actors involved, and the nature of their interest in the process. They cannot be defined in advance.
Building on national strategies
The approach should be a pragmatic one, based on the adoption of a realistic and dynamic integration strategy. Among the building blocks constituting such a strategy, the first relates to the very notion of community-building, which should reflect a cumulative consensus among the actors concerned at the subnational, national, and international levels. This implies that regional construction should be based on national strategies, defined as part of the democratic process.
Integration should be viewed as a gradual process, in which higher and higher levels of cooperation are achieved, through a process aimed more at the strengthening of emerging national economies than their dissolution into a larger regional body. Regional integration should not be viewed as a panacea in the pursuit of economic recovery and development. It can at best be a complement, not a substitute, for national programs, and it is essential for member countries to have a clear vision of their own development priorities. The objective should be to use the community as a vehicle for the promotion of selected economic sectors or activities, in collaborative fashion. Such an approach requires that participating countries rise above petty national rivalries and ulterior motives that are capable of undermining the integration process to foster long-term understanding, solidarity, and mutual confidence among states and economic actors. The first priority should be the coordination of economic arid social policies to harmonize the economic environments in different countries, in favour of stakeholders whose activities are capable of promoting economic integration in a sustained and irreversible way.
A Gradual and flexible Approach
The second requirement of a more realistic and pragmatic approach lies in the composition of regional groupings. The idea of carving up the continent into a small number of large and exclusive economic communities should be replaced by an approach which follows the lead of stakeholders in various areas of activity. This implies the need for a highly flexible approach and the organization of countries into groups along variable lines according to the objectives of different stakeholders.
The definition of integration programs and time-frames should also take into account the nature of socio ethnic structures in and among the countries concerned, the recent history of social relations, and the geostrategic context within which they operate. Socio ethnic ties continue to play an important role in conditioning the behaviour of individuals and economic actors everywhere in Africa, and in West Africa specifically. The animosities that prevailed in the past between various social groups can flare up at any time, especially under difficult or unstable economic conditions. As has often occurred, a simple sporting event involving teams from two neighbouring countries or a theft of cattle can have an incommensurate impact on inter country relations, seriously jeopardizing cooperative initiatives or joint investment projects, which are sometimes perceived by local populations as a source of resource transfer at their expense to the benefit of neighbouring countries.
The role of the State and IGOs
The regional integration process needs to be revisited in terms of the roles assigned to various actors, the state in particular. The evolving political economic context, in which the state is progressively withdrawing from economic activity, suggests a less interventionist role for the state in the promotion of regional integration. The state‘s role will increasingly be one of informing and supporting the integrative activities of private traders and economic agents operating under competitive market conditions.
However, the role of the state should not be neglected. As the arbiter of resources and provider of regulatory functions, the public sector plays an important role in the promotion or marginalization of different interest groups. Voluntarism in the choice of overall goals and time-frames can thus translate into support for specific groups of actors considered as potential agents of change. Three groups of economic and social actors should be distinguished: those likely to benefit from integration, those mostly unaffected by it, and those likely to lose from it. An understanding of these actors‘ strategies and ambitions and their economic, political, social, and geographic base is essential to the design of community-building strategies. Under this approach, decisions such as the creation of a free-trade area or the choice of deadlines for its implementation would take into account the existence or absence of private parties interested in taking advantage of new trading opportunities in the countries concerned. Both governments and IGOs should make it a priority to understand the strategic concerns of different groups, in order to build on appropriate sources of support for regional integration.
The future role of IGOs and their affiliated institutions should be reassessed in this light. IGOs should be restructured to serve a support function for stakeholders, instead of continuing to function as extensions and outgrowths of governments without any prerogatives of their own. Such a shift could offer the dual benefit of freeing these bodies from the emasculating grip of higher authorities, while offering some prospect of self-financing by interested parties involved in the on-going community-building process.
Strengthening the knowledge base The complexity of the issues and the need to balance competing interests in the various African subregions mean that the general approach being advocated here can only be implemented gradually, as the weaknesses of voluntarist and instrumentalist approaches come to be better appreciated, and there develops a better understanding of the various actors, their projects, and strategies. The knowledge needed to pursue an optimal community-building strategy is neither easily available nor easily obtained. Such knowledge will come from the act of construction itself, which will confirm or invalidate various hypotheses and strategic options, enrich them, or supersede them, as the case may be, in the quest for alternative solutions.
In view of the uncertainties involved, efforts should be made to encourage the participation of stakeholders in the process through the provision of information regarding the stakes involved, the constraints to be faced and the resources to be made available, the dynamics of the process and its possible repercussions, and the successes and failures of experience to date. It is not sufficient to popularize the content of the treaties and decisions, or to mobilize the support of stakeholders for decisions already taken by the heads of state.
A participatory approach of this sort calls for a change in the status of IGO staff and associated personnel who have, until now been the hand maidens of the member states. Their contribution as observers of what is happening in the field is essential to any opening up of the process to stakeholders. This sort of shift will require that the IGOs themselves be restructured, and the status of IGO staff clarified. It requires also that IGO staff be sensitized to the need for a more open approach and that they be encouraged to disseminate knowledge that is available to them but has remained confidential or unavailable in documented form. Better information and understanding of the .process should enable us to transcend the conventional explanation of the failure of regional integration by appealing to insufficient ―political will.‖ What appears as such should be seen as the political outcome of a combination of factors, strategies, and constraints that cannot be reduced to the will of heads of state, however powerful they may be.
4.0 Conclusion
From the above discussion, it is obvious that a multiplicity of emerging and operational economic and monetary unions exist in Africa. Specifically five major groupings encompass the entire continent. These are the Arab Maghreb Union, CEMAC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).
5.0 Summary
A regional community cannot be constructed without taking into account the specificities of the countries and stakeholders involved, including their own historical experiences, in identifying the errors of the past and new paths for the future. Only in this way will it be possible to overcome the limits of existing models that remain totally divorced from socio historical realities, despite all their apparent pragmatism in focusing on concrete modalities and timetables for action. Efforts to develop a general theory of regional integration and community-building should not blind us to the specific problems of each region, in light of its own social and economic reality, history, and culture.
6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
What roles do IGOs play in regional integration?
7.0REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS
Alexyev, S. 1990. Socialism and law. Progress Publishers, Moscow, Russia.
Awolowo, O. 1977. The problems of Africa. Macmillan, London, UK. Burke, E. 1846. Works II.
Henry G. Bohn, London, UK. Dahrendorf, R. 1964. Recent changes in the class structure of European societies. Daedalus, Winter. ECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa);
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). 1987. Proposals for the rationalisation of West African integration efforts. ECA, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
ECA/MULPOC (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Multinational Programming and Operational Centre). 1993. Directory of West African intergovernmental organisations. UNECA/MULPOC, Niamey, Niger.
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). 1992. Final report of the Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the ECOWAS Treaty. ECOWAS Secretariat, Lagos, Nigeria.
Hencken, H.L. (ed.). 1952. A new dictionary of quotations. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY, USA. Hurwitz, L.; Lesquesne, C. (ed.). 1991. The state of the European community. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, USA. International Commission of Jurists. 1991. Justice in Guinea. The Review, 7 (December), 4–9.
Jackson, R.H.; Rosberg, C.G. 1982. Personal rule in Black Africa. University of Berkeley Press, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Kiralfy, A.R. 1958. Potter‘s historical introduction to English law and its institutions (4th ed.). Sweet and Maxwell, London, UK.
Legum, C. (ed.). 1970–71, 1972–73, 1974–75, 1975–76. Africa contemporary record. Rex Collings, London, UK.
Machiavelli, N. 1940. The prince and the discourses. The Modern Library, New York, NY, USA.
Nwabueze, B.A. 1973. Constitutionalism in the emergent states. C. Hurst, London, UK. Pp. 1–21.
Ojo, O. 1992. The role of pressure groups in the growth and development of ECOWAS. Presented at the International conference on regional integration in West Africa, 11–15 January, Dakar. Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Document E/ECA/CM.17/2.
Voltaire 1926. The age of Louis XIV (translated by M.P. Pollack). Dent, London, UK.
Welch, C.E. Jr. 1990. Human rights in francophone West Africa. In Naim, A.A.; Deng, F.M. (ed.). Human rights in Africa. Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, USA.
COURSE MODULE ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY INTEGRATION
Module on European Economic and Monetary Integration – Agboola, O. W.
Contents
SESSION ONE: ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU) 3
1.2 Economic and Monetary Union: A Definition. 3
1.3 Rationale for the Formation of an Economic and Monetary Union. 4
1.4 Economic and Monetary Unions in Practice. 5
1.5 The European Economic and Monetary Union. 7
1.6 Institutions of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 8
SESSION TWO: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE EUROPEAN EMU.. 10
2.2 Theory of Customs Union. 10
2.3 Traditional Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) 11
2.4 Endogenous Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (Endogenous-OCA) 12
2.5 New Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (New-OCA) 12
2.5 Summary of Theories of EMU.. 13
SESSION THREE: SUSTAINABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN EMU.. 14
3.2 The Viable Currency Area: Net Benefit of Integration as a Necessary Condition. 15
3.4 The Role of Institutional Adjustment Mechanisms for (IMA) to Asymmetric Shocks. 17
3.5 Why Adjustment Mechanisms Break Down. 18
3.5.1 The Impossible Trinity. 18
3.5.2 A Conflation of Policy-Based Mechanisms and Institutional Mechanisms. 19
3.5.3 Is there a role for Fiscal Monetization?. 21
SESSION ONE: ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU)
1.0 Introduction
This session introduces the concept of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and provides practical examples with special focus on the European EMU.
1.1 Learning Objectives
The objectives of Session One are to:
- Define an Economic and Monetary Union.
- List existing examples of EMU across the world.
- Briefly describe the European EMU.
- Briefly justify the formation of the European EMU.
1.2 Economic and Monetary Union: A Definition
An economic and monetary union (EMU) is the one (usually the fifth or sixth) of the seven stages towards the complete economic integration process. The seven stages are: preferential trading area, free-trade area, customs union, single market, economic union, economic and monetary union, and complete economic integration. While the United States of America (USA) is often cited as an example of a complete economic integration, the European Economic and Monetary Union is the most prominent region to consistently implement the above stages in its gravitation towards complete economic integration. In essence, economic and monetary union is a fusion of two terms: an economic union and a monetary union. An economic union is an agreement between two or more countries to form a single market (which allows free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour) and harmonize their economic policies. On the other hand, a monetary union is an agreement between two or more countries to adopt a common currency and harmonize their monetary policies, usually under a common central bank. Therefore, an EMU is an agreement between two or more countries to form a single market and adopt a single currency while coordinating economic and monetary policies under a single central bank. In essence, therefore, economic and monetary union occurs when a region (usually comprising economically and politically independent units) permanently frees up its borders for the movement of people, products, and capital with a decentralized but coordinated economic policy while completely abandoning the use of national currencies for a common currency managed through a centralized monetary policy, often with common guidelines for the conduct of fiscal policy and prohibition of excessive government deficits.
Quick Quiz 1: Differentiate between an economic and a monetary union.
In practical terms, an EMU entails:
- Adoption of a single market by members
- Coordination of economic and fiscal policies among members
- Adoption of a single currency and harmonization of monetary policy under a common central bank
- Coordination and surveillance of financial institutions within the union
1.3 Rationale for the Formation of an Economic and Monetary Union
According to the European commission, economic integration brings the benefits of greater size, internal efficiency, and robustness to the EU economy as a whole and to the economies of the individual Member States, and this, in turn, offers opportunities for economic stability, higher growth and more employment, which are outcomes of direct benefit to EU citizens. Generally, the rationale for the formation of an economic and monetary union is an attempt to optimize resources (minimize cost) in achieving the macroeconomic objectives of full employment, price stability and external balance. This rationale is usually premised on the proposition that with free and unhindered movement of people, products and capital, and flexible domestic prices (of factors, products, and money), the only hinderance to attaining equilibrium in employment, prices, and external balance is the cost of altering exchange rates. Thus, it is wise for a region to integrate by freeing up their borders, harmonizing their economic policies and permanently fixing their exchange rates among one another, and sometimes by also adopting a single currency. The above proposition often rests on the assumption that member countries face symmetric (similar) real and/or financial shocks (internal or external, temporary or permanent, country-specific or sector-specific), the effects of which can be mitigated or eliminated by simply altering domestic prices.
Quick Quiz 2: Do you agree that altering domestic prices always help to mitigate shocks in an EMU?
1.4 Economic and Monetary Unions in Practice
Even though the European EMU is the most notable example of an economic and monetary union, other EMUs exist at various stages of the integration process. For instance, while the European EMU officially came into existence in 1999, having existed as an economic community since 1957, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, also known as Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine, UEMOA), was formerly launched in 1994, having formally existed as a monetary union, the West African Monetary Union (WAMU, also known as Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine, UMOA) since 1962. Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is currently in the process of forming an ECOWAS-wide EMU with a target commencement date of 2027, having existed as an economic community since 1975. Other examples in Africa with clear goal of attaining an EMU are the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), and the African Economic Community (AEC).
Theoretically, an EMU is expected to be a region that is characterized (actually or potentially) by a combination of macroeconomic convergence and monetary convergence. However, the age long question in the formation of an EMU has always been which should come first: the ‘chicken’ of economic integration (as advocated by economists) or the ‘egg’ of monetary integration (as advocated by monetarists). The core debate in this regard often relates to whether to first attain economic integration as a necessary condition for attaining sustainable monetary integration or whether to first achieve monetary integration to reduce asymmetry (dissimilarities) and ultimately attain sustainable economic integration. Nevertheless, it appears that, if an EMU must be viable, each of economic and monetary integration is necessary to sustain the other, whether ex-ante or ex-post (after) the formation of whichever comes first. The dominant practice, as prominent in the case of the European EMU and the proposed EMU for ECOWAS, has been to first pursue economic integration by forming a single market with coordinated economic policies before introducing a common currency managed through a centralized monetary policy. However, WAEMU first existed for many years as a monetary union before becoming an EMU.
Quick Quiz 3: Do you think it will be more sustainable for an EMU to begin with economic integration or with monetary integration?
Quick Quiz 4: Is WAEMU truly a functional EMU?
Corollary: Should a family that decides to run a joint bank account run the account first or first harmonize their businesses or jobs in order to be viable?
1.5 The European Economic and Monetary Union
Created in 1991 and launched in 1992, the European EMU represents a major step further in the process of attaining economic integration among European countries. Essentially, the EMU as an economic integration process in Europe began with the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 by the six founding members (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany). The EEC was later joined in 1973 by Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom and then by Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), and Spain (1986), bringing the membership to 11. In 1993, a single market was created, which brought membership rose to 27.
Most of the EU countries had completed the three-stage process recommended by the Delors Report: removing all barriers to trade and movement of product, people and capital; establishing monetary institutions, including the European Central Bank; and adopting the euro as a common currency and thereby irrevocably fix exchange rates. However, in January 1999, 11 out of then 15 EU countries adopted the euro as their currency and transferred responsibility for monetary policy to the European Central bank (ECB), thereby effectively creating the European Economic and Monetary Union, also known as the Eurozone or the Euro area. As of January 2023, membership of the Eurozone had risen to from the original 11 members to 20 (Greece, 2001; Slovenia, 2007; Cyprus, 2008; Malta, 2008; Slovakia, 2009; Estonia, 2011; Latvia, 2014; Lithuania, 2015; and Croatia, 2023). It is important to not that the European EMU is still being completed as we speak.
Quick Quiz 5: Distinguish among the European Union, the euro area, and the euro system.
Quick Quiz 6: Read the following statement as obtained from one of the official websites of the EU and comment your disposition:
“All European Union Member States are part of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and coordinate their economic policy-making to support the economic aims of the EU. However, a number of Member States have taken a step further by replacing their national currencies with the single currency – the euro. These member States from the euro area.”
1.6 Institutions of the European Economic and Monetary Union
The institutions of the European Economic and Monetary Union are set up with several key objectives centered around ensuring the full completion of the European economic integration process while maintaining the strength and stability of the euro as well as Member States’ economies in the process. Since January 1999 when the European economic and monetary union was formalized with the introduction of the euro as a common currency, the following have been the key institutions of the European EMU:
- The European Central Bank (ECB): Established on 1 June 1998 as the sole institution with the authority to issue banknotes within the euro area while Member States may issue coins subject to approval by the ECB of the volume of the issue.
- The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the Eurosystem: The ESCB consists of the ECB and the national central banks of all EU Member States and has the core role of maintaining price stability by
- The Economic and Financial Committee: The Committee of no more than six members is appointed (a third each by the Member States, the Commission, and the ECB) to perform the duties largely similar to those of the Monetary Committee, which it succeeded on 1 January 1999.
- The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin): Ecofin comprises the finance ministers of all EU Member States and is the decision-making body at European level with the core duty of, having consulted the ECB, taking decisions regarding the exchange-rate policy of the euro vis-à-vis non-EU currencies, whilst adhering to the objective of price stability.
- The Euro Group: The meeting of the Economics and Finance Ministers of the euro area, an advisory and informal body which meets regularly to discuss all the issues connected with the smooth running of the euro area and EMU.
- The European Parliament: The Parliament performs legislative and supervisory roles for the smooth running of the European EMU.
Quick Quiz 7: Describe the institutions of the European EMU.
SESSION TWO: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE EUROPEAN EMU
2.0 Introduction
This session examines the theoretical literature on economic and monetary unions. Two relevant theoretical considerations are briefly discussed. The first is the theory of customs union (Viner, 1950; Meade, 1955; Lipsey, 1957) while the second include the various nuances of the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969; Frankel & Rose, 1997, among others).
2.1 Learning Objectives
The objectives of Session Two are to:
- Briefly trace the theories of economic integration.
- Briefly trace the theories of monetary integration.
2.2 Theory of Customs Union
One of the earliest theories of regional economic integration was the theory of customs union (Viner, 1950) which holds that the creation of a free trade area in the form of a customs union will only be of global benefit if the ensuing production effects (trade creation effects minus trade diversion effects) are positive. However, Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) added that promoting free trade also create consumption effects arising from lower relative prices and which could outweigh unfavourable production effects. Other improvements to the standard theory of integration have posited that beyond the production and consumption effects, which are static (short-run) effects (Grimwade, 2013), economic integration also creates dynamic (scale and hence long-run) effects, which are larger than the static effects (Owen, 1983). Subsequent authors have also postulated growth effects through increased capital formation due to integration (Baldwin, 1989), location effects (Krugman, 1991) of economic integration. In essence, therefore, the standard theory of integration as well as its extensions demonstrate the beneficial effects of regional integration and serve as the foundation upon which the European economic integration rests. The relevant theories of monetary integration are briefly highlighted below.
Quick Quiz 8: Trace the theory of economic integration.
2.3 Traditional Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA)
One of the relevant theories underlying the formation of a monetary union is the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), which stipulates that an area may be able to eliminate both internal and external disequilibrium by adopting a common currency, provided the area is characterized by the pre-existence of free and unhindered movement of people (labour mobility; Mundell, 1961), products (trade openness; McKinnon, 1963) and capital (capital mobility), as well as the existence of product diversification (Kenen, 1969) and flexible prices and wages (Corden, 1972). Essentially, the OCA theory holds that free mobility and price flexibility will help to ensure stability while product diversification help to reduce the vulnerability of members of the union in the presence of shocks. However, the traditional OCA theories suffers some limitations based on its reliance of the neoclassical assumptions of flexible prices consequent clearing of markets. In reality it is rare to come by an existing optimum currency area (OCA) because most regions of the world are characterized by barriers to trade and movement of resources while the mechanisms for domestic price adjustments are not only far from being flexible but also vary widely across countries. In addition, Pelagides (1996) countered the ability of diversification to reduce vulnerability since deeper market integration leads to higher product specialization.
2.4 Endogenous Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (Endogenous-OCA)
In what has come to be known as the endogenous theory of optimum currency areas, the similarity of shocks to economic fundamentals (Frankel & Rose, 1997) has been highlighted as an important precursor to the formation of a monetary union. According to this version of the theory, business cycles may converge for countries with close trade links, such that the convergence criteria become amenable to policy influence and as such are achievable endogenously. In other words, the endogenous OCA theory predicts that countries which trade significant proportions of their GDP and have similar shocks (shock symmetry) should fix their exchange rates. Indeed, studies have shown that the endogeneity hypothesis is supported by cross-section estimates of the correlation of business cycles and trade intensity among OECD countries between 1959 and 1993 (Fidrmuc, 2001). Furthermore, a common European business cycle has followed the creation of the European Monetary Union, thereby validating the endogeneity hypothesis (Artis & Zhang, 1995; Hochreiter & Winckler, 1995). However, Funke (1997) argues that the hypothesis of symmetric versus asymmetric shocks is not very operational and cannot easily be tested, thereby calling to question the usefulness of correlation analysis in drawing inferences about shock symmetry.
2.5 New Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (New-OCA)
Given that the issues relating to the quest for monetary integration are multifaceted and cut across economic, political and institutional, the OCA theory has evolved further to incorporate many more germane issues, thereby giving rise to the new OCA theory (Mongelli, 2002; Broz, 2005; Kunroo, 2015). Mongelli (2002) contend that the optimum currency area theory has gone through four main phases (the pioneering, reconciliation, reassessment and empirical phases). Broz (2005) posit that the OCA criteria have evolved over time to many other considerations, including wage flexibility (Corden, 1972), inflation differentials, character of shocks, synchronisation of business cycles (Frankel & Rose, 1997), political factors, degree of policy integration and similarity between rates of inflation, effectiveness of monetary policy (Calvo & Reinehart, 2002) and labour market institutions, among others. Going by Kunroo (2015), the new theory of OCA has shifted its focus towards the issues including credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy, endogeneity of OCA, correlation and variation of shocks, character of shocks and their probable impact on an economy, synchronisation of business cycles and alternative commitment mechanisms for policy-makers, convergence of economies towards the steady state, trade patterns and specialisation in production arising from comparative advantage, various types of frictions prevailing in labour, goods and capital markets, and the role of non-economic (political) factors in monetary unifications.
Quick Quiz 9: Trace the theory of economic integration.
2.5 Summary of Theories of EMU
In summary, even though the theories of regional integration and the OCA theories still play significant roles in the determination of whether a region should become an economic and monetary union, both theories have evolved over time to include diverse considerations which may affect the sustainability of an EMU. However, despite their multifaceted considerations, both theories have focused predominantly on the market-based role of money while ignoring its state-based role in an EMU, including the implications of such an omission for the sustainability of the European EMU. The next session traces the issues surrounding the sustainability of the European economic and monetary union.
SESSION THREE: SUSTAINABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN EMU
3.0 Introduction
Whether or not an economic and monetary union is sustainable depends largely on the extent to which the assumptions of its underlying theory are met or violated. The vast majority of empirical findings have indicated that no region in the world (including the Eurozone and ECOWAS) has satisfied the assumptions of OCA theory. Therefore, the principal question of sustainable economic and monetary integration centers on two questions. The first is whether the union is economically viable, which entails enquiring whether members have the incentives to create the conditions for free and unhindered mobility of people, products, and capital and to give up independent currencies as well as economic and monetary policy making. The second question is whether the union is sustainable, a condition which is often tested through the requirement of intending members to meet certain convergence criteria before admission into the EMU while relying on the ability of certain adjustment mechanisms to mitigate or eliminate the effects of shocks to economic fundamentals of member countries. This is the approach adopted by the European EMU and other regions at one stage or the other of the economic integration process. However, given the experience of the Eurozone in the aftermath of the recent global recession that trailed the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the adequacy of existing adjustment mechanisms in dealing with post-admission shocks has been called to question, as many of the Eurozone countries such as Greece were hit by severe sovereign debt crises, causing some countries to declare bankruptcy.
3.1 Learning Objectives
The objectives of Session One are to:
- Differentiate between an optimum currency area and a viable currency area.
- Appraise the net benefits of joining an EMU.
- Discuss the sustainability of the European EMU.
3.2 The Viable Currency Area: Net Benefit of Integration as a Necessary Condition
In the absence of the optimality conditions of the OCA theory, the viability option, which relates to investigating whether a region is viable as an EMU, becomes necessary. This involves determining whether countries have sufficient incentives to meet the conditions for integration. These incentives are determined by comparing the cost, as indicated by the effectiveness of intending members’ independent monetary policy, to the benefits. Generally, monetary integration should yield net benefits, if the cost of adjusting exchange rate is higher than that of adjusting domestic prices. Among the numerous theoretical costs of monetary integration, the most obvious and direct, and perhaps the most significant, is the opportunity cost in terms of forgoing an effective independent monetary policy (usually including the option of fiscal monetization) for achieving macroeconomic stabilization (economic) and other objectives such as pursuing social programmes (social) and financing the cost of governance (political).
The opportunity cost of joining a monetary union, in terms of foregoing an effective independent monetary policy, become greater when the option of fiscal monetization is given up. On the other hand, of the numerous potential (theoretical) benefits of monetary integration among member countries, such as reduced exchange rate risks, increased capital flows, reduced transaction costs, more stable real wage rates (or trade union integration), increased employment flows, greater price stability, more harmonized fiscal policies and political (or noneconomic gains), many of which are hinged on the existence of trade openness, factor mobility (especially labour and capital), perhaps the most significant is increased trade creation effects. Beyond the loss of an independent (and effective) monetary policy in dealing with country-specific shocks, there also exists a greater cost when countries join a monetary union without the option of fiscal monetization for dealing with the effects of asymmetric shocks and for achieving valid social and political objectives.
Quick Quiz 10: The most significant cost of monetary integration is the cost of abandoning the ability to independently conduct effective monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization (economic) as well as for pursuing social programmes (social) and financing the cost of governance (political).
Comment your opinion on the above assertion.
3.3 The Sustainable EMU
The second condition, which might be thought of as a sufficient condition, involves investigating whether integration is sustainable over time. This involves determining whether member countries can survive integration in the presence of asymmetric shocks. Sustaining the European economic and monetary union has largely been based on the use of adjustment mechanisms to deal with asymmetric shocks. However, the Eurozone experience has shown that the adjustment mechanisms put in place often break down, thereby threatening the sustainability of the European EMU. Among the external shocks that have threatened the sustainability of the European economic and monetary union is the disruptive effects of the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) between the late 2007 and late 2008 period. As a consequence of the GFC, Lehman Brothers declare insolvency with effects spreading to Ireland, Belgium, Germany, France and Spain. Also, the Fed had to bailout Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and others in what happens to be the largest bailout in the history of the United States. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created by the US Congress to provide liquidity, stability and affordability in the mortgage market. They provide liquidity to banks and other finance houses for housing finance by buying mortgages from lenders and holding them to maturity or packaging the loans into mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Furthermore, European interbank collapsed, leading to weakening of conventional monetary policy and prompting the ECB to provide additional liquidity on a large scale. It has been argued that the structure of the EMU as a monetary union but not a fiscal union contributed to the European debt crises and the limited ability of European leaders to respond. Another consequence is the extraordinary increases in government debts, largely due to bailouts to rescue banks, anti-crisis measures, built-in stabilization measures and second-round effects of consolidation.
Quick Quiz 11: Discuss the implications of the Global Financial Crisis of the late 2000s for the sustainability of the European EMU.
3.4 The Role of Institutional Adjustment Mechanisms for (IMA) to Asymmetric Shocks
Essentially, the issue of sustainable monetary integration hinges critically on macroeconomic convergence, fiscal convergence, financial convergence (including in the face of the disruptive effects of financial innovation). Thus, the asymmetric nature of shocks in the context of monetary integration highlight the need for comprehensive adjustment mechanisms that accommodate competitive markets, effectively coordinated monetary and fiscal policies and strong institutions as tools to ensure the achievement of economic, social and political objectives within the union. Respectively, therefore, market-based (or economic) mechanisms, policy-based mechanisms and institution-based mechanisms must be deployed to ensure sustainability of an economic and monetary union such as the existing Eurosystem and the proposed ECOWAS EMU.
The market-based mechanisms entail making prices flexible and making quantities (people, products and capital) mobile, i.e., price/wage flexibility combined with labour mobility, trade openness and capital mobility. The market-based mechanisms are better suited to dealing with structural shocks, which are of a permanent nature. On the other hand, policy-based mechanisms involve the use of fiscal and/or monetary intervention involving the central authority and member states to deal with asymmetric shocks. Policy-based mechanisms are better suited to dealing with cyclical shocks, which are transient or temporary in nature. Following North (1990) who defines institutions as constraints devised to structure human interactions which are fraught with uncertainties, institutional mechanisms would be, broadly speaking, interventions that stipulate or adjust the rules and regulations that govern the market as well as policy. Institutional mechanisms are suited to dealing with both temporary and permanent asymmetric shocks. Incidentally, there is often a thin line between temporary and permanent shocks as many real-life shocks have elements of both.
Quick Quiz 12: What are adjustment mechanisms and how are they relevant to sustaining the European EMU.
3.5 Why Adjustment Mechanisms Break Down
3.5.1 The Impossible Trinity
The impossible trinity, also known as the trilemma is a concept in international economics (developed by John Marcus Flemming and Rubert Alexander Mundell in different articles between 1960 and 1963) which states that it is impossible for a country to simultaneously enjoy the benefits of fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility and monetary sovereignty.
Analogy of the Impossible Trinity: It is impossible to simultaneously enjoy ‘Me’, ‘You’ and ‘We’ in a marriage!
Essentially, monetary integration combines fixed exchange rate and free capital mobility of the impossible trinity and foregoes monetary sovereignty. Meanwhile, monetary sovereignty is often tied to certain social and political issues which often defy the framework of the adjustment mechanisms that have been put in place. Indeed, external shocks to these social and political issues often require fiscal interventions which may not be feasible in a monetary union, especially when the option of fiscal monetization is given up as a condition for joining the monetary union. Furthermore, financial shocks due to financial innovation may threaten the sustainability of monetary integration in the absence of fiscal monetization.
3.5.2 A Conflation of Policy-Based Mechanisms and Institutional Mechanisms
There has been a conflation of institutional mechanisms and policy-based mechanisms. Fiscal measures involving members as well as the central authority of the EMU, which are policy-based mechanisms, have often been referred to as ‘institutional mechanisms’. This is a misnomer because the involvement of the countries and the central authority in the fiscal measures to deal with asymmetric shocks does not in itself make such measures institutional. The automatic fiscal transfers from the central budget (fiscal federalism), discretionary transfers and borrowing/lending, which have been implemented to sustain the EMU are merely fiscal policy measures. In the first instance, such fiscal-policy-based mechanisms ought to be complemented with appropriate ‘monetary-policy-based mechanisms’ to achieve ensure effective monetary-fiscal coordination.
Unfortunately, the monetary-policy-based options have been largely ignored (Voss, 1998) for fear of inflation and financial recklessness by member states. However, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), monetary-policy-based mechanisms are now coming to the fore, including negative interest rates (NIR), asset purchase programme (APP), targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs), forward guidance, central bank communication (CBC) and the big picture, which have all been implemented by the Eurozone.
To truly qualify as institutional mechanisms, there must be independent institution(s) created to implement certain rule-based mandates required to stabilize the monetary union. For instance, Mundell (2012) has suggested that the Eurozone should create the institutions that it deems necessary for its survival, such as the Unified Public Debt. Other such mechanisms include the Growth and Stability Pact (which has broken down) and the proposed Central Fiscal Authority. A first-best option will be a strategic combination of policy-based, institutional, and market-based mechanisms. Although, on rare occasions, a calculated combination of any suitable two or a tactical selection of one may help weather the storm.
For example, fiscal-policy-based mechanisms, largely due to their inflexibility in the short run, may be unable to achieve internal balance in the short run. In addition, the fiscal-policy-based mechanisms may be inadequate in helping members facing dire debt crises (e.g., Greece) and may even result in accumulation of debts in the long-term. Furthermore, fiscal-policy-based mechanisms may not be suitable for financing certain social programmes (such as the Green New Deal in the US and pocket moni in Nigeria) as well as for financing short term governance needs, say conduct of elections. These scenarios represent a case for monetary-policy-based mechanisms, which are flexible in the short run, to complement fiscal-policy-based measures. Meanwhile, sustaining any gains from a combination of monetary-policy-based and fiscal-policy-based mechanisms requires appropriate institutional mechanisms to deal with medium-term shocks and market-based mechanisms to mitigate shocks that are long-term in nature.
Quick Quiz 13: How should adjustment mechanisms change to become more effective in sustaining the European EMU?
3.5.3 Is there a role for Fiscal Monetization?
A fiscal union implies a region characterized by fiscal convergence among members. The relevant question here is whether fiscal integration is necessary for an economic and monetary union to be sustainable. The import of this question comes to the fore when considering the ability of countries to monetize unsustainable deficits and debts, finance certain social programmes or deal with environmental contingencies of great magnitudes. The ultimate financing of accumulated debts may require monetization to avoid bankruptcy (as in the case of Greece). In addition, the diverse fiscal composition and needs of most countries, for example, harmonization and control of fiscal policies and possible deficits may prove difficult and unsustainable without options for fiscal integration, perhaps through some form of a joint framework for financing of government fiscal deficits and/or debts either directly through the process of money creation by the Central Authority (this is known as money-financed deficit and is more expansionary through the money multiplier effect) or indirectly through purchases of government-issued bonds in the secondary market by the Central Authority (this is known as debt-financed deficit and is less expansionary through fiscal multiplier effect).
A policy-based (monetary) mechanism is proposed in terms of a fiscal monetization option, in addition to Voss (1998)’s scheme of ‘co-insurance’ through money finance and the GDP-linked bonds proposed by the European Parliament’s Monetary Sub-Committee on 2nd September, 1998. Possibly, in addition to the 4% cap on fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, members should be able to invoke a ‘monetization clause’ (perhaps to liquidate growing debts, accumulated deficits or to finance some important social projects or programmes, provided they have low inflation and are below full employment) on the basis of their real GDP per head relative to that of the entire area. Perhaps, the strongest arguments against fiscal monetization include inflation and fiscal recklessness, two possible reasons why current monetary integration arrangements (e.g., the EMU) prohibits monetization, direct or indirect.
Quick Quiz 14: Do you agree that fiscal coordinated fiscal monetization has a role to play in sustaining the European EMU?
References
Artis, M., & Zhang, W. (1995). International Business Cycle and the ERM: Is There a European Business Cycle? Discussion Paper No. 1191, CEPR, London.
Baldwin, R. (1989). The growth effects of 1992. Economic Policy 9: 247–282.
Broz, T. (2005). The theory of optimum currency areas: A literature review. Privredna Ktetanja I Ekonomska Politika. January 2005
Calvo, A. G., & Reinehart, C. M. (2002). Fear of Floating. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(2), 379-408
Corden, W. M. (1972). Monetary Integration. Essays in International Finance No. 93, Princeton University, April.
Fidmuc, J. (2001). The Endogeneity of optimum currency area criteria, intra-industry trade and EMU enlargement. BOFIT Discussion Papers 2001. No. 8.
Frankel, J., & Rose, A. (1997). The endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria. The Economic Journal. 108(449), 1009-1025.
Funke, M. (1997). The Nature of Shocks in Europe and in Germany. Economica, 64(255), 461–469. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00090
Grimwade, N. (2013). Theory of Economic Integration: A Review. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.
Hochreiter, E., & Winckler, G. (1995). The Advantages of Tying Austria’s Hands: The Success of the Hard Currency Strategy. European Journal of Political Economy 11, 83-111.
Kenen, P. (1969). The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View. In R. Mundell and A. Swoboda eds., Monetary Problems of the International Economy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969. 41-60.
Krugman, P. (1991). Geography and trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kunroo, M. H. (2015). Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. Review of Market Integration, 7(2), 87–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974929216631381
Lipsey, R.G. (1957). The theory of customs unions: trade diversion and welfare. Economica 24: 40–46.
McKinnon, R. (1963). Optimum currency areas. American Economic Review 53. 4: 717-25.
Meade, J. E. (1955). The theory of customs unions. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mongelli, F. P. (2002). “New” Views on the Optimum Currency Area Theory: What is EMU Telling US? Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 140, Royal Economic Society. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecj/ac2002/140.html
Mundell, R. A. (1961). A theory of optimum currency areas. American Economic Review, 51 (4), 657–665.
Owen, N. (1983). Economies of scale, competitiveness and trade patterns within the European community. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pelagidis, T. (1996). Optimum currency area approach and the third stage of EMU: A review of recent evidence. International Journal of Economic and Commercial Sciences, 43(4) 1996, 759-789.
Viner, J. (1950). The customs union issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS AND POLICIES
By
Dr. Omolara Qadri
Session Narrative:
This session of the module focuses on the nature of political process and policies of the European Union (EU). There are several decision-making procedures in the EU. A wide range of actors are involved in EU multi-level decision-making; different types of decisions; different actors which dominate and different types of rationality that inform actors’ behaviour and actions at the various levels of decision hierarchies within the EU. If EU is perceived as a system of governance or policy system, there is the need to explore how its policy agendas are set, policies are formulated and policy decisions implemented. This session of the module examines how EU policy process works and what matters in shaping policy outcomes.
- Learning Objectives
At the end of this study session, student should be able to:
Explain the nature of policy and policy process;
Identify actors in the EU policy process;
Discuss European Union policies process;
Communicate ideas, information and knowledge about European Union policy process.
- Main Content
Nature of Policy
Policy is defined as a relatively stable, purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern (Anderson, 2003).
It is also a set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed officially by a group of people, a business organisation, a government or a political party’ (Cambridge Dictionaries).
Policy is a set of decisions and non-decisions; it may be formal or informal and written or unwritten.
Policies can be laws, documents, procedures, guiding principles, statements of intent, working frameworks to achieve certain objectives, a programme of action, rules and regulations.
Policies exist at many different levels, from the local community to towns, cities, counties, states, the national level, and in the case of the EU – the multinational level. Policies are adopted and pursued not just by governments, but by political parties, the media, lobbies, and individual government institutions. Within every policy community there are multiple sub-communities with their own separate and often conflicting policy interests, and this is no less true at the EU level than at the national level; European policy is influenced by the major institutions (such as the Commission, Parliament, and the Council of Ministers), the directorates-general within the Commission, the regional and national policy interests pursued by member states, and the cross-national policies pursued by groups with shared interests, such as the environmental lobby, farmers, corporations, workers, labour unions, and parties within the European Parliament (McCormick 2008,p. 101).
- The Policy Process
The concept of policy process brings the idea that public policies are shaped at all stages by different types of actors and institutions, actors can establish relationships (whether formalized networks or not) according to their beliefs/ interests in the defense of an idea, their actions being affected by the context in which they operate and influenced by external events (Almeida and Gomez, 2018). The policy process is the study of change and development of policy and the related actors, events, and contexts (Weible, Heikkila, DeLeon and Sabatier, 2011). Policies are developed through a complex process as they involved many actors and their interests and the contexts within which a particular policy issue operates. The policy process includes several key aspects: a definition of the problem to be addressed, the goals the policy is designed to achieve, and the instruments of policy. Policy process not only provides useful insights into ‘why’ and ‘how’ policies are formulated and implemented, and ‘succeed’ or ‘fail’, but also offers strategic choices and options necessary for coalition/support building for appropriate and effective policy formulation and implementation. Furthermore, insights of the policy process helps us to understand the nature of policy actors, their interests and preferences and the challenges or constraints they face in the task of making policies.
- Influences that Create and Impact Policies at the Level of EU
John McCormick (2008 pp. 102-103) examined certain factors (internal, external; formal, informal; predictable, unpredictable) that create and impact policies at the level of EU:
- Treaty obligations: The treaties outline the general goals and principles of European integration as well as some of the more specific tasks of the EU institutions. For example, Maastricht said that the general goals of the EU were (among others) to ‘promote economic and social progress … the strengthening of economic and social cohesion … [and] to assert its identity on the international scene’. These are broad and ambiguous goals, but they set the foundations for policy, which must be turned into specific actions mainly in the form of new laws. ‘
- Pressures to harmonize. The need to bring national laws and policies into alignment has been central to avoiding economic and social differences among the member states, and to ensuring the smooth functioning of the single market. It accounted, for example, for most of the early laws on environmental policy, which were designed to remove the barriers to the single market created by different environmental standards.
- Legislative pressures. Many new proposals for policy and law come out of requirements or assumptions built into past laws. This is certainly the case with laws that include within them an obligation for amendment or review after a specified period of time, and is particularly true of the EU’s framework directives, which set general goals with the assumption that more laws – known as daughter directives – will be developed later that will provide more detail and focus.
- Policy evolution and spillover. Policy is rarely static, and the principles and goals of EU policy are constantly redefined as greater understanding emerges about the causes and effects of problems, as technological developments offer new options for addressing old problems, as the failure of existing policies demands new approaches, as the balance of interests changes within the member states, and as the political, economic, and social priorities of European integration evolve.
- Institutional pressures. The Commission although has a monopoly over the development of new proposals for law, yet, it is subject to various formal and informal pressures, including suggestions from the European Council regarding the broad goals of EU policy, ‘invitations’ from the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers to develop new proposals, · suggestions or demands from the EP or the Council of Ministers for changes in Commission proposals, and the impact of rulings by the Court of Justice on the content and nature of EU law.
- International law. The EU as a unit has signed numerous international treaties on behalf of the member states, most of which impose specific obligations on the EU. This means the development of new laws and policies to respond to those obligations, and the development of common positions taken during negotiations on the progress of implementation.
- Political initiatives. Individual national leaders, working alone or in combination with others, have always been at the core of important policy initiatives. Thus, the early steps on building a European foreign policy came out of a decision by European leaders to organize regular meeting~ among the foreign ministers of the member states, much of the headway on security policy in the late 1990s was made because of initiatives taken by Tony Blair of Britain and Jacques Chirac of France, and it was agreement among European leaders in early 2007 that led to the revival of the defunct constitutional treaty as the Lisbon treaty.
- Public opinion. Although the EU is often described as elitist and undemocratic, neither the EU institutions nor the leaders of the member states have been able to ignore public opinion. It has been important, for example, in the development and agreement of new treaties and in the debate over the. constitution. And even if voters have not always been able to express their opinions on new treaties through national referendums, the unwillingness or failure of governments to hold referendums has itself drawn attention to public opinion and has often sparked vigorous debates about Europe.
- Internal pressures. As integration has proceeded, so problems have presented themselves that have been internal to Europe, common to multiple member states, and potential barriers to successful integration. These have included, for example, ongoing concerns about unemployment, which have exercised EU governments for many years, or the need to monitor the movement of criminals around the EU, which has set off an active programme of policy and legal responses in the field of justice and home affairs.
- External pressures. Problems and demands have also come from outside the EU, and have often demanded the concerted and united response of all member states. In addition to the sometimes obvious and sometimes more subtle impact of pressures from the EU’s major allies (such as the United States) and its competitors (such as China), policy has also responded to economic problems in other parts of the world, to trade imbalances and disputes, or to disagreements with other countries.
- Emergencies or crises. These have been a part of the policy calendar from the beginning. Many crises event have been followed by much hand-wringing, but has also ultimately drawn new attention to policy needs.
- The EU Policy Process
The European Union policy process is characterized by complexities. There are different actors and interests in the EU policy process. The EU’s supranational political institutions, the European Commission and the European Parliament, often play very important roles in mobilizing these interests for collective gains. In certain policy fields, particular specialized institutions have the principal parts. A wide range of non-state actors such as trade unions, interest groups, and non-governmental organisations usually mobilize to try to shape policy decisions (Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg 2009).
The overall direction of European law-making is set by the European Council, which agrees on the EU’s long-term goals. They set guidelines for the Commission to follow and also pass powers to the Commission to act on a wide range of policies. In most cases, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission produce the policies and laws that apply throughout the EU. The process they follow is called the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. (Formerly known as the ‘co-decision’ procedure). This is a process where the three main institutions come to an agreement on legislation.
Policy made at the EU level generally applies to all Member States of the EU, unless any have negotiated ‘opt outs’ or exemptions, which mean that they do not have to implement certain policies, or particular clauses in legislation (europarlamentti.info/en/values-and-objectives/policies). Member States have several opportunities to feed into this policymaking process through their representation in the European Parliament (elected representatives of the European Parliament) and the Council (representatives of national governments).
How decisions are made in the EU:
- Heads of state and government make decisions on general policies in the European Council
- The Commission makes proposals for new laws.
- The Parliament reviews the proposals and passes decisions together with the Council of Ministers.
- The Council of Ministers and Parliament approve the laws together.
- The Commission controls that decisions are followed in all member states.
- The European Court of Justice settles disagreements that may come up.
Quiz: Outline how decisions are made at the EU.
- Policy Development in the EU
The European Commission develops proposals. It does this by inviting input from citizens, stakeholders and experts through consultations and expert committees to develop these.
Before the European Commission proposes new initiatives, it must assess the economic, social and environmental impact that proposals may have and present the findings in an autonomous report.
If a proposed Commission policy is expected to have ‘considerable economic, social and environmental impacts’, the preparation of an Impact Assessment (IA) is required. An Impact Assessment sets out possible policy options and analyzes the advantages and potential problems.
IAs must verify the existence of a problem, identify its underlying causes, assess whether EU action is needed, and analyze, quantifying where possible, the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches. This applies to both legislative and non-legislative initiatives as well as delegated acts and implementing measures, where the Commission can make more technical changes and amend non-essential aspects of legislation.
Commission guidelines specify that IAs are usually not required when, ‘there is little or no choice available for the Commission (for instance when the Commission is implementing previous policy decisions already subject to an IA); Impacts cannot be clearly identified (for instance, in the case of broad policy communications); or Impacts are small (for instance, the repeal of a redundant act)’.
The proposal then undergoes a process of scrutiny and debate by Members of European Parliaments from the 27 EU Member States and representatives from the governments of each state in the Council. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union examine the proposals and suggest amendments before voting on whether the law should pass. There are several ways in which the Parliament and Council can examine laws – the most common method is ordinary legislative procedure, or the co-decision procedure. In the co-decision procedure, the Council and Parliament must both agree on the wording of the legislation.
- Ordinary Legislative Procedure
The standard decision-making procedure in the EU is the “ordinary legislative procedure” formerly known as “co-decision”. Under this procedure, set out in Article 249 of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council and European Parliament share legislative power. Both institutions act on a proposal by the Commission which has the sole right of initiative (Brans, 2012).
The European Commission proposal is considered by the co-legislators: the European Parliament and the Council. This is the ‘first reading’ of the proposed policy.
In the Council, proposals are considered by specialised working groups which go over the texts to agree as far as they can and report upwards to senior officials and then to national ministers in Member States. The extent to which ministers are directly involved – whether in Member State capitals or in Brussels – depends on the issues and how far they generate controversy among Member States. The Council may agree on a ‘general approach’ before the Parliament has agreed on its position, to give them an idea of the Council’s general view of the Commission’s policy proposal.
In the European Parliament, a specialist Committee of MEPs is assigned to lead in scrutinizing, debating and developing amendments to the proposed policy. The Committee also agrees a negotiating team for discussions with the Council. One MEP from this Committee is elected as a rapporteur. They will lead the development of a committee report, suggesting any amendments they think should be made to the Commission’s policy proposal. This report is presented to the rest of the Parliament and an overall Parliamentary position is developed. This will form the basis of the Parliament’s position to debate with the other co-legislator, – the Council.
As a co-legislator, the Council can choose to agree with the Parliament’s position, or suggest amendments. Any amendments must be debated with the Parliament through further ‘readings’ of the text until an agreement is reached.
‘Trilogue’ meetings can also be arranged between the members and representatives of Commission, Parliament and Council as an informal way of engaging and facilitating agreement in addition to the formal agreement process.
A Conciliation Committee (made up of an equal number of Council representatives and MEPs) reaches agreement on the final joint text. This Committee must agree in order for the policymaking process to continue. The policy is adopted when Parliament and Council approve the text after a ‘third reading’, where they cannot make any further textual changes.
The Presidents and Secretary-Generals of both institutions sign the text and it becomes official one it is published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Once a piece of policy is in place, it can be reviewed and adapted at certain times if necessary. This may be to take into account changes in an area of legislation due to technical and scientific advances. The Commission can propose a reform of an existing policy which is passed to the Parliament and Council for agreement through ordinary legislative procedure.
Once it has been adopted, EU legislation may be subject to challenge in the national and European court systems. Legislation can be annulled by the European Court of Justice if it infringes upon EU treaties or fundamental rights. The European Court of Justice can also enforce the law against national governments if they do not comply with EU law (https://royalsociety.org).
- Special Legislative Procedure
The “Special Legislative Procedure” is a collective name for a number of procedures set out in the Lisbon Treaty. These procedures are exceptions to the standard “Ordinary Legislative Procedure” and apply to specific cases especially in more sensitive areas. Under the Special Legislativse Procedures, the Council of the EU is in practice the sole legislator but must either consult or obtain the consent from the European Parliament depending on the case (Brans, 2012).
- Policy Implementation
EU policy is implemented in Member States according to the type of policy proposal. For example, a Directive will give a set time period in which Member States integrate it into their own domestic legislation (a process called ‘transposition’) and apply it to their national law. A Regulation must be applied in its exact form in all Member States in a given time period, and typically forms part of national legislation once the Regulation has entered into force (royalsociety.org). Most EU policy comes in the form of directives, which gives the member states the maximum leeway on issues of implementation. This allows the different national systems to find their own methods of achieving an agreed common goal decision (Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2009).
- Comitology
Comitology refers to the procedure the Commission follows to execute its implementing powers conferred on it by the EU legislators (Council and European Parliament). It refers to the committees that deliver an “opinion” on draft implementing measures before the Commission can adopt them. “Comitology Committees” consist of representatives from each EU Member State and are chaired by a Commission official. Comitology Committees act as a forum for discussion on implementing measures and as a communication channel between the Commission and the Member States’ national authorities. The extent to which the committees’ opinions are binding depends on the type of procedure (Brans, 2012).
- Types of EU Legislations and Policies Documents
EU Legislation and Policy are implemented and supported by a range of official documents. Some are legislative and introduce an obligation for the Member States, while others set out recommendations and are not binding.
Regulation is a legislative decision made by the EU, which must be implemented in the same way by all Member States. It must be applied in its entirety across the EU.
A Directive is a legislative decision made by the EU that requires Member States to achieve the outcome as outlined in the Directive, but allows some variation in how they implement this.
Decisions is a legislative decision aimed only at specific organisations and individuals, made clear in the Decision. A Decision is binding on those to whom it is addressed (e.g. an EU country or an individual company).
A Green Paper is a document published by the European Commission to stimulate discussion on given topics at European level. It invites the relevant parties (bodies or individuals) to participate in a consultation process and to debate on the basis of the proposals they put forward. Green Papers may give rise to legislative developments that are then outlined in White Papers.
A White Paper is a document containing proposals for community action in a specific area. In some cases, it follows a Green Paper published to launch a consultation process at European level. When a White Paper is favourably received by the Council, it can lead to an action programme for the Union in the area concerned.
A Communication is a policy document with no mandatory authority. The Commission takes the initiative of publishing a Communication when it wishes to set out its own thinking on a topical issue. A Communication has no legal effect.
A Staff Working Document usually accompanies a Communication to dig deeper in a specific topic. Like a Communication, it has no legal effect.
A Recommendation is not binding. A Recommendation allows the institutions to make their views known and to suggest a line of action without imposing any legal obligation on those to whom it is addressed.
An Opinion is a non-binding instrument on a specific issue that can be issued from three of the institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament), or from the (consultative). It allows the institutions to make a statement without imposing any legal obligation on those to whom it is addressed.
A Non-Paper is a discussion document designed to stimulate debate on a particular issue without representing the official position of the institution which drafted them (https://www.eltis.org/in-brief/legislation-policies).
- Conclusion
The European Union makes policies in a range of complex ways. There are actors, interests and preferences involved in EU decision making process. All the institutions of the European Union are involved in decision-making in one way or another, each playing important roles that shape the policies and impacts on member states. However, EU decision making depends almost entirely upon the collective will of the member states that constitute the EU governance system.
Assignment
Discuss many factors that shape and impact on the EU policy process.
References
Almeida, Lia de Azevedo and Gomes, R. C., (2018). The Process of Public Policies: Literature Review, Theoretical Reflections and Suggestion for Future Research. Cad. EBAPE.BR, v. 16, nº 3, Rio de Janeiro, July/Sept.
Brans, H. (2012). EU Institutions and Decision Making. U S Mission to the European Union. Foreign Agricultural Service, Brussels.
McCormick, J (2008). Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction. Fourth Edition. Palgrave, Macmillan.
Selin, H. and VanDeveer, S. D. (2015). Broader, Deeper and Greener: European Union Environmental Politics, Policies and Outcomes. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2015. 40:309–35
Warleigh-Lack, A. and Drachenberg, R. (2009). Policy Making in the European Union in Cini, M. and Borragan, N.P. (eds.) European Union Politics. Oxford University Press. pp 209-224.
Weible, C.M., Heikkila, T. DeLeon, P. and Sabatier, P.A.,(2011). Understanding and Influencing the Policy Process. Policy Sc. DOI 10.1007/s11077-011-9143-5.
https://www.eltis.org/in-brief/legislation-policies.
https://europarlamentti.info/en/values-and-objectives/policies.